Hetero-Heteroaffection
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Where it appears in the corpus (2)
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#01
Self and Emotional Life: Philosophy, Psychoanalysis, and Neuroscience · Adrian Johnston & Catherine Malabou · p.18
Self > Preface
Theoretical move: Johnston argues that psychoanalysis, enriched rather than foreclosed by neuroscience, can theorize (if not always cure) neuropathological conditions, and proposes a novel neuro-psychoanalytic account of affective subjectivity built on a Hegelian-inflected tripartite distinction between affects, emotions, and feelings—culminating in the concept of "misfelt feelings" as distorted conscious registrations of unconscious affects.
Catherine calls a 'hetero-heteroaffection,' through which heteroaffection, as the subject's capacity to be affected, itself is affected by the event of trauma qua the hetero- of a certain sort of alterity or otherness.
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#02
Self and Emotional Life: Philosophy, Psychoanalysis, and Neuroscience · Adrian Johnston & Catherine Malabou · p.36
Part I. > Introduction > The Issue of Wonder
Theoretical move: The passage argues that wonder (*admiratio*) occupies a structurally ambiguous position between autoaffection and heteroaffection, and that this ambiguity makes it a privileged site for the philosophical, psychoanalytic, and neurobiological redefinition of subjectivity — with the neurobiological possibility of the total *loss* of wonder representing the one deconstruction of subjectivity that philosophy and psychoanalysis have not yet theorized.
the possibility of a hetero-heteroaffection (if we may speak thus), that is, an affection of the affects themselves that causes their ruin or their disappearance. A heteroaffected subject is still an affected subject. A hetero-heteroaffected subject is 'disaffected.'