Canonical lacan 476 occurrences

Analysand

On this page 7 sections

ELI5

In psychoanalysis, the "analysand" is the person on the couch — but the word is chosen carefully to show that they are the ones doing the real work of figuring things out, not the therapist who mostly listens and occasionally asks a pointed question.

Definition

In the Lacanian and Freudian clinical tradition as represented in this corpus, the analysand (from the gerund analysant/analysand, literally "the one doing the analyzing") designates the person who undergoes psychoanalytic treatment as an active agent of the work rather than a passive recipient of the analyst's expertise. The terminological preference for "analysand" over "patient" or "client" carries decisive theoretical weight: it assigns the lion's share of the interpretive, associative, and working-through labor to the speaking subject, while repositioning the analyst as a structural support for that labor rather than as the omniscient decoder of a fixed unconscious. This reversal of clinical agency is inseparable from the Lacanian thesis that unconscious knowledge belongs to the analysand, not to the analyst, and that what the analyst can legitimately claim to know is only what the analysand's own discourse delivers.

The analysand's position is structurally defined by several interlocking features: (1) the fundamental rule of free association, which obligates them to say whatever comes to mind without censorship, thereby suspending the ego's rationalizing mastery and opening the unconscious to speech; (2) a constitutive not-knowing about the causes of their own suffering, dreams, slips, and symptoms — it is this unknowing that makes them an analysand at all; (3) a relation to the Other's desire embodied by the analyst (formalized as the "subject supposed to know"), which generates transference and serves as the motor force of the work; and (4) the task of subjectivizing the cause of their own existence — that is, gradually assuming as their own what was formerly experienced as a foreign compulsion or symptom. The end of analysis, from this vantage, involves the analysand's traversal of the fundamental fantasy, subjective destitution of the analyst from the position of subject supposed to know, and — in certain cases — the passage from the analysand position to that of analyst.

Evolution

The terminological shift from "patient" (patient / analysé) to "analysand" (analysant / psychanalysant) is documented in Lacan's work from 1967 onward, where he introduced the gerund form explicitly to counter the passive connotation of the analysed person and to insist that the one on the couch is the agent of the process (Evans's dictionary; Lacan's Seminars XIV–XV). Before 1967, Lacan used "patient" or "subject" more or less interchangeably, with "subject" beginning to carry theoretical weight from the mid-1950s (Evans, subject entry; Lacan Seminar I). In his early return-to-Freud period (Seminars I–III), the analysand appears primarily as the locus of the Other's discourse — the one whose ego-talk conceals the unconscious chain that speaks through slips, symptoms, and dreams, and whose task is to relinquish the ego's false mastery for the symbolic work of recollection and full speech.

By the early 1960s (Seminars VIII–XI), the analysand's position is theorized through the structural pair alienation/separation: the analysand alienates himself within the signifying chain of the Other while simultaneously seeking to separate from it in order to find a desire of his own. Transference is now the dynamic field in which the analysand projects the subject supposed to know onto the analyst, and the analytic work consists in progressively dissolving this projection. The analysand's desire — not the analyst's agenda — is posited as the true motor of the treatment (Fink, Clinical Introduction, occurrence 26 on the Dora case).

In the object-a period (Seminars XII–XV), the analysand is conceptualized as the subject who produces the psychoanalyst through the completed analysis — the famous "pass" in which the analysand becomes a testimony to what analysis can achieve. Lacan's seminars on the psychoanalytic act (XV) make explicit that the analysand occupies the place of task (faire) while the analyst occupies the place of act (acte); the passage from analysand to analyst is the hinge of institutional transmission.

In the commentators (Fink, McGowan, Ruti, Johnston), these Lacanian structural positions are enriched with clinical illustration, ethical reflection, and comparative critique. Fink's work consistently foregrounds the analysand as the primary agent whose speech — including its resistances, negations, parapraxes, and dreams — is the irreducible clinical material, while the analyst's role is to refrain from hijacking this material with premature interpretation. Gherovici extends the concept to trans-identifying analysands, arguing that the Lacanian framework's refusal to pathologize the symptom and its positioning of the analysand as expert of their own unconscious knowledge opens ethical space for non-normative gender presentations.

Key formulations

A Clinical Introduction to Freud: Techniques for Everyday PracticeBruce Fink · 2017 (page unknown)

a term I prefer to patient, as analysand implies that it is the person who goes into analysis who does the lion's share of the analyzing

This is Fink's programmatic definition of the term, linking the grammatical gerund form directly to the clinical and theoretical insistence that the analysand, not the analyst, is the primary agent of the work.

An Introductory Dictionary of Lacanian PsychoanalysisDylan Evans · 1996 (page unknown)

Lacan prefers this term because, being derived from the gerund, it indicates that the one who lies on the couch is the one who does most of the work. This contrasts with the old term (psych)analysé which, being derived from the passive participle, suggests either a less active participation in the analytic process, or that the analytic process has finished.

Evans's dictionary entry articulates the structural and grammatical logic behind Lacan's 1967 terminological innovation, anchoring the concept in the history of analytic discourse.

A Clinical Introduction to Freud: Techniques for Everyday PracticeBruce Fink · 2017 (p.158)

In psychoanalysis, it is the analysand's desire that serves as the ultimate motor force of the analysis

Fink's reading of the Dora case crystallizes the normative ethical principle: any analysis organized around the analyst's desire rather than the analysand's is structurally defective.

A Clinical Introduction to Freud: Techniques for Everyday PracticeBruce Fink · 2017 (page unknown)

it must be the analysand who does the lion's share of that, and as I have indicated elsewhere, it is more important to bring the unconscious to speech than it is to bring it to consciousness. Most important of all is not to hijack the analysis and make it one's own instead of the analysand's!

This formulation captures the ethical imperative that defines the analysand's position from the analyst's side: the analysis belongs to the analysand, and any seizure of it by the analyst constitutes a structural violation of the frame.

Against Understanding, Volume 1: Commentary and Critique in a Lacanian KeyBruce Fink · 2014 (p.165)

I hope it is clear from some of these examples the degree to which W does the analyzing himself, hence the appropriateness of the term 'analysand,' which is the gerund form meaning 'the person who does the analyzing.'

Fink's foregrounding of the term in a clinical case explicitly links the theoretical definition to practice, showing how the analysand's self-analyzing labor is the empirical ground for the terminological choice.

Cited examples

Freud's case of Ida (Dora) *(case_study)*

Cited by A Clinical Introduction to Freud: Techniques for Everyday PracticeBruce Fink · 2017 (p.158). Fink uses Freud's premature and analyst-centered interpretation in the Dora case as the paradigm case of what happens when the analyst hijacks the analysis and substitutes his own desire for the analysand's. Ida's early departure from treatment is read as the direct result of Freud's failure to cultivate the analysand's own self-sustaining desire to investigate.

Clinical case of W (boot fetish) *(case_study)*

Cited by Against Understanding, Volume 1: Commentary and Critique in a Lacanian KeyBruce Fink · 2014 (p.165). Fink describes how the analysand W did the majority of analytic work himself—associating to dreams, daydreams, sexual fantasies, and slips—such that the analyst's role was primarily to follow and occasionally redirect. The dream in which the analyst drowns signals the termination of the fetish and illustrates what the analysand's own unconscious labor can achieve.

Richard Boothby's own analysis with Barbara Frankel *(case_study)*

Cited by Blown Away: Refinding Life After My Son's SuicideRichard Boothby · 2022 (p.39). Boothby narrates from the first-person analysand position, showing how free association on the couch reveals patterns of repetition (lifelong self-exile, disidentification with ambition) that were invisible prior to the analytic work. The account dramatizes the phenomenology of the analysand's position: chronic discomfort, the obligation to speak, and the retroactive recognition of what was being avoided.

Lacan's self-positioning as analysand in the Seminar *(other)*

Cited by Seminar XIX bis · The Knowledge of the PsychoanalystJacques Lacan · 1971 (p.17). Lacan explicitly claims to occupy the position of the analysand (rather than analyst) vis-à-vis his seminar audience, arguing that his discourse proceeds by a constitutive 'I don't want to know anything about it' — a move that destabilizes the master/analyst distinction and positions the seminar itself within the logic of the analytic situation.

Trans analysands presenting gender trouble *(case_study)*

Cited by Transgender Psychoanalysis: A Lacanian Perspective on Sexual DifferencePatricia Gherovici · 2017 (p.39). Gherovici's clinical vignettes (Jana, Abioye, Maxwell, trans men on testosterone) ground the theoretical argument that the analysand position — defined by the fundamental rule and the analyst's non-directive stance — provides the ethical space for non-normative gender presentations to be heard without pathologization.

Tensions

Within the corpus

Whether the analysand's active agency in the work is compatible with the analyst's active interventional style (construction, suggestion, deliberate erroneous hypotheses).

  • Fink (Clinical Introduction): The analyst should actively 'hazard an incorrect hypothesis or construction' to prompt the analysand to correct them, and sometimes must push the analysand toward material they are loath to voice. The analysand's agency is cultivated through strategic analyst interventions. — cite: a-clinical-introduction-to-freud-bruce-fink, page 138

  • Fink (Against Understanding, Vol. 1): The analyst should use only words the analysand has introduced, avoid leading questions, and refrain from answering all questions — because 'analysands usually do far more of the interpretative work themselves when analysts refrain from answering all questions and interpreting every bit of the material.' Analyst intervention, even well-intentioned, risks colonising the analysand's language. — cite: against-understanding-volume-1-bruce-fink, page 34

    Both positions are Fink's own but represent a productive tension between tactical analyst activity (construction/hypothesis) and structural analyst restraint (not putting words in the analysand's mouth) that maps onto Lacanian debates about active versus minimal technique.

Whether the analysand's position is defined by voluntary choice (constitutive voluntarism) or by structural constraint that cannot be reduced to individual decision.

  • Žižek/Ruda (Reading Marx): The analysand is 'constitutively a volunteer' — entry into analysis is an act of free commitment, and this voluntarism is the structural analogue for political emancipation; the paradox of being 'forced to be free' is central to the analytic situation. — cite: slavoj-zizek-frank-ruda-agon-hamza-reading-marx-polity-pres-2018, page 143

  • Lacan (Seminar XV): The psychoanalysand 'chooses' to make themselves more alienated than anyone else by abdicating to the drift of language — but this is 'a choice that is masked, eluded, because made earlier.' The choice is not free but is the effect of a prior, unconscious determination; the analysand commits to an abdication that is structurally compelled. — cite: jacques-lacan-seminar-15-1, page 102

    This tension maps onto the broader Lacanian problem of whether the subject's relation to the symbolic is chosen or imposed — a fault line between voluntarist and determinist readings of the analytic entry.

Across frameworks

vs Ego Psychology

Lacanian: In the Lacanian model, the analysand is the active agent whose unconscious knowledge drives the cure; the analyst refrains from strengthening the analysand's ego, from serving as an ego-ideal for identification, and from prescribing 'health' as an adaptive goal. The analysand's desire — however neurotic — is the motor, and the analyst's desire is for the analytic work to continue, not for any particular outcome.

Ego Psychology: Ego psychology positions the analysand as a patient whose weak or conflicted ego needs to be strengthened through identification with the analyst's 'strong' and 'conflict-free' ego. The analysand's task is to develop insight, accept interpretations, and progressively align their functioning with reality as assessed by the analyst. The therapeutic alliance is central, and the measure of success is the analysand's adaptive functioning in social and professional life.

Fault line: The deep disagreement concerns where analytic authority resides: Lacanian theory places it in the analysand's unconscious (the analysand is the 'subject supposed to know' only in disguise), while ego psychology places it in the analyst's professional judgment about normative health. This produces opposed answers to the question: who is the agent of the cure?

vs Cbt

Lacanian: Lacanian psychoanalysis insists that the analysand's own idiosyncratic logic — however irrational it appears — must be followed rather than replaced. Interpretation aims not at correcting faulty cognitions but at reducing signifiers to their non-meaning and locating the determinants of the subject's behavior. There is no pre-given 'correct' way of seeing the world that the analysand needs to be taught.

Cbt: CBT treats the patient as someone whose symptoms arise from faulty cognitions and maladaptive behavioral patterns that can be identified, challenged, and corrected using structured protocols. The therapist actively teaches the patient to think differently, assigning homework, challenging distortions, and providing alternative cognitive frameworks. The patient's 'incorrect' logic is the target of intervention.

Fault line: CBT presupposes a shared, objective standard of rational cognition to which the patient should be brought; Lacanian analysis presupposes that such a standard does not exist and that the patient's 'faulty' logic is precisely their singular unconscious logic, which must be traced rather than corrected.

vs Humanistic Self Actualization

Lacanian: Lacanian analysis explicitly rejects the idea that the analysand has a 'true self' waiting to be liberated or actualized. The subject is constitutively split ($), and the 'authentic' ego presented in therapy is itself a construct — a 'false being' built from imaginary identifications. The goal is not self-actualization but traversal of fantasy and assumption of one's division.

Humanistic Self Actualization: Humanistic and person-centred approaches understand the client as possessing an inherent drive toward growth and self-actualization that is blocked by conditional regard and introjected evaluations from others. The therapist's role is to provide unconditional positive regard, empathy, and congruence, creating conditions under which the client's natural developmental potential can unfold. The 'real self' is something to be recovered and expressed.

Fault line: The deep fault line is between a theory of constitutive lack (Lacan: the subject is split by language and has no pre-symbolic authentic core) and a theory of constitutive plenitude (Rogers: the organism has a natural actualizing tendency that pathology disrupts but does not destroy).

All occurrences

Where it appears in the corpus (419)

  1. #01

    Against Understanding, Volume 1: Commentary and Critique in a Lacanian Key · Bruce Fink

    <span id="page-10-0"></span>[PREFACE](#page-7-0)

    Theoretical move: The passage argues that psychoanalytic practice requires navigating between premature understanding and total incomprehension, and that this same dialectic applies to analysands who must accept partial, provisional formulations rather than seeking definitive answers—a position grounded in the overdetermined, fractal nature of human experience.

    But much the same challenge faces analysands, the people who are undergoing psychoanalysis with us. Like us, they are ineluctably inclined to jump to conclusions
  2. #02

    Against Understanding, Volume 1: Commentary and Critique in a Lacanian Key · Bruce Fink · p.12

    **The Satisfaction Understanding Brings**

    Theoretical move: Fink argues that understanding in psychoanalysis primarily satisfies the ego rather than the unconscious, and that the unconscious is better gratified by nonsense, puns, and condensations than by logically well-formed statements — making ego-satisfying understanding a clinical danger that short-circuits treatment.

    it leads to precipitated solutions that often work for a limited time only, requiring the analysand to return to treatment
  3. #03

    Against Understanding, Volume 1: Commentary and Critique in a Lacanian Key · Bruce Fink · p.13

    **Making Do without the Satisfactions of Understanding**

    Theoretical move: Fink argues that psychoanalytic interpretation is irreducibly partial and provisional—never commanding absolute truth-value—and that this epistemic limitation is not a defect to be overcome but a structural condition of the work, one whose acceptance actively guards against the illusion of mastery.

    we never have all of the facts at our disposal. We never know every facet of the analysand's past—early childhood experiences, family configuration, family members' names, stories overheard, and events witnessed
  4. #04

    Against Understanding, Volume 1: Commentary and Critique in a Lacanian Key · Bruce Fink · p.14

    **What Is Understanding Good For?**

    Theoretical move: Fink argues that understanding per se has no curative value in psychoanalysis; felicitous analytic effects operate independently of (and often against) intellectual understanding, producing change through a different order of satisfaction.

    the analysand is often led to reply, 'Yes, I know perfectly well what is happening, but I can't help myself.'
  5. #05

    Against Understanding, Volume 1: Commentary and Critique in a Lacanian Key · Bruce Fink · p.15

    **Collection**

    Theoretical move: This passage is a non-substantive editorial preface in which Bruce Fink describes the scope, methodology, and publication history of the collected papers, with only a passing invocation of Feyerabend/Kuhn-inflected skepticism toward scientific method as a framing gesture.

    proposes more or less tentative hypotheses about analysands' speech in sessions or analysts' writings
  6. #06

    Against Understanding, Volume 1: Commentary and Critique in a Lacanian Key · Bruce Fink · p.16

    **Notes**

    Theoretical move: These notes develop a clinical-dialectical method in which the analyst must systematically suspect the opposite of what the analysand asserts, grounding this reversal practice in Lacan's account of truth as alternation between strict opposites rather than a movement toward synthesis.

    when the analysand asserts that something is his biggest problem, we often must entertain the idea that it is his greatest jouissance; when he claims that he feels guilty for something, we must consider that this is precisely what he wants to do or enjoys most
  7. #07

    Against Understanding, Volume 1: Commentary and Critique in a Lacanian Key · Bruce Fink · p.23

    [Why Understanding Should Not Be Viewed as an](#page-7-0) Essential Aim of Psychoanalytic Treatment

    Theoretical move: Fink argues that the primary aim of Lacanian psychoanalysis is not understanding or ego-observation but radical transformation achieved by bringing repressed material to speech before another person, demonstrated through a clinical vignette in which a fantasy dissolves after childhood material is articulated for the first time.

    Speaking this material aloud to someone else is not the same as understanding why the fantasy came into being... Bringing things to speech with another person is what is essential.
  8. #08

    Against Understanding, Volume 1: Commentary and Critique in a Lacanian Key · Bruce Fink · p.25

    AGAINST UNDERSTANDING

    Theoretical move: Fink argues that psychoanalytic change operates through the putting-into-words of the unspeakable rather than through understanding or meaning-making; understanding and meaning serve ego rationalization and resist analytic transformation, so the analyst's task is to dismantle meaning and bring the unconscious to speech without providing mastery.

    For it is only by putting all of this into words that lasting change can be brought about.
  9. #09

    Against Understanding, Volume 1: Commentary and Critique in a Lacanian Key · Bruce Fink · p.25

    AGAINST UNDERSTANDING

    Theoretical move: Fink argues, via clinical illustration, that therapeutic change does not require conscious understanding or the analysand's ability to articulate causal connections between past and present; the subject can get better without knowing why, which places the burden of proof on cognitivist accounts of cure.

    It seems to me that the onus is on those who wish to say that he must have understood something (something about his past or some connection between his past and his present) to clarify what this understanding could possibly consist of if the analysand himself can say nothing about it.
  10. #10

    Against Understanding, Volume 1: Commentary and Critique in a Lacanian Key · Bruce Fink · p.27

    AGAINST UNDERSTANDING

    Theoretical move: Fink argues that the Imaginary register governs the analyst's tendency toward premature understanding and prefabricated meaning, and that analytic practice requires actively deferring understanding in order to remain open to the specificity of the analysand's language rather than reducing it to the analyst's own frameworks.

    we most likely do not understand what our analysands are saying or what is going on for them, and to attempt to defer understanding for as long as possible
  11. #11

    Against Understanding, Volume 1: Commentary and Critique in a Lacanian Key · Bruce Fink · p.29

    **The Symbolic Is Centered on Nonmeaning and Nonsense**

    Theoretical move: Operating in the symbolic register means attending to the letter of the analysand's discourse rather than filtering speech through imaginary, me-centered understanding; this distinction—between hearing what is actually said (including nonsense and ambiguity) versus grasping pragmatic meaning-for-us—is the clinical foundation of free-floating attention and the analyst's capacity to catch material that would otherwise slip by.

    We try as hard as we can to hear exactly what the analysand is saying (the letter of her discourse), even as we pay attention to the meaning she is trying to convey.
  12. #12

    Against Understanding, Volume 1: Commentary and Critique in a Lacanian Key · Bruce Fink · p.31

    AGAINST UNDERSTANDING

    Theoretical move: Fink argues that the analyst's primary ethical and technical task is to listen in the symbolic register—attending to what is actually said rather than projecting imaginary meaning onto the analysand's speech—and that resistance in analysis belongs fundamentally to the analyst, not the analysand, when the analyst fails to prompt free association toward what is left unsaid.

    It is the job of analysts to listen in the symbolic register, in other words, to pay careful free-floating attention so that we hear what the analysand actually says.
  13. #13

    Against Understanding, Volume 1: Commentary and Critique in a Lacanian Key · Bruce Fink · p.33

    AGAINST UNDERSTANDING

    Theoretical move: Fink argues that the clinical aim is not understanding but exhaustive articulation: affects must be spoken in all their variations, incomplete utterances (aposiopesis) must be completed, and verbal compromise formations must be heard and unpacked — all of which reveals meaning as overdetermined, multilayered, and never fully masterable.

    Analysands very often abort what they have begun to say. They begin a thought, 'Well, . . . ' and then change the subject; this is known in rhetoric as aposiopesis
  14. #14

    Against Understanding, Volume 1: Commentary and Critique in a Lacanian Key · Bruce Fink · p.34

    **Whose Understanding?**

    Theoretical move: Fink argues that the analyst's use of their own vocabulary — even seemingly neutral everyday terms — constitutes an act of understanding that short-circuits the analysand's own articulation; clinical practice therefore requires radical restraint in language, confining itself as far as possible to the analysand's own words so as not to foreclose subjective exploration.

    we should avoid putting words in our analysands' mouths. Speaking in their stead allows us to articulate our own experience, but thwarts their articulation of their own.
  15. #15

    Against Understanding, Volume 1: Commentary and Critique in a Lacanian Key · Bruce Fink · p.35

    AGAINST UNDERSTANDING

    Theoretical move: Fink argues that analytic technique must resist popular-psychological labels (like "abuse") that exonerate the analysand and foreclose the discovery of unconscious guilt displacement, submissive agency, and deeper Oedipal crime; conscious understanding through the observing ego is insufficient and may even obstruct the treatment's real work.

    The analysand eventually told me that after a session she had been recalling some of her early childhood experiences of being punished, and shuddered when she realized that there was a moment at which she knew, even as a young girl, that she could have run away
  16. #16

    Against Understanding, Volume 1: Commentary and Critique in a Lacanian Key · Bruce Fink · p.37

    AGAINST UNDERSTANDING

    Theoretical move: Fink argues that intellectual "understanding" is always partial, provisional, and imaginary, and that genuine analytic transformation operates at the level of jouissance (the Real, libidinal economy) rather than conscious comprehension — making jouissance, not meaning, the proper lodestar of analytic work.

    it merely dangles a bit of abstract knowledge before the analysand, around which her conscious sense of herself may recrystallize, but it rarely, in my experience, leads to fundamental change
  17. #17

    Against Understanding, Volume 1: Commentary and Critique in a Lacanian Key · Bruce Fink · p.37

    AGAINST UNDERSTANDING

    Theoretical move: Fink argues, following Lacan, that analytic listening must bypass imaginary understanding and operate at the symbolic level—attending to the formal, material dimensions of speech (slips, pauses, compromise formations)—in order to localize and work with the analysand's jouissance, which belongs to the real and cannot be 'understood' but only detected and perturbed through oracular interpretation.

    We do not come to understand the analysand's jouissance thereby, but merely to detect and work with it.
  18. #18

    Against Understanding, Volume 1: Commentary and Critique in a Lacanian Key · Bruce Fink · p.39

    **Beyond Understanding**

    Theoretical move: Fink demonstrates that the analyst's avoidance of imaginary projection—through open-ended rather than leading questions—allows the analysand's symptom to speak in its own signifying logic; the clinical vignette shows how tracking the analysand's own words (rather than imposing diagnostic categories) can unlock the unconscious chain underlying a somatic symptom.

    we should strive to refrain from asking leading questions—that is, from steering analysands to characterize their experiences in ways they themselves would not have characterized them
  19. #19

    Against Understanding, Volume 1: Commentary and Critique in a Lacanian Key · Bruce Fink · p.47

    LACANIAN CLINICAL PRACTICE

    Theoretical move: The passage uses ethological observations and Augustinian examples to argue that the imaginary register — characterized by rivalrous, limitless intra-species aggression — requires symbolic mediation to introduce limits, since instinct alone is insufficient for human beings.

    One of my analysands shoved his baby sister into a dresser drawer when he was a young child, hoping she would be forgotten about.
  20. #20

    Against Understanding, Volume 1: Commentary and Critique in a Lacanian Key · Bruce Fink · p.55

    *Slips of the Tongue*

    Theoretical move: The differential frequency and productivity of slips of the tongue in neurosis versus psychosis is used to argue that the unconscious (as a formation of repression) is structurally absent in psychosis, and that this clinical distinction demands differentiated analytic technique rather than a universalized psychoanalytic method.

    it leads us beyond the story being told as he or she already understands it to something else
  21. #21

    Against Understanding, Volume 1: Commentary and Critique in a Lacanian Key · Bruce Fink · p.57

    **What Kind of Other Is the Analyst?**

    Theoretical move: The passage argues that the differential response to equivocation and metaphor between neurotics and psychotics marks a structural distinction in their relation to the symbolic dimension: neurotics implicitly grant the analyst the position of Subject Supposed to Know and allow double meanings to operate, while psychotics lack this symbolic attribution and are "blind to metaphor," making interpretive work structurally impossible with them.

    An analysand of mine had a dream in which she had been assigned a new office at her job... she kept repeating the phrase, 'I'm being moved.'
  22. #22

    Against Understanding, Volume 1: Commentary and Critique in a Lacanian Key · Bruce Fink · p.58

    **Language Is Ambiguous**

    Theoretical move: The differential relation between signifier and signified in neurosis versus psychosis is clinically operative: neurotics can hear homophonic slippage as meaningful (erect/"a wreck"), while psychotics take words as things, blocking the polysemy that makes such interventions possible. The crucial diagnostic distinction is not "concreteness" but the capacity to sustain multiple meanings within a single signifier.

    One of my analysands said that the thought came to him that if a woman he was interested in found someone else before he finally made his move, he would be 'a wreck.'
  23. #23

    Against Understanding, Volume 1: Commentary and Critique in a Lacanian Key · Bruce Fink · p.61

    **Meaning Is Determined in the Place of the Other**

    Theoretical move: Meaning is not self-constituted by the speaker but is determined in the place of the Other who listens; this structural dependency on the Other is what the neurotic eventually concedes in treatment, while the psychotic's foreclosure of this dependency is what marks the clinical distinction.

    Analysts have probably all had the experience of saying something during a session only to hear it reported back by the analysand in a very different form in a later session
  24. #24

    Against Understanding, Volume 1: Commentary and Critique in a Lacanian Key · Bruce Fink · p.62

    **Recognition and Meaning in the Other**

    Theoretical move: The passage draws a structural clinical distinction between neurosis and psychosis based on the subject's orientation toward recognition by the Other: the neurotic desires to be fully understood (recognized) by the analyst, while the psychotic does not seek such recognition, treating their own speech as always already adequate.

    The neurotic, in speaking to the analyst, wants to be understood and holds out for herself the belief that she can be understood
  25. #25

    Against Understanding, Volume 1: Commentary and Critique in a Lacanian Key · Bruce Fink · p.64

    **Notes**

    Theoretical move: This notes section elaborates the theoretical architecture of the imaginary vs. symbolic distinction by clarifying edge cases: animal behaviour as purely imaginary (no symbolic duping), the superego as that which creates ego interiority in neurosis vs. remaining "outside" in psychosis, and the symbolic as language operating in a particular manner rather than speech per se.

    Lacan considers this to be one of the goals the neurotic analysand eventually sets him- or herself: le bien dire, to put it well.
  26. #26

    Against Understanding, Volume 1: Commentary and Critique in a Lacanian Key · Bruce Fink · p.65

    <span id="page-63-0"></span>[A LACANIAN RESPONSE TO](#page-7-0) FOUCAULT'S CRITIQUE OF PSYCHOANALYSIS

    Theoretical move: Fink distinguishes Lacanian psychoanalysis from American ego psychology by tracing how the latter's emphasis on adaptation and social conformity—rather than analytic goals proper—produced pathological exclusions (notably of homosexuals), thereby establishing the political and ethical stakes of the Lacanian critique of ego psychology as a baseline for addressing poststructural/feminist critiques of Lacan himself.

    They came to conceive of illness as the inability of the analysand's ego to adapt the analysand's id impulses to the analysand's reality.
  27. #27

    Against Understanding, Volume 1: Commentary and Critique in a Lacanian Key · Bruce Fink · p.67

    **Foucault's Critique of Analytic Power Dynamics**

    Theoretical move: Fink uses Foucault's critique of analytic power (analyst as "master of truth") as a foil to articulate Lacan's contrasting position: the analyst occupies a position of semblance rather than mastery, thereby redirecting the production of truth and interpretation back to the analysand, progressively dismantling the power dynamic the analysand projects onto the analyst.

    According to Foucault, the analysand is forced to avow everything, to make a complete confession, and yet the analysand is not considered by the analyst to be able to formulate his or her own truth.
  28. #28

    Against Understanding, Volume 1: Commentary and Critique in a Lacanian Key · Bruce Fink · p.67

    A RESPONSE TO FOUCAULT'S CRITIQUE

    Theoretical move: By contrasting the passive, dependent position of the cognitive-behavioral/psychiatric patient with the analysand's position in Lacanian psychoanalysis, Fink argues that non-analytic therapies reproduce a permanent expert-subject hierarchy that Lacanian practice structurally refuses.

    This is a far cry from the analysand's position in Lacanian psychoanalysis!
  29. #29

    Against Understanding, Volume 1: Commentary and Critique in a Lacanian Key · Bruce Fink · p.73

    A RESPONSE TO FOUCAULT'S CRITIQUE

    Theoretical move: Fink argues that psychoanalysis and Foucauldian discourse analysis operate with fundamentally different conceptions of the psyche—one multileveled (Möbius-strip-like) and one a flat "surface network"—and that the clinical imperative to symbolize traumatic experience cannot be reduced to a mere continuation of confessional/scientific power, because there remain determinants of speech that fall outside normative discourse and resist symbolization.

    when I, as an analysand, talk on and on about a particular subject, I may well be beating around the bush or skirting the issue, my speech avoiding precisely what it is I do not want to say
  30. #30

    Against Understanding, Volume 1: Commentary and Critique in a Lacanian Key · Bruce Fink · p.73

    A RESPONSE TO FOUCAULT'S CRITIQUE

    Theoretical move: Fink defends psychoanalytic symbolization against Foucault's critique by arguing that working-through trauma is not merely recoding it in dominant discourse, and that Foucault's implicit appeal to a pre-discursive primary experience is incoherent — tantamount to a secularized myth of the Fall or Rousseau's State of Nature.

    which although it must inevitably work from the analysand's own discourse—permeated as it is by dominant cultural discourses
  31. #31

    Against Understanding, Volume 1: Commentary and Critique in a Lacanian Key · Bruce Fink

    **Section III**

    Theoretical move: Lacan's critique of empathy, the "communication of unconsciouses," and Ferenczi's subjectivism converge on a single theoretical move: the analyst's function requires preserving the place of the Other and non-knowledge rather than identification or resemblance with the analysand.

    preserves a place for the revelation of the analysand's unconscious by leaving room for the Other in both analyst and analysand
  32. #32

    Against Understanding, Volume 1: Commentary and Critique in a Lacanian Key · Bruce Fink · p.97

    **Section IV**

    Theoretical move: Lacan's conception of speech is distinguished from referentialist or informational models of language: speech is not a meta-level ground of the signifier/signified system but an evocative act that transforms the subject without altering objective reality, making it the operative mechanism of analytic change.

    not by conveying/communicating something objective about the analysand to the analyst
  33. #33

    Against Understanding, Volume 1: Commentary and Critique in a Lacanian Key · Bruce Fink · p.98

    *True Speech versus True Discourse*

    Theoretical move: The passage distinguishes Lacan's concepts of "true speech" (mutual recognition of subjects) from "true discourse" (correspondence to the thing / knowledge of reality), arguing that each undermines the other, and that both analysand and analyst are compelled to navigate an "intermediate discourse" that holds both in tension — a tension that is clinically productive when the analyst learns to hear authentic speech within it.

    In analysis the analysand is forced to adopt this 'intermediate discourse': he wants to be recognized, to have his desire recognized, but must simultaneously take 'into account what he knows of his being as given'.
  34. #34

    Against Understanding, Volume 1: Commentary and Critique in a Lacanian Key · Bruce Fink · p.99

    **Whose Truth?**

    Theoretical move: The passage argues that the analyst's constituted knowledge (savoir) is itself a symptom—a compromise formation driven by the passion not to know—and that genuine analytic practice requires the analyst to maintain a stance of nonknowledge oriented toward the analysand's singular truth, rather than applying predigested, imaginary generalities.

    Analytic science must be called back into question in the analysis of each case
  35. #35

    Against Understanding, Volume 1: Commentary and Critique in a Lacanian Key · Bruce Fink · p.121

    **The Virtual Impossibility of Understanding**

    Theoretical move: A psychoanalytic ethics grounded in the unconscious requires a principled stance of nonmastery and deferred understanding—a "virtual impossibility of understanding"—which Fink operationalizes both clinically (attending to the analysand's jouissance and discourse without presuming comprehension) and hermeneutically (refusing to stabilize Lacan's polysemic textual meanings).

    Just as I take it for granted that I probably don't really understand what to others might seem readily comprehensible in an analysand's discourse
  36. #36

    Against Understanding, Volume 1: Commentary and Critique in a Lacanian Key · Bruce Fink · p.123

    **You Get What You Work For**[5](#page-132-0)

    Theoretical move: Fink argues that translating Lacan requires the same epistemological posture as analytic listening: the translator must occupy the position of non-knowledge (mirroring the analyst's stance) while treating the text as an analysand whose obscure speech conceals a genuine, if opaque, knowledge — thereby making the analytic concept of the Subject Supposed to Know the methodological foundation of both translation and clinical practice.

    just like the analysand's verbal and bodily discourse and actions are often trying to express something and to have a certain effect on those around the analysand
  37. #37

    Against Understanding, Volume 1: Commentary and Critique in a Lacanian Key · Bruce Fink · p.124

    **The Unconventional Logic of the Text**

    Theoretical move: Fink argues that Lacanian psychoanalytic practice and textual interpretation share a common methodological principle: both require the analyst/reader to presuppose an unconventional, highly personal logic in the material (patient's discourse or Lacan's text) rather than replacing it with a standard or external logic, illustrating this via a mistranslation in Sheridan's rendering of the Graph of Desire passage where desire's relation to fantasy is at stake.

    To assume that there is no logic there is to attempt to simply replace the patient's unconscious logic with one's own, attempting to force the analysand to model herself on oneself.
  38. #38

    Against Understanding, Volume 1: Commentary and Critique in a Lacanian Key · Bruce Fink · p.131

    **The Limits of Meaning**

    Theoretical move: Interpretation in psychoanalysis aims not at producing meaning but at reducing signifiers to their nonsensicality, as demonstrated by the Rat Man case where symptomatic formations are generated by letter-based (non-semantic) relations among signifiers—it is the signifier itself, not meaning, that subjugates the subject.

    the difficulties of Lacan's writing remind us that not everything can be made meaningful, whether in a written text or in the analysand's discourse
  39. #39

    Against Understanding, Volume 1: Commentary and Critique in a Lacanian Key · Bruce Fink · p.132

    **Conclusions**

    Theoretical move: Fink argues that the analytic stance of nonmastery—in which the analyst suspends knowledge claims and attends to the analysand's multiple signifying levels—provides the model for ethical translation practice, with the translator placed in the structural position of the lover who cannot demand reciprocation; and that translation, unlike analysis, stops short of the "impossible profession" precisely because it involves only one subject's jouissance.

    psychoanalysts do not know what their analysands 'really mean' since 1) their speech is open to multiple readings, 2) their intentions may be several, and 3) they may unwittingly say more than they consciously mean to say
  40. #40

    Against Understanding, Volume 1: Commentary and Critique in a Lacanian Key · Bruce Fink

    **Theoretical and Research Basis**

    Theoretical move: This passage situates a clinical case within a Lacanian psychoanalytic framework, foregrounding the ethical stance of non-moralism toward perversion and the practical innovation of telephone-conducted analysis.

    the analysand lives in a city where there are no psychoanalysts and few Ph.D.-level clinicians
  41. #41

    Against Understanding, Volume 1: Commentary and Critique in a Lacanian Key · Bruce Fink · p.155

    *Presenting Complaints*

    Theoretical move: This passage introduces a clinical case study centred on a fetish (boots), using the presenting complaints and symptomatic constellation to frame the subsequent analytic investigation; it is primarily clinical scene-setting rather than theoretical argument.

    The analysand is a man in his forties with whom I have been working for about four years
  42. #42

    Against Understanding, Volume 1: Commentary and Critique in a Lacanian Key · Bruce Fink · p.155

    *Signifying Contributions*

    Theoretical move: Through detailed clinical reconstruction of a boot fetish, Fink demonstrates that the fetish object is constituted through a dense web of overdetermined signifiers that simultaneously mark and collapse sexual difference, functioning as a condensation of ambiguous sexual meaning rather than a simple substitute for a missing object.

    W seems to have noticed that the women in his family had larger behinds than the men and to have concluded that the special opening must be the butt
  43. #43

    Against Understanding, Volume 1: Commentary and Critique in a Lacanian Key · Bruce Fink · p.161

    **Course of Treatment and Assessment of Progress**

    Theoretical move: Through clinical case narration, Fink argues that analytic work effects structural change by allowing the analysand to reclaim his body from the Other's desire—not through brilliant interpretation but through the gradual elaboration of fantasy and dream-work—and frames the analyst's proper aim as furthering the analysand's Eros rather than imposing a concept of the Good.

    At that very moment, all my analysands were set free... it became progressively easier for him to masturbate
  44. #44

    Against Understanding, Volume 1: Commentary and Critique in a Lacanian Key · Bruce Fink · p.165

    *Relationship with the Mother*

    Theoretical move: Through a detailed clinical vignette, Fink demonstrates how the mother's jouissance becomes installed in the analysand's bodily experience and desire, and how analytic work—via variable-length sessions and the analysand's own self-analyzing—enables a gradual exorcism of that maternal inscription, illustrating core Lacanian principles about the analyst's non-masterful position and the analysand's active role.

    I hope it is clear from some of these examples the degree to which W does the analyzing himself, hence the appropriateness of the term "analysand," which is the gerund form meaning "the person who does the analyzing."
  45. #45

    Against Understanding, Volume 1: Commentary and Critique in a Lacanian Key · Bruce Fink · p.168

    *Analytic Stance*

    Theoretical move: Fink argues that the analyst's primary clinical tool is the expression of the Desire of the Analyst — not interpretation or resistance-accusation — and that this desire is what sustains the analysand's capacity to symbolize an inherently resistant Real; the analyst occupies the place of the unconscious for the analysand, making the unacceptable speakable through transference.

    Rather than accuse analysands of resisting me or of resisting the process as so many analysts seem to do, I try to express my desire, as often as necessary, that they continue the work.
  46. #46

    Against Understanding, Volume 1: Commentary and Critique in a Lacanian Key · Bruce Fink · p.169

    *Transference Relationship*

    Theoretical move: The passage uses the clinical case of W to demonstrate the reversibility of the object a position in transference: both analyst and analysand can occupy the place of cause of desire for the other, and when the analysand positions himself as cause of the analyst's desire, this configuration approaches perversion rather than neurosis; the passage further shows how the death drive can be routed through the transference relationship itself.

    'Who trains the analyst but the analysand,' which is, of course, quite true!
  47. #47

    Against Understanding, Volume 1: Commentary and Critique in a Lacanian Key · Bruce Fink

    **Treatment Implications of the Case**

    Theoretical move: The passage argues that masochistic trends and associated life difficulties can be substantially resolved through long-term psychoanalytic treatment, on the condition that the analyst has worked through their own countertransference around sexuality via personal analysis, leaving the analysand's sexual orientation undetermined.

    being able to leave the analysand's sexual orientation up to him or her
  48. #48

    Against Understanding, Volume 1: Commentary and Critique in a Lacanian Key · Bruce Fink · p.173

    **Recommendations to Clinicians and Students**

    Theoretical move: This passage makes no substantive theoretical move; it offers practical clinical recommendations about fee structures and access to long-term psychoanalytic work, and closes with a publication note identifying the paper's provenance.

    Many of my analysands report changes that have nothing to do with their presenting complaints: having much more energy than before, being able to genuinely listen to people for the first time
  49. #49

    Against Understanding, Volume 1: Commentary and Critique in a Lacanian Key · Bruce Fink

    <span id="page-174-0"></span>[INTER\(OED\)DICTIONS](#page-8-0)

    Theoretical move: This clinical vignette introduces a case of compulsive pornography use, deploying the concepts of addiction, acting out, and the scopic drive to frame the analysand's symptom as structured by a secret enjoyment that blocks symbolic commitment (marriage), with the post-phone-call binge functioning as a transference acting-out that signals the subject's demand for the analyst to assume the inhibiting function.

    The analysand whom I am going to talk about today—I shall call him Slater—came to me because of what he referred to as his addiction to Internet porn.
  50. #50

    Against Understanding, Volume 1: Commentary and Critique in a Lacanian Key · Bruce Fink · p.180

    **Parent/Child Relations**

    Theoretical move: The passage demonstrates a clinical move in which the analysand's own recognition of a structural parallel between two statements — one about his mother's death, one about the discovery of his porn use — opens the interpretive path toward an unconscious connection between the two objects.

    early on in the analysis, Slater said that the one thing that would really devastate him would be if his mother were to die.
  51. #51

    Against Understanding, Volume 1: Commentary and Critique in a Lacanian Key · Bruce Fink · p.183

    **Looking for Castration in All the . . .**

    Theoretical move: Fink argues that Slater's compulsive porn use represents a refusal of castration that nonetheless operates entirely within castration (within the phallic order), not beyond it—his illicit jouissance is object a (a rem(a)inder of the barred mother), not Other jouissance; and he extends this to a clinical-theoretical point that the neurotic's fantasy of possessing Other jouissance is itself a symptom of remaining within phallic jouissance.

    numerous patients, both male and female, have come to me quite explicitly asking me to tell them to stop cheating on their spouses, stop using pornography
  52. #52

    Against Understanding, Volume 1: Commentary and Critique in a Lacanian Key · Bruce Fink · p.188

    <span id="page-186-0"></span>[SEXUAL ANXIETIES](#page-8-0)

    Theoretical move: Through the clinical case of "Slater," Fink demonstrates how obsessional neurosis structures sexuality around fantasy as a mediating distance that both enables jouissance and defends against its annihilating excess, while the "real sex" with the original object remains a traumatic touchstone that subsequent relations only approximate.

    When he first came to see me about two years ago, he told me that even though they had been living together for many years
  53. #53

    Against Understanding, Volume 1: Commentary and Critique in a Lacanian Key · Bruce Fink

    **Entry into Analysis**

    Theoretical move: The passage illustrates how the analytic process works retroactively (après-coup): only after two years of treatment does the analysand begin to problematize the jouissance he initially presented as desirable, reframing anguish/anxiety as analytically significant rather than as the "ultimate in jouissance" — demonstrating that entry into analysis proper requires a shift in the subject's relationship to his own jouissance.

    Slater did not come to me for analysis having problematized the jouissance he experienced with Celine.
  54. #54

    Against Understanding, Volume 1: Commentary and Critique in a Lacanian Key · Bruce Fink · p.197

    A Lacanian Perspective

    Theoretical move: Fink argues that "insight" in psychoanalysis functions as a lure that can impede rather than advance analytic work, because it instates a meta-position of the ego as objectifying observer—a Cartesian cogito structure—while genuine analytic progress requires the continual reversal and inversion of any realized insight rather than its consolidation.

    having the impression that the individual has at last become a genuine analysand—someone who is truly engaged in the analyzing process.
  55. #55

    Against Understanding, Volume 1: Commentary and Critique in a Lacanian Key · Bruce Fink · p.207

    **The Writing Subject**

    Theoretical move: Through a detailed clinical case, Fink argues that the structural absence of the paternal function (rather than repression) produces a psychotic-adjacent subjectivity in which fraud/contradiction destabilizes the subject's entire meaning structure, and that writing may serve as an inventive supplement to the failed paternal function.

    It is always more difficult, I find, to briefly discuss an analysand on whom I have hundreds of pages of notes
  56. #56

    Against Understanding, Volume 1: Commentary and Critique in a Lacanian Key · Bruce Fink

    **A Word in Conclusion**

    Theoretical move: This concluding passage is a bibliographic/contextual note closing a clinical paper on psychosis treatment, with only a minimal theoretical gesture toward the individualised, analysand-specific construction of meaning in psychosis.

    tailored to what gets created by each analysand in the attempt to grapple with the enigmas in his or her life
  57. #57

    Against Understanding, Volume 1: Commentary and Critique in a Lacanian Key · Bruce Fink · p.223

    **Demand and Desire Are Not One and the Same**

    Theoretical move: The passage uses the clinical structure of hysteria to argue for a radical split between demand (the explicit request) and desire (the underlying want), demonstrating that responding only to the first level of demand systematically misses the second level of desire, with hysterics characteristically engineering situations where their stated demands are met while their desire remains structurally unsatisfied.

    consider the common request made by analysands to decrease the number of sessions per week or to discontinue treatment altogether.
  58. #58

    Against Understanding, Volume 1: Commentary and Critique in a Lacanian Key · Bruce Fink

    **The image that comes to me, when I think about the Lacanian analyst, is the Delphic Oracle, speaking enigmatically about fate . . .**

    Theoretical move: The analyst's speech should be oracular — deliberately ambiguous and polyvalent — so that interpretive work is displaced onto the analysand rather than delivered as a fixed, authoritative statement.

    it's up to the patient to try to think about all the different meanings that might be attributed to his speech
  59. #59

    Against Understanding, Volume 1: Commentary and Critique in a Lacanian Key · Bruce Fink · p.247

    **Would you agree that the larger appeal of Lacan, at least in philosophy, lies in his attempt to provide a general theory of the subject, rather than restrict his insights to clinical pathology alone?**

    Theoretical move: Fink argues that Lacan's general theory of subjectivity rests on a disjunction (not conjunction) between thinking and being, and that in clinical-analytical practice it is the Symbolic—not the Imaginary—that introduces flux, since symbolizing a fantasy loosens its hold on the subject, whereas the Imaginary is characterised by fixity and capture.

    Once fantasies are symbolized—that is, articulated in speech to another person—they begin to lose their hold on the analysand
  60. #60

    Against Understanding, Volume 1: Commentary and Critique in a Lacanian Key · Bruce Fink · p.252

    A SUMMARY COMPARISON [OF PSYCHOANALYTIC PARADIGMS](#page-8-0)

    Theoretical move: Fink contrasts three paradigms for the role of the analyst — Freudian observer, contemporary co-participant, and Lacanian — arguing that the Lacanian approach distinguishes itself by positioning the analyst as objet petit a (cause of desire) operating at the level of the Real, rather than as an imaginary ego or relational participant, while channelling a desire for the analytic work itself over any particular outcome.

    the analysand does the majority of the analyzing; the analyst provides occasional polyvalent interpretations.
  61. #61

    Against Understanding, Volume 1: Commentary and Critique in a Lacanian Key · Bruce Fink · p.260

    **Two-person psychology.** > **Four-person (or more).** > CRITIQUE

    Theoretical move: Fink's comparative table critiques contemporary relational/intersubjective psychologies by contrasting them with both a caricature of Freud and a proposed Lacanian approach, arguing that the Lacanian framework—grounded in Saussurean linguistics, the topology of the Klein bottle/cross-cap, and the structure of the unconscious as the Other's discourse—supersedes ego-psychology and object-relations models that reduce treatment to behavioral reconditioning or perspectivist reality-testing.

    analyst enlists analysand's ego in 'stepping back' and observing patterns developing in the therapy situation
  62. #62

    Against Understanding, Volume 1: Commentary and Critique in a Lacanian Key · Bruce Fink · p.239

    **What would she do otherwise?**

    Theoretical move: When psychoanalytic or Lacanian language becomes culturally assimilated, it ceases to function analytically and instead becomes a form of resistance — a barrier to the individual subject's self-discovery — so that theoretical literacy in the analysand can paradoxically obstruct rather than advance the work of analysis.

    most of the people who come to me for analysis who have been reading about Lacan don't really understand these concepts. They mouth them, but they tend to serve little or no helpful purpose in the analysis.
  63. #63

    Against Understanding, Volume 2: Cases and Commentary in a Lacanian Key · Bruce Fink · p.12

    AGAINST UNDERSTANDING, VOLUME 2 > **What Is a Case Study?**

    Theoretical move: Fink argues that case studies are structurally motivated by the clinician's drive to demonstrate mastery—of theory, technique, and diagnosis—and that genuine clinical honesty is only possible outside institutional power relations, a critique that operates as a meta-theoretical reflection on the epistemological conditions of psychoanalytic knowledge production.

    to use a patient's complex and circuitous pathway through an analysis to 'demonstrate' the value of some particular technique or concept
  64. #64

    Against Understanding, Volume 2: Cases and Commentary in a Lacanian Key · Bruce Fink · p.28

    <span id="page-23-0"></span>ANALYSAND AND ANALYST IN THE [GLOBAL ECONOMY, OR WHY ANYONE](#page-7-0) IN THEIR RIGHT MIND WOULD PAY FOR AN ANALYSIS > **Letting Go of the Loss**

    Theoretical move: The goal of psychoanalysis is reframed as "losing a loss" — relinquishing the jouissance-laden fixation on an irrecoverable lost object — which means accepting a form of symbolic castration: giving up the symptom as a secret source of satisfaction derived from misery.

    few psychoanalysts tell prospective analysands that they are going to have to give up what is currently the source of their greatest jouissance in life
  65. #65

    Against Understanding, Volume 2: Cases and Commentary in a Lacanian Key · Bruce Fink · p.29

    <span id="page-23-0"></span>ANALYSAND AND ANALYST IN THE [GLOBAL ECONOMY, OR WHY ANYONE](#page-7-0) IN THEIR RIGHT MIND WOULD PAY FOR AN ANALYSIS > **Three Clinical Vignettes** > *Making the Other Pay*

    Theoretical move: Through the clinical vignette of Jeffrey, Fink demonstrates how desire is constituted by and against the Other's desire/prohibition: Jeffrey's drive collapses once paternal opposition is removed, revealing that his desire was entirely structured by the need to antagonize and provoke the father-as-Other. The accompanying "depression" is reframed not as melancholy but as unacknowledged hatred—of others and of oneself.

    Jeffrey's complaint upon coming to analysis was that everyone had wronged him
  66. #66

    Against Understanding, Volume 2: Cases and Commentary in a Lacanian Key · Bruce Fink · p.30

    <span id="page-23-0"></span>ANALYSAND AND ANALYST IN THE [GLOBAL ECONOMY, OR WHY ANYONE](#page-7-0) IN THEIR RIGHT MIND WOULD PAY FOR AN ANALYSIS > **Three Clinical Vignettes** > COMMENTARY

    Theoretical move: The passage uses a clinical vignette to argue that neurotic jouissance is structured as a refusal to relinquish symptomatic enjoyment, even at financial cost; the goal of analysis is not the elimination of all enjoyment but the dissipation of the enjoyment tied to symptoms, a "pound of flesh" that money alone cannot substitute for.

    he would rather pay than talk, pay than give up this paralyzing pleasure, pay than give up any of his symptomatic enjoyment and move on in life.
  67. #67

    Against Understanding, Volume 2: Cases and Commentary in a Lacanian Key · Bruce Fink · p.31

    <span id="page-23-0"></span>ANALYSAND AND ANALYST IN THE [GLOBAL ECONOMY, OR WHY ANYONE](#page-7-0) IN THEIR RIGHT MIND WOULD PAY FOR AN ANALYSIS > **Three Clinical Vignettes** > *I Can't because They . . .*

    Theoretical move: Through the clinical vignette of "Sarah," Fink demonstrates how an analysand's repeated invocation of intellectual inadequacy functions as a resistance that deflects attention from her own agentive role in perpetuating her symptom, showing that the jouissance derived from the symptom is more precious to the subject than the analytic work that would dissolve it.

    One of my female analysands—whom I shall refer to with the pseudonym Sarah
  68. #68

    Against Understanding, Volume 2: Cases and Commentary in a Lacanian Key · Bruce Fink · p.30

    <span id="page-23-0"></span>ANALYSAND AND ANALYST IN THE [GLOBAL ECONOMY, OR WHY ANYONE](#page-7-0) IN THEIR RIGHT MIND WOULD PAY FOR AN ANALYSIS > **Three Clinical Vignettes** > COMMENTARY

    Theoretical move: The passage demonstrates clinically how a subject's symptom (failing as a writer, being "silenced") is libidinally maintained because its very persistence sustains a grievance against the parents—yielding a "miserable satisfaction"—so that improvement would entail surrendering the primary source of jouissance the symptom provides.

    Unlike Jeffrey, she has never depicted her early childhood as idyllic, as a paradise from which she was forcibly chased.
  69. #69

    Against Understanding, Volume 2: Cases and Commentary in a Lacanian Key · Bruce Fink · p.32

    <span id="page-23-0"></span>ANALYSAND AND ANALYST IN THE [GLOBAL ECONOMY, OR WHY ANYONE](#page-7-0) IN THEIR RIGHT MIND WOULD PAY FOR AN ANALYSIS > **Three Clinical Vignettes** > *Tucking Some Away*

    Theoretical move: Through the clinical vignette of "George," Fink demonstrates how the obsessional's characteristic posture—self-blame and conspicuous hard work in analysis—functions as a resistance to the non-goal-directed associative work psychoanalysis requires, while the inherited money operates simultaneously as the enabling condition for treatment and as a symptomatic object that condenses the analysand's entire conflicted relation to his family and his intellectual project.

    He is, it seems, more than happy to pay for his analysis with this relative's money, and unlike the two previously mentioned analysands, works very hard at his analysis
  70. #70

    Against Understanding, Volume 2: Cases and Commentary in a Lacanian Key · Bruce Fink · p.33

    <span id="page-23-0"></span>ANALYSAND AND ANALYST IN THE [GLOBAL ECONOMY, OR WHY ANYONE](#page-7-0) IN THEIR RIGHT MIND WOULD PAY FOR AN ANALYSIS > **Three Clinical Vignettes** > *The Refusal to Work*

    Theoretical move: The analysand's financial situation is not merely external but enters the libidinal economy of the analysis itself; the clinical vignettes demonstrate that conditions around payment and work can either precipitate or abort the analytic process, and that refusal to work is often a symptomatic insistence that the Other continue to pay for a perceived deprivation.

    the analysand's financial situation always has an impact on the analysis—on its dynamics and course—and enters into the analysand's libidinal economy
  71. #71

    Against Understanding, Volume 2: Cases and Commentary in a Lacanian Key · Bruce Fink · p.35

    <span id="page-23-0"></span>ANALYSAND AND ANALYST IN THE [GLOBAL ECONOMY, OR WHY ANYONE](#page-7-0) IN THEIR RIGHT MIND WOULD PAY FOR AN ANALYSIS > **The Analyst as Capitalist?**

    Theoretical move: Fink argues that the peculiar political economy of psychoanalysis—where the analysand pays to work rather than to receive a service—is what distinguishes it from all other therapies and from capitalist exchange logic, and that the analyst's acceptance of transference projections (occupying the place of the cause of desire) is precisely what is purchased, not advice or knowledge.

    Psychoanalysts require analysands to work, but instead of paying them for their work, we make them pay for the privilege of working.
  72. #72

    Against Understanding, Volume 2: Cases and Commentary in a Lacanian Key · Bruce Fink · p.37

    <span id="page-23-0"></span>ANALYSAND AND ANALYST IN THE [GLOBAL ECONOMY, OR WHY ANYONE](#page-7-0) IN THEIR RIGHT MIND WOULD PAY FOR AN ANALYSIS > **Notes**

    Theoretical move: This passage consists entirely of endnotes to a chapter on the analysand and analyst in the global economy; it contains no sustained theoretical argument, only brief clarificatory asides and cross-references.

    Even in their own cases, according to Lacan (2006a). See my discussion of this point in Chapter 5 of Volume 1 of the present collection.
  73. #73

    Against Understanding, Volume 2: Cases and Commentary in a Lacanian Key · Bruce Fink · p.39

    <span id="page-36-0"></span>[WHAT'S SO DIFFERENT ABOUT](#page-7-0) LACAN'S APPROACH TO PSYCHOANALYSIS? > **Lacan's Ode to Mediation**

    Theoretical move: Fink argues that Lacan's early work introduces language as an irreducible third term that supersedes both one-person and two-person psychological frameworks, reconceptualizing the analytic dyad as always already mediated by the big Other (language/culture), which is radically heterogeneous to the persons it encompasses.

    It is language that allows the analysand to express the lion's share of his or her experiences, feelings, and thoughts to the analyst
  74. #74

    Against Understanding, Volume 2: Cases and Commentary in a Lacanian Key · Bruce Fink · p.40

    <span id="page-36-0"></span>[WHAT'S SO DIFFERENT ABOUT](#page-7-0) LACAN'S APPROACH TO PSYCHOANALYSIS? > **Lacan's Ode to Mediation** > COMMENTARY

    Theoretical move: Fink argues that the only form of objectivity available in psychoanalysis is the semantic polyvalence or ambiguity inherent in what the analysand actually says—not any privileged access to reality—and that the big Other (the shared language outside both parties) is the condition of possibility for detecting unconscious meaning in speech acts.

    It was up to him to decide how to reconcile the two, and find a way, if he could, to enjoy the process of artistic creation without constantly thinking about whether what he does is revolutionary or not.
  75. #75

    Against Understanding, Volume 2: Cases and Commentary in a Lacanian Key · Bruce Fink · p.42

    <span id="page-36-0"></span>[WHAT'S SO DIFFERENT ABOUT](#page-7-0) LACAN'S APPROACH TO PSYCHOANALYSIS? > **Lacan's Ode to Mediation** > COMMENTARY

    Theoretical move: Fink argues that the Lacanian thesis "the unconscious is structured like a language" entails a radical intersubjectivity mediated entirely by the symbolic order, such that there is no unmediated access to another's unconscious — not through speech, body language, or affect — and all analytic communication is therefore constitutively misunderstanding requiring interpretation.

    The analysand's speech does not give us immediate access to his thoughts or feelings; his speech has to be interpreted and is virtually always at least partially misinterpreted
  76. #76

    Against Understanding, Volume 2: Cases and Commentary in a Lacanian Key · Bruce Fink · p.44

    <span id="page-36-0"></span>[WHAT'S SO DIFFERENT ABOUT](#page-7-0) LACAN'S APPROACH TO PSYCHOANALYSIS? > **Lacan's Ode to Mediation** > COMMENTARY

    Theoretical move: Fink argues that all analytic access to the analysand's experience is necessarily mediated by interpretation through the analyst's own symbolic order, and that the illusion of unmediated access (intuition, attunement, projective identification) reduces the Other to the Same; Lacan's "ode to mediation" is thus a defense of radical otherness and the precondition of interpretation itself.

    there can be no interpretation without mediation—the Other is always there as a third party, making it such that there is no direct connection between self and other, between analyst and analysand
  77. #77

    Against Understanding, Volume 2: Cases and Commentary in a Lacanian Key · Bruce Fink · p.44

    <span id="page-36-0"></span>[WHAT'S SO DIFFERENT ABOUT](#page-7-0) LACAN'S APPROACH TO PSYCHOANALYSIS? > **Desire Is (Still) the Essence of Man**

    Theoretical move: Fink argues that Lacan's "return to Freud" recovers the centrality of unconscious desire—grounded in Spinoza's dictum that desire is the essence of man—against contemporary psychoanalysis's neglect of wish-interpretation, demonstrating through clinical examples that dream wish-fulfillment systematically operates through the inversion of conscious wishes via condensation and displacement.

    One male analysand who began to work with me after 15 years of analysis with several different clinicians was shocked to hear me say that a dream he had might contain what to him was a counterintuitive wish.
  78. #78

    Against Understanding, Volume 2: Cases and Commentary in a Lacanian Key · Bruce Fink · p.47

    <span id="page-36-0"></span>[WHAT'S SO DIFFERENT ABOUT](#page-7-0) LACAN'S APPROACH TO PSYCHOANALYSIS? > **Interpretation Aims at Transforming the Analysand's Subjective Position**

    Theoretical move: Lacanian interpretation does not aim at making the unconscious conscious or providing meaning, but at shaking up the analysand's subjective position by targeting the specific forms of jouissance—correlated with the Real—that structure their fundamental stance in life, as illustrated through detailed clinical vignettes showing how propinquity of topics in a session reveals the hidden connections underpinning that position.

    interpretation (as employed with neurotics, as opposed to psychotics) aims not at providing meaning... but rather at making waves, at shaking up analysands' longstanding views of who they are and why they do what they do in the world
  79. #79

    Against Understanding, Volume 2: Cases and Commentary in a Lacanian Key · Bruce Fink · p.51

    <span id="page-36-0"></span>[WHAT'S SO DIFFERENT ABOUT](#page-7-0) LACAN'S APPROACH TO PSYCHOANALYSIS? > **Time as Technique**

    Theoretical move: Fink defends Lacan's technique of variable-length sessions (scansion) as a directed interpretive intervention that concentrates analytic work on the most significant formulations, reversals of perspective, and unconscious material, distinguishing it from a misread "virtue of nonaction" and framing the analytic process as dialectical rather than linear.

    the analysand who even after two years of analysis was quite reluctant to speak about sexual topics, came out with the words, 'Maybe I wish [my husband] was a girl.'
  80. #80

    Against Understanding, Volume 2: Cases and Commentary in a Lacanian Key · Bruce Fink · p.55

    <span id="page-36-0"></span>[WHAT'S SO DIFFERENT ABOUT](#page-7-0) LACAN'S APPROACH TO PSYCHOANALYSIS? > **Concluding Remarks**

    Theoretical move: Fink consolidates the distinctively Lacanian analyst's stance against three common analytic failures: direct intuition of the analysand's experience, settling for spontaneous associations rather than working unconscious formations fully, and lapsing into clinical passivity — all in contrast to other contemporary approaches.

    encourage the analysand to spend the majority of his sessions talking about topics of genuine psychoanalytic import, rather than letting him skirt difficult and even traumatic subjects
  81. #81

    Against Understanding, Volume 2: Cases and Commentary in a Lacanian Key · Bruce Fink · p.66

    <span id="page-36-0"></span>[WHAT'S SO DIFFERENT ABOUT](#page-7-0) LACAN'S APPROACH TO PSYCHOANALYSIS? > **Trying to Prove Something to Oneself**

    Theoretical move: The passage argues that beneath the structural phases of the beating fantasy lies a "phase zero" — a constitutive sense of maternal neglect — which the fundamental fantasy displaces and covers over, thereby sustaining desire through a denial of victimization; this covering-over is not a distortion of external reality but the very constitution of the subject's psychical reality via its interpretation of the Other's desire.

    the construction of the entire unit in the analysands I have worked with
  82. #82

    Against Understanding, Volume 2: Cases and Commentary in a Lacanian Key · Bruce Fink · p.67

    <span id="page-36-0"></span>[WHAT'S SO DIFFERENT ABOUT](#page-7-0) LACAN'S APPROACH TO PSYCHOANALYSIS? > **The Fundamental Fantasy as an Axiom**

    Theoretical move: The fundamental fantasy functions as an axiom that generates and subtends the subject's entire way of seeing the world; traversal of fantasy is theorized not as mere dissolution but as a shift in the axiomatic system itself — analogous to moving from Euclidean to non-Euclidean geometry — requiring a change in the premises through which the subject interprets the Other's desire.

    I would be tempted to suggest that by the time an analysand has brought out most of the elements of a fundamental fantasy, it has already begun to change and give way to something else.
  83. #83

    Against Understanding, Volume 2: Cases and Commentary in a Lacanian Key · Bruce Fink · p.75

    <span id="page-36-0"></span>[WHAT'S SO DIFFERENT ABOUT](#page-7-0) LACAN'S APPROACH TO PSYCHOANALYSIS? > <span id="page-71-0"></span>[THE ETHICS OF PSYCHOANALYSIS](#page-7-0)

    Theoretical move: Against psychology's co-optation by social norms (the "service of goods"), Fink argues that the ethics of psychoanalysis is oriented first and foremost toward the analysand's desire—desire which is constitutively the Other's desire, making analytic work a process of sifting one's own desire from the inherited desires of the Other.

    A good part of the work of analysis involves a sifting of what I myself want from what others around me wanted—their desire may in fact disgust me and yet contain the secret of my own fondest longings.
  84. #84

    Against Understanding, Volume 2: Cases and Commentary in a Lacanian Key · Bruce Fink · p.76

    <span id="page-36-0"></span>[WHAT'S SO DIFFERENT ABOUT](#page-7-0) LACAN'S APPROACH TO PSYCHOANALYSIS? > **Desire and Guilt**

    Theoretical move: Fink argues that Lacanian ethics inverts the common moral intuition: guilt arises not from acting on desire but from giving up on it, and this principle—grounded in Seminar VII and extended through Freud's Civilization and Its Discontents—ultimately shifts from desire to drive-satisfaction as the ethical locus, marking Lacan's theoretical evolution in the early-to-mid 1960s.

    One of my analysands had for several years viewed a certain man in his graduate program as a 'pompous ass' and a 'jerk,' and fantasized about saying it to his face.
  85. #85

    Against Understanding, Volume 2: Cases and Commentary in a Lacanian Key · Bruce Fink · p.78

    <span id="page-36-0"></span>[WHAT'S SO DIFFERENT ABOUT](#page-7-0) LACAN'S APPROACH TO PSYCHOANALYSIS? > **Reality and "The Good"**

    Theoretical move: The passage argues that the analyst's proper ethical orientation is not toward the analysand's "good" (which the analyst cannot know better than anyone else) but toward the analysand's greater Eros, and that the distinction between the pleasure principle and the reality principle, correctly read via Lacan and Freud, concerns psychical reality—specifically the reality of unconscious desire—rather than any unmediated contact with external reality; this grounds an ethics of psychoanalysis in grappling with desire, not in normative reality-adjustment.

    analysands are prone to give ground when it comes to their Eros—that is, the analyst aims at getting them to stop doing so.
  86. #86

    Against Understanding, Volume 2: Cases and Commentary in a Lacanian Key · Bruce Fink · p.85

    <span id="page-36-0"></span>[WHAT'S SO DIFFERENT ABOUT](#page-7-0) LACAN'S APPROACH TO PSYCHOANALYSIS? > <span id="page-83-0"></span>[A Few Refl ections on Diagnosis](#page-7-0)

    Theoretical move: The clinical distinction between neurosis and psychosis is not merely diagnostic but is ethically and technically decisive: applying neurotic interpretive technique (splitting, ambiguity, interpretation) to a psychotic subject risks triggering psychotic breaks, meaning that differential diagnosis is a precondition for doing no harm in directing the treatment.

    Czermak (1977) recounted a case in which a psychoanalytic interpretation triggered psychosis in an analysand.
  87. #87

    Against Understanding, Volume 2: Cases and Commentary in a Lacanian Key · Bruce Fink · p.93

    <span id="page-36-0"></span>[WHAT'S SO DIFFERENT ABOUT](#page-7-0) LACAN'S APPROACH TO PSYCHOANALYSIS? > **The Title of the Seminar** > COMMENTARY

    Theoretical move: Fink argues that Lacan's seminar title "A discourse that would not be of semblance" operates as an overdetermined hypothesis rather than a testable proposition: semblance and truth are not opposites but strictly correlated dimensions, so any discourse aspiring to bypass semblance risks the illusion of unmediated access to truth—a move Lacan's own framework forecloses.

    truth as deciphered on the basis of the analysand's inevitably lying speech
  88. #88

    Against Understanding, Volume 2: Cases and Commentary in a Lacanian Key · Bruce Fink · p.97

    <span id="page-36-0"></span>[WHAT'S SO DIFFERENT ABOUT](#page-7-0) LACAN'S APPROACH TO PSYCHOANALYSIS? > **"How Is the Seminar Structured?"**

    Theoretical move: Fink shows how Lacan structurally positions himself as analysand and his audience as analyst in the Seminar, while ironically noting they lack the knowledge required by that position in the Analyst's Discourse — generating a paradox of an analysand in search of an analyst worthy of him, with the concept of surplus-jouissance serving as the pivot for characterizing the audience.

    Lacan claims here to be in the position of analysand (p. 11), his audience being in the position of analyst (a)
  89. #89

    Against Understanding, Volume 2: Cases and Commentary in a Lacanian Key · Bruce Fink · p.110

    <span id="page-36-0"></span>[WHAT'S SO DIFFERENT ABOUT](#page-7-0) LACAN'S APPROACH TO PSYCHOANALYSIS? > **The Clinical Relevance of Freud's Myth of the Primal Horde**

    Theoretical move: Through two clinical vignettes, Fink demonstrates the contemporary clinical relevance of Freud's myth of the primal horde: both analysands unconsciously organize their desire around a paternal figure who is experienced as the primordial owner of all women, producing characteristic inhibitions, triangulating structures, and symptomatic solutions (erectile dysfunction, passive fantasy) that are intelligible only through that mythic framework.

    He feels that when he is with a woman, he has to call upon his father's potency in order to make love to her, and that she somehow remains his father's and not his.
  90. #90

    Against Understanding, Volume 2: Cases and Commentary in a Lacanian Key · Bruce Fink · p.174

    <span id="page-36-0"></span>[WHAT'S SO DIFFERENT ABOUT](#page-7-0) LACAN'S APPROACH TO PSYCHOANALYSIS? > <span id="page-169-0"></span>[Talk given upon receipt of a prize for translating](#page-8-0) *Écrits* > COMMENTARY

    Theoretical move: Fink argues that mistranslation of Lacan's key theoretical distinction—that the analyst strives to get the analysand to divine their own unconscious knowledge, rather than exposing it to them—obliterated a foundational clinical difference between Lacanian technique and ego-psychological mastery, thereby distorting Lacan's reception in the English-speaking world.

    the analyst tries to expose the patient's unconscious whereas what Lacan had said was that 'the analyst strives to get the analysand to guess (lui faire deviner)' what is in his unconscious.
  91. #91

    Against Understanding, Volume 2: Cases and Commentary in a Lacanian Key · Bruce Fink · p.183

    <span id="page-36-0"></span>[WHAT'S SO DIFFERENT ABOUT](#page-7-0) LACAN'S APPROACH TO PSYCHOANALYSIS? > **Jouissance Crisis?**

    Theoretical move: The passage uses a clinical case (Wesley) to illustrate how a jouissance crisis precipitating entry into analysis is structured by unconscious repetition: the analysand is compelled toward a fate that mirrors his father's, reactivating conflicts around the Oedipus complex, incest, and the choice of a love object — a structure compared to Freud's Rat Man case.

    One of the first questions that may well come to the practitioner's mind is why Wesley entered analysis almost 30 years after the murder and not before.
  92. #92

    Against Understanding, Volume 2: Cases and Commentary in a Lacanian Key · Bruce Fink · p.184

    <span id="page-36-0"></span>[WHAT'S SO DIFFERENT ABOUT](#page-7-0) LACAN'S APPROACH TO PSYCHOANALYSIS? > **Relations with Women**

    Theoretical move: Through the clinical case of Wesley, Fink demonstrates how the absence of a gap/lack in the (m)Other produces a subject unable to locate female sexuality, desire, or separation, and how the mother's persistent desire for something beyond the child (rather than paternal intervention) is what partially enables separation and forestalls psychosis.

    having discussed the 'call of destiny'—leading to a kind of libidinal (or jouissance) crisis—that may have led Wesley into analysis
  93. #93

    Against Understanding, Volume 2: Cases and Commentary in a Lacanian Key · Bruce Fink · p.195

    <span id="page-36-0"></span>[WHAT'S SO DIFFERENT ABOUT](#page-7-0) LACAN'S APPROACH TO PSYCHOANALYSIS? > **Words, Words, Words**

    Theoretical move: Through the detailed clinical case of Wesley, Fink demonstrates how the inability to name "the lack in the Other"—particularly the lack constitutive of sexual difference—structures both an obsessional neurosis and a broader symptomatic relation to language, writing, and women, showing how analytic work on sexual significations can open a gap in the Other that enables desire and speech.

    He commented at that point, 'You're enabling my dick.' This perhaps illustrates what Lacan means when he suggests that the analyst should try to further the analysand's Eros.
  94. #94

    Against Understanding, Volume 2: Cases and Commentary in a Lacanian Key · Bruce Fink · p.197

    <span id="page-36-0"></span>[WHAT'S SO DIFFERENT ABOUT](#page-7-0) LACAN'S APPROACH TO PSYCHOANALYSIS? > **Features of Obsession**

    Theoretical move: Through a detailed clinical vignette (Wesley), Fink illustrates the structural features of obsession: the subjective strategy of "playing dead" to preserve desire from actualization, the need for an inaccessible object to sustain impossible desire, the annulling of the Other, the ripping away of object a, and the pervasive feeling of being "always already late" — all read through Lacanian coordinates.

    Wesley indicated that he feels that he is always late, we might even say 'always already' late, because he slept through his mother's lethal act
  95. #95

    Against Understanding, Volume 2: Cases and Commentary in a Lacanian Key · Bruce Fink · p.198

    <span id="page-36-0"></span>[WHAT'S SO DIFFERENT ABOUT](#page-7-0) LACAN'S APPROACH TO PSYCHOANALYSIS? > **Relation to the Analyst**

    Theoretical move: Through detailed clinical vignette, Fink demonstrates how transference operates as a field in which repressed affects and object-relations (maternal and paternal) emerge first as projections onto the analyst before becoming accessible as memories, and how the analyst's clinical decisions (e.g., timing of the couch) are guided by reading transferential material for indicators of psychic structure (paranoid anxiety, foreclosure of vision, aggression).

    Wesley felt like he had to bore or gnaw through them, like a rat would, to create a gap.
  96. #96

    Against Understanding, Volume 2: Cases and Commentary in a Lacanian Key · Bruce Fink · p.209

    <span id="page-36-0"></span>[WHAT'S SO DIFFERENT ABOUT](#page-7-0) LACAN'S APPROACH TO PSYCHOANALYSIS? > **Identifi cations**

    Theoretical move: Fink distinguishes identification (a deep structural process with lethal dimensions) from identity construction, arguing through clinical material that analysand George's life is organized by three "deadly identifications" with dead or killed family figures, and connects the resulting compulsion to recover a fantasized lost state to Kierkegaard's concept of repetition.

    George told me that he was high every day for four years after that and smoked cigarettes for most of the next decade until very recently.
  97. #97

    Against Understanding, Volume 2: Cases and Commentary in a Lacanian Key · Bruce Fink · p.215

    <span id="page-36-0"></span>[WHAT'S SO DIFFERENT ABOUT](#page-7-0) LACAN'S APPROACH TO PSYCHOANALYSIS? > **Semblance** > SEMBLANCE IN "IDENTITY" CONSTRUCTION

    Theoretical move: Semblance structures identity-formation by generating a gap between consciously endorsed ideals (ego-ideal) and actual desire/jouissance; psychoanalytic practice works by cutting through semblance and misrecognition, forcing the analysand to confront what they effectively desire and enjoy rather than what they believe they should desire.

    Analysts, in their attempt to get at what analysands desire and enjoy, cut through semblance, calling into question the norms and ideals that analysands repeat and appeal to.
  98. #98

    Against Understanding, Volume 2: Cases and Commentary in a Lacanian Key · Bruce Fink · p.217

    <span id="page-36-0"></span>[WHAT'S SO DIFFERENT ABOUT](#page-7-0) LACAN'S APPROACH TO PSYCHOANALYSIS? > <span id="page-215-0"></span>[THE FREUD MAN AND THE](#page-8-0) FUNDAMENTAL FANTASY

    Theoretical move: The passage establishes a distinction between popular-culture "fantasy" (pleasurable imaginary scenarios governed by the pleasure principle) and the psychoanalytic concept of fantasy (any mental scenario regardless of affective valence, potentially beyond the pleasure principle), using a clinical vignette to motivate the further distinction between ordinary/everyday fantasies and the Lacanian "fundamental fantasy."

    he told me that he found it distressing that I would mention such radically different entities in the same breath—for, as he put it, dreams come from the Other, whereas he felt he had control over his fantasies.
  99. #99

    Against Understanding, Volume 2: Cases and Commentary in a Lacanian Key · Bruce Fink · p.218

    <span id="page-36-0"></span>[WHAT'S SO DIFFERENT ABOUT](#page-7-0) LACAN'S APPROACH TO PSYCHOANALYSIS? > **Identifying with Freud**

    Theoretical move: Through the clinical case of the "Freud Man," Fink demonstrates how fantasized identifications with a symbolic figure (Freud) organize the analysand's desire and behaviour, and how the paternal pronouncement functions as the kernel around which a counter-fantasy—"I will succeed at everything"—is constructed, leading toward an analysis of the fundamental fantasy.

    Let me now properly introduce this analysand, whom I will refer to as the 'Freud Man.'
  100. #100

    Against Understanding, Volume 2: Cases and Commentary in a Lacanian Key · Bruce Fink · p.224

    <span id="page-36-0"></span>[WHAT'S SO DIFFERENT ABOUT](#page-7-0) LACAN'S APPROACH TO PSYCHOANALYSIS? > **A Child Is Being Molested or Abused**

    Theoretical move: By mapping Freud's three-phase beating fantasy schema onto a clinical case (the "Freud Man"), Fink distinguishes between pure wish-fulfillment at the unconscious root of fantasy and the ambivalent, unbearable jouissance Lacan associates with the fundamental fantasy, thereby articulating a structural difference between Freudian and Lacanian understandings of unconscious fantasy.

    the part available to consciousness, was the idea that a child is being beaten, for that is what the analysand usually meant when he said
  101. #101

    Against Understanding, Volume 2: Cases and Commentary in a Lacanian Key · Bruce Fink · p.225

    <span id="page-36-0"></span>[WHAT'S SO DIFFERENT ABOUT](#page-7-0) LACAN'S APPROACH TO PSYCHOANALYSIS? > **A Child Is Being Molested or Abused** > THE FREUD MAN

    Theoretical move: Lacan's reframing of the fundamental fantasy as an axiomatic lens on reality—rather than a traumatic event to be recovered—is deployed here to argue that fantasy structures the analysand's world-view prior to any interpretive elaboration, and that analytic work can shift even these axiomatic structures, which tend to dissolve precisely as they become articulable.

    to assume, as I have done here, that the analysand's primary love object is the mother, not the father, yields different results than Freud's analysis, and that we should never make a priori assumptions about this, allowing ourselves to be guided instead by the analysand's discourse.
  102. #102

    Against Understanding, Volume 2: Cases and Commentary in a Lacanian Key · Bruce Fink · p.230

    <span id="page-36-0"></span>[WHAT'S SO DIFFERENT ABOUT](#page-7-0) LACAN'S APPROACH TO PSYCHOANALYSIS? > **Nothing Succeeds Like Success**

    Theoretical move: The passage demonstrates how an analysand's encounter with unbearable, indeterminate Other-desire is managed by its reduction to specific, negotiable demands, and shows how the subject's symptomatic logic—an impossible, infinite desire to succeed at everything—functions as a defense that ultimately produces paralysis, and how finite desire becomes the condition of possibility for action.

    the analysand's retort seems to have taken the form of the contrary—that is, the universal affirmative, 'I will succeed at everything.'
  103. #103

    Against Understanding, Volume 2: Cases and Commentary in a Lacanian Key · Bruce Fink · p.233

    <span id="page-36-0"></span>[WHAT'S SO DIFFERENT ABOUT](#page-7-0) LACAN'S APPROACH TO PSYCHOANALYSIS? > **Reconfi guration of the Fundamental Fantasy**

    Theoretical move: The traversal of the fundamental fantasy is not a single instantaneous event but proceeds through intermediate configurations; in the neurotic case, traversal involves a shift from the position of divided subject to that of cause of one's own desire, illustrated clinically through the staged evolution of the "Freud Man's" fantasy around the gaze.

    intermediate configurations frequently arise along the way, configurations that in many cases may even incline the analysand to leave analysis altogether
  104. #104

    Against Understanding, Volume 2: Cases and Commentary in a Lacanian Key · Bruce Fink · p.234

    <span id="page-36-0"></span>[WHAT'S SO DIFFERENT ABOUT](#page-7-0) LACAN'S APPROACH TO PSYCHOANALYSIS? > **In Conclusion**

    Theoretical move: Fink argues that the analyst's presentation of clinical material is necessarily selective yet productive, and extends this to speculate that certain hysterical fantasies may originate not from felt neglect but from felt suffocation by the Other's excessive love — inverting the standard interpretive axis of desire while still pointing toward a fundamental fantasy structure.

    we present enough of what the analysand actually said that readers can see more in the clinical material than we ourselves saw
  105. #105

    Against Understanding, Volume 2: Cases and Commentary in a Lacanian Key · Bruce Fink

    <span id="page-36-0"></span>[WHAT'S SO DIFFERENT ABOUT](#page-7-0) LACAN'S APPROACH TO PSYCHOANALYSIS? > <span id="page-236-0"></span>[CONTOURS OF TRAUMA](#page-8-0)

    Theoretical move: This passage introduces a clinical case study to explore the contextual conditions under which events acquire traumatic status, while also illustrating, via a counter-example, the clinical principle that the analyst must keep their own personality and background out of the treatment.

    Our work together lasted about seven years in all, but the frequency of sessions never exceeded two sessions per week and was often just once a week... owing to the poor state of the analysand's finances
  106. #106

    Against Understanding, Volume 2: Cases and Commentary in a Lacanian Key · Bruce Fink · p.238

    <span id="page-36-0"></span>[WHAT'S SO DIFFERENT ABOUT](#page-7-0) LACAN'S APPROACH TO PSYCHOANALYSIS? > **Backdrop**

    Theoretical move: Through a detailed clinical vignette, Fink constructs the contours of a patient's traumatic history by tracing the conflictual libidinal economy between Patrick and both parents, illustrating how the Oedipus complex and its "reverse" variant, castration anxiety, and the formation of a core sense of defectiveness operate in tandem to structure the analysand's subjective position.

    While at first the analysand often said that he felt his father rejected him for preferring his mother's company to his father's, Patrick later said he felt he himself had rejected his father's attempts to get close to him.
  107. #107

    Against Understanding, Volume 2: Cases and Commentary in a Lacanian Key · Bruce Fink · p.246

    <span id="page-36-0"></span>[WHAT'S SO DIFFERENT ABOUT](#page-7-0) LACAN'S APPROACH TO PSYCHOANALYSIS? > *Inability to Express Anger Directly*

    Theoretical move: Through a detailed clinical case, Fink argues that the analyst's proper role is not to "lay down the law" in response to an analysand's appeal for punishment and prohibition, but rather to interpret that appeal as a symptom of the subject's conflicted relation to a superego already in place — thereby reframing the transference dynamics and the evolution of fantasy as the real site of analytic work.

    Like those of many other analysands, Patrick's fantasies evolved considerably over the course of the years of analytic work, as if exploring all possible organs and orifices, and all imaginable power combinations
  108. #108

    Against Understanding, Volume 2: Cases and Commentary in a Lacanian Key · Bruce Fink · p.250

    <span id="page-36-0"></span>[WHAT'S SO DIFFERENT ABOUT](#page-7-0) LACAN'S APPROACH TO PSYCHOANALYSIS? > **Discussion and Conclusions**

    Theoretical move: The passage argues that traumatic events acquire their status retroactively, through the accumulation of meanings and after-effects inscribed onto an event after the fact, illustrating this through clinical material that shows how early experiences become fixed points around which repetition, fantasy, and symptom-formation organize themselves.

    events that are referred to by our analysands as 'traumatic' often would not be considered 'traumatic events' by anyone else
  109. #109

    Against Understanding, Volume 2: Cases and Commentary in a Lacanian Key · Bruce Fink · p.254

    <span id="page-36-0"></span>[WHAT'S SO DIFFERENT ABOUT](#page-7-0) LACAN'S APPROACH TO PSYCHOANALYSIS? > *Diagnosis*

    Theoretical move: Fink argues that clinical diagnosis must be grounded in the predominant mechanism of negation (repression, disavowal, foreclosure) and structural criteria rather than surface behaviors, using Patrick's case to distinguish neurotic repetition compulsion from structural perversion/masochism, and to show how the analyst's own position can become the site where masochistic logic plays out.

    Making the continuation of the therapy contingent upon the cessation of certain activities is a card we cannot play until it has become clear that the analysand is more attached to the therapy and the therapist than to certain of his forms of enjoyment
  110. #110

    Against Understanding, Volume 2: Cases and Commentary in a Lacanian Key · Bruce Fink · p.255

    <span id="page-36-0"></span>[WHAT'S SO DIFFERENT ABOUT](#page-7-0) LACAN'S APPROACH TO PSYCHOANALYSIS? > *Diagnosis* > *Follow-up*

    Theoretical move: Through clinical reflection on a case follow-up, Fink argues that diagnostic precision (neurosis vs. perversion/masochism) has direct clinical stakes: an earlier and more accurate reading of the analysand's fundamental fantasy and clinical structure would have enabled better-timed intervention, foregrounding the irreducible difficulty of calculating interpretive timing in analytic work.

    one never necessarily knows until after the fact whether one had at the time the necessary leverage with the analysand for such an intervention to have the desired effect.
  111. #111

    Against Understanding, Volume 2: Cases and Commentary in a Lacanian Key · Bruce Fink · p.256

    <span id="page-36-0"></span>[WHAT'S SO DIFFERENT ABOUT](#page-7-0) LACAN'S APPROACH TO PSYCHOANALYSIS? > **Notes**

    Theoretical move: This passage consists of clinical and theoretical endnotes to a case study chapter, touching on Lacanian concepts such as the sexual non-relation underlying trauma, masochism's relation to the superego and Oedipus complex, and the analyst's desire as an alternative to legalistic conditions in treatment — but is primarily footnote material with limited standalone theoretical development.

    the fact that the analysand has sought out the analyst precisely to figure out how to get off drugs or stop drinking, and does not yet know how to do so
  112. #112

    Against Understanding, Volume 2: Cases and Commentary in a Lacanian Key · Bruce Fink · p.262

    <span id="page-36-0"></span>[WHAT'S SO DIFFERENT ABOUT](#page-7-0) LACAN'S APPROACH TO PSYCHOANALYSIS? > **How did you end up becoming a psychologist and analyst? What led you to Lacan?**

    Theoretical move: Fink argues that genuine psychoanalysis must refuse empirical outcome-study demands because such compliance would implicitly endorse the Discourse of the Master in its current capitalist form, which reduces the irreducibly subjective, unconscious, and temporally unquantifiable process of psychoanalysis to measurable consumer satisfaction.

    if you give both analysands a survey to fill out exactly four years into the process, you might receive extremely skewed responses.
  113. #113

    Against Understanding, Volume 2: Cases and Commentary in a Lacanian Key · Bruce Fink

    <span id="page-36-0"></span>[WHAT'S SO DIFFERENT ABOUT](#page-7-0) LACAN'S APPROACH TO PSYCHOANALYSIS? > **Can you imagine an outcome study that could more fully capture the complexity of the psychoanalytic process?**

    Theoretical move: The passage explains the Lacanian "pass" procedure as an institutionalized feedback mechanism that triangulates between analysands' self-reports, peer transmission, and committee assessment, allowing an institute to measure the gap between its theoretical model of psychoanalytic practice and its actual clinical results.

    It involves having analysands who believe that they have completed their analyses describe in detail what has happened to them over the course of their analyses to fellow analysands who are close to the end of their own analyses.
  114. #114

    Against Understanding, Volume 2: Cases and Commentary in a Lacanian Key · Bruce Fink · p.265

    <span id="page-36-0"></span>[WHAT'S SO DIFFERENT ABOUT](#page-7-0) LACAN'S APPROACH TO PSYCHOANALYSIS? > **What do you believe is behind the growing emphasis on and demand for such outcome studies?** > LACAN IN AMERICA

    Theoretical move: Fink argues that affect is an effect rather than a cause, and that the Lacanian concept of jouissance — the patient's hidden enjoyment in their own symptoms — is the clinically decisive category that symptom-reduction approaches and affect-centred therapies systematically miss; anxiety is then theorised as the universal convertible currency of affect in which jouissance manifests.

    The very thing that seems to be the most problematic to the analysand, the most painful—that is where satisfaction (that is, jouissance) lies.
  115. #115

    Against Understanding, Volume 2: Cases and Commentary in a Lacanian Key · Bruce Fink · p.36

    <span id="page-36-0"></span>[WHAT'S SO DIFFERENT ABOUT](#page-7-0) LACAN'S APPROACH TO PSYCHOANALYSIS? > **What does "The Return to Freud" mean in the context of Lacanian discourse? What are the similarities and differences between Freud and Lacan?**

    Theoretical move: Lacan's "return to Freud" is defined primarily as a return to the unconscious as explored through language, against the contemporary drift toward privileging the analyst-analysand relationship and affect over unconscious investigation; both Freud and Lacan insist on depth work aimed at symptom and fundamental fantasy, contra surface-level therapeutic approaches.

    the relationship between analyst and analysand had begun to take precedence in many clinicians' minds over the investigation of the unconscious
  116. #116

    Against Understanding, Volume 2: Cases and Commentary in a Lacanian Key · Bruce Fink · p.270

    <span id="page-36-0"></span>[WHAT'S SO DIFFERENT ABOUT](#page-7-0) LACAN'S APPROACH TO PSYCHOANALYSIS? > **What kinds of links does Lacanian psychoanalysis have with other post-Freudian psychoanalytic approaches such as object relations and ego psychology?**

    Theoretical move: The passage argues that object relations and ego psychology operate exclusively at the imaginary level, while Lacanian psychoanalysis demands work at the symbolic and real levels, and that analytic progress requires the analyst to keep the analysand's subjective position—particularly their unconscious desire and jouissance—in focus so that subjectification can occur.

    The analyst must always keep an eye out for the analysand's subjective position, which implies, at least in part, deciphering the coordinates of the position the analysand keeps putting him- or herself into.
  117. #117

    Against Understanding, Volume 2: Cases and Commentary in a Lacanian Key · Bruce Fink · p.273

    <span id="page-36-0"></span>[WHAT'S SO DIFFERENT ABOUT](#page-7-0) LACAN'S APPROACH TO PSYCHOANALYSIS? > <span id="page-271-0"></span>[VIOLENCE IN PSYCHOANALYSIS](#page-8-0)

    Theoretical move: Violence is endemic to analytic work at multiple levels: it inheres in the Other's desire and jouissance as they are mobilized in transference, in analytic techniques such as scansion and interpretation, and in the post-Freudian betrayal of Freud's praxis through the reversion from transference-work to suggestion.

    the analysand may solicit it, try to provoke the analyst to it
  118. #118

    Against Understanding, Volume 2: Cases and Commentary in a Lacanian Key · Bruce Fink

    <span id="page-36-0"></span>[WHAT'S SO DIFFERENT ABOUT](#page-7-0) LACAN'S APPROACH TO PSYCHOANALYSIS? > [INDEX](#page-8-0)

    Theoretical move: This is a book index (pages from an index section of Bruce Fink's "Against Understanding, Volume 2"), listing concepts and page references with no substantive theoretical argument.

    aiming to transform analysand's subjective position 27–31, 251; focus on analysand's 27–31, 163–4, 251
  119. #119

    The Interpretation of Dreams · Sigmund Freud

    **BURNING FREUD: THE INTERPRETATION OF DREAMS AS A CLASSIC OF SCIENCE AND LITERATURE**

    Theoretical move: The passage defends psychoanalysis against epistemological, ideological, and empirical critiques by redefining its object as "symptomatic communication" and its field as interpretive practice (free association), while arguing that *The Interpretation of Dreams* itself exemplifies the split subject—being a radically composite, multi-voiced text that enacts the very disjunctive structure of the dream it theorizes.

    This object and field are primarily constituted in practice by the discourse between analyst and analysand in the therapeutic relationship.
  120. #120

    Bodies to Wear: Four Lacanian Takes on Trans · Patricia Gherovici · p.17

    BODIES TO WEAR FOUR LACANIAN TAKES ON TRANS > BODIES ON THE COUCH

    Theoretical move: The passage uses the clinical encounter with hysterical and somatic symptoms in a Philadelphia barrio clinic as a launching point to triangulate Butler's theory of gender performativity with Lacan's assertion that "Woman does not exist," arguing that both converge on anti-essentialist grounds while diverging on the question of corporeal reality—a tension made acute by transgender clinical experience.

    the crack of gunfire tearing the analysands' speech like an unwelcome punctuation
  121. #121

    Bodies to Wear: Four Lacanian Takes on Trans · Patricia Gherovici · p.33

    BODIES TO WEAR FOUR LACANIAN TAKES ON TRANS > BODY DRESSING

    Theoretical move: Gherovici argues that trans embodiment is not a question of "having" an identity but a strategy of "being," grounded in the death drive as a life-enabling force; she proposes an "ethics of embodied desire" that reframes transition as a creative act of re-birth rather than a pathological or identity-based phenomenon.

    If trans analysands experience 'gender trouble,' as Butler puts it, and resolve the 'trouble' finding themselves in a trans identity, I propose a movement from death to life.
  122. #122

    Bodies to Wear: Four Lacanian Takes on Trans · Patricia Gherovici · p.38

    BODIES TO WEAR FOUR LACANIAN TAKES ON TRANS > FOUR LACANIAN TAKES TO RETHINK THE TRANS EXPERIENCE

    Theoretical move: Gherovici proposes four new clinical concepts—realness, beauty, laughter, and the swerve/clinamen—as expansions of Lacan's four fundamental concepts, arguing that trans experience stages not a crossing of gender boundaries but a confrontation with death that opens onto life, and that this framework reconceptualises the Real as bodily plasticity intertwined with the death drive.

    my experience as a psychoanalyst working with trans-identified analysands has taught me that the real boundary in question is not one of gender but rather an engagement with another frontier—the confrontation with death itself
  123. #123

    Bodies to Wear: Four Lacanian Takes on Trans · Patricia Gherovici · p.109

    BODIES TO WEAR FOUR LACANIAN TAKES ON TRANS > FOUR LACANIAN TAKES TO RETHINK THE TRANS EXPERIENCE > REAL ENCOUNTERS

    Theoretical move: The passage argues that Lacan's appropriation of the Lucretian *clinamen* (atomic swerve) reframes trauma, repetition, and the analytic session as sites of turbulence that introduce chance into unconscious determinism, and that this trajectory culminates in the shift from symptom-as-metaphor to sinthome-as-knot, where jouissance rather than decoding becomes the operative clinical concept.

    This method primarily impacts the analysand's jouissance by inserting an inclination into the void, a swerve, a clinamen.
  124. #124

    Bodies to Wear: Four Lacanian Takes on Trans · Patricia Gherovici · p.128

    BODIES TO WEAR FOUR LACANIAN TAKES ON TRANS > Forthcoming by Everyday Analysis

    Theoretical move: This is a publisher's blurb/back-matter passage describing the contents of Gherovici's pamphlet and the Everyday Analysis series; it is non-substantive promotional text with minimal theoretical development.

    Patricia Gherovici argues for a return to her work with trans-identified analysands in the present moment.
  125. #125

    Reading Lacan's Écrits: From 'The Freudian Thing' to 'Remarks on Daniel Lagache' · Derek Hook, Calum Neill & Stijn Vanheule (eds.)

    <span id="ch10.xhtml_page_1"></span>[Introduction to ‘Reading the <span class="italic">Écrits</span>’: <span class="italic">La trahison de l’écriture</span>](#ch05.xhtml_tocbook-part-002)

    Theoretical move: The Écrits is theorized not as a conventional book but as a labyrinthine, desire-engendering psychoanalytic tool whose deliberate obscurity, resistance to writing, and symptomatic relation to the seminars position it as a transference-inducing object rather than a vehicle of rational comprehension.

    the perplexity and the suspension of knowledge that the analysand experiences in respect of the analyst and the analytic process itself
  126. #126

    Reading Lacan's Écrits: From 'The Freudian Thing' to 'Remarks on Daniel Lagache' · Derek Hook, Calum Neill & Stijn Vanheule (eds.) · p.9

    [The Freudian Thing, or the Meaning of the Return to Freud in Psychoanalysis](#ch05.xhtml_tocbook-part-003) > Situation in time and place of this exercise

    Theoretical move: Lacan's "return to Freud" is theorized as a repetition-with-difference (après-coup) that counters the ego-psychological Americanization of psychoanalysis, which is diagnosed as a symptomatic repression of the unconscious behind an adaptive, autonomous ego and a medicalized analyst-as-knower structure that inverts the true knowledge-relation of the clinic.

    the analyst–analysand rapport is one in which knowledge resides on the side of the analysand and ignorance on the side of the analyst.
  127. #127

    Reading Lacan's Écrits: From 'The Freudian Thing' to 'Remarks on Daniel Lagache' · Derek Hook, Calum Neill & Stijn Vanheule (eds.) · p.13

    [The Freudian Thing, or the Meaning of the Return to Freud in Psychoanalysis](#ch05.xhtml_tocbook-part-003) > The adversary

    Theoretical move: Lacan's critique of ego psychology and object-relations theory in "The Freudian Thing" turns on the distinction between ego and subject (with proper subjectivity as unconscious), the insistence that truth/unconscious always returns despite repression or theoretical falsification, and the defense of a symbolically-mediated body against pseudo-Freudian reductivism to pre-Oedipal objects.

    Actual analysands on analysts' couches are speaking subjects who have become what they are through an ontogenetic life history always-already mediated by the socio-historical matrices of big Others as symbolic orders.
  128. #128

    Reading Lacan's Écrits: From 'The Freudian Thing' to 'Remarks on Daniel Lagache' · Derek Hook, Calum Neill & Stijn Vanheule (eds.)

    [The Freudian Thing, or the Meaning of the Return to Freud in Psychoanalysis](#ch05.xhtml_tocbook-part-003) > The thing speaks of itself

    Theoretical move: The passage argues that the Freudian unconscious, personified as a speaking Thing (la Chose freudienne), is not a hidden depth but a surface-inscribed, linguistically constituted truth that invariably manifests itself — and that the analyst's proper technique is to attend literally to the signifying text of the analysand's speech, treating all analytic material as language-immanent variables.

    the analyst's evenly hovering attunement to the devilish details of the literal text of the analysand's symbolico-linguistic productions is the surest manner by which to maintain close contact with the speaking unconscious
  129. #129

    Reading Lacan's Écrits: From 'The Freudian Thing' to 'Remarks on Daniel Lagache' · Derek Hook, Calum Neill & Stijn Vanheule (eds.) · p.19

    [The Freudian Thing, or the Meaning of the Return to Freud in Psychoanalysis](#ch05.xhtml_tocbook-part-003) > Parade

    Theoretical move: The passage argues that Lacan's "Parade" section of "The Freudian Thing" performs a critique of ego psychology and object-relations theory by showing how both camps misidentify the speaking "I" of the unconscious—either by privileging non-verbal phenomena or by misconstruing them as Saussurian signs—and that only a return to Freud grounded in Saussurian structural linguistics can restore the unconscious as the proper object of psychoanalysis.

    psychoanalytic experience and the theories to which it gives rise originate in Freud's clinical practice as itself grounded upon his analysands' free associations, namely, their speech.
  130. #130

    Reading Lacan's Écrits: From 'The Freudian Thing' to 'Remarks on Daniel Lagache' · Derek Hook, Calum Neill & Stijn Vanheule (eds.) · p.29

    [The Freudian Thing, or the Meaning of the Return to Freud in Psychoanalysis](#ch05.xhtml_tocbook-part-003) > The thing’s order

    Theoretical move: By retranslating Freud's 'Wo Es war, soll Ich werden' against the ego-psychological rendering, Lacan argues that the telos of analysis is not ego-over-id domination but the analysand's de-alienating subjectification toward the unconscious subject ($), grounding his ethics of psychoanalysis and his critique of misreadings of Freud that degrade the primacy of speech and signifiers in clinical practice.

    Lacan warns of the high practical-therapeutic costs of not adequately appreciating the linguistic constitution and mediation of the analytically symptomatic.
  131. #131

    Reading Lacan's Écrits: From 'The Freudian Thing' to 'Remarks on Daniel Lagache' · Derek Hook, Calum Neill & Stijn Vanheule (eds.) · p.32

    [The Freudian Thing, or the Meaning of the Return to Freud in Psychoanalysis](#ch05.xhtml_tocbook-part-003) > Resistance to the resisters

    Theoretical move: Lacan's critique of ego-psychological defense analysis shows it to be self-defeating: by privileging the ego as analytic interlocutor, it redoubles alienation and misrecognition, reinforces defenses rather than dissolving them, and substitutes the analyst's suggestive opinions for genuine analytic truth—whereas Lacan insists that the Freudian Thing speaks even through defenses, making everything said (or unsaid) by the analysand available to interpretation.

    The analysand, for Lacan, spontaneously self-objectifies in talking about him/her-self on the couch.
  132. #132

    Reading Lacan's Écrits: From 'The Freudian Thing' to 'Remarks on Daniel Lagache' · Derek Hook, Calum Neill & Stijn Vanheule (eds.) · p.43

    [The Freudian Thing, or the Meaning of the Return to Freud in Psychoanalysis](#ch05.xhtml_tocbook-part-003) > Imaginary passion

    Theoretical move: The passage argues that Lacan's mirror stage grounds the ego in a constitutive double alienation—imaginary and symbolic—such that the ego is structurally paranoid, narcissistic, and rivalrous, making ego-to-ego analysis (as in ego psychology) a therapeutic dead end that merely amplifies imaginary passions rather than dissolving the transference.

    the not-so-therapeutic outcome resulting from the analyst's ego becoming the superegoistic ego-ideal to the analysand's ego inevitably must entail tapping into and stirring up the 'imaginary passion'
  133. #133

    Reading Lacan's Écrits: From 'The Freudian Thing' to 'Remarks on Daniel Lagache' · Derek Hook, Calum Neill & Stijn Vanheule (eds.) · p.50

    [The Freudian Thing, or the Meaning of the Return to Freud in Psychoanalysis](#ch05.xhtml_tocbook-part-003) > The locus of speech

    Theoretical move: The passage argues that the Lacanian analytic practice turns on distinguishing the Imaginary (ego-centred empty speech) from the Symbolic (unconscious full speech), and that the compulsive repetition of neurotic symptoms is explained through a Hegelian–Kojèvian logic of unrecognised desire, whereby the analyst's appropriate recognition of transferential demands can finally dissolve symptomatic repetition.

    The ear of the Lacanian analyst attunes itself to signifiers insofar as, while listening to the analysand's speech, this ear quietly loosens what the analysand takes to be tight, firm ties between his/her signifiers and the consciously envisioned signifieds he/she intends.
  134. #134

    Reading Lacan's Écrits: From 'The Freudian Thing' to 'Remarks on Daniel Lagache' · Derek Hook, Calum Neill & Stijn Vanheule (eds.) · p.61

    [The Freudian Thing, or the Meaning of the Return to Freud in Psychoanalysis](#ch05.xhtml_tocbook-part-003) > Symbolic debt

    Theoretical move: Lacan reads the Rat Man case as paradigmatic for a structural, transgenerational theory of neurotic etiology: symptoms are encrypted testimonies to symbolically transmitted family debts (signifiers), not to brute biological instincts, and the proper telos of analysis is not happiness/success but the analysand's confrontation with the contingent, factical nonsense—the Freudian Thing—that underpins apparent meaning, achieved by weakening the Imaginary ego to let the Symbolic unconscious speak.

    The attainment of this 'singular correspondence' (361, 5) is the sine qua non of therapeutic termination, the true telos of the analytic experience
  135. #135

    Reading Lacan's Écrits: From 'The Freudian Thing' to 'Remarks on Daniel Lagache' · Derek Hook, Calum Neill & Stijn Vanheule (eds.) · p.64

    [The Freudian Thing, or the Meaning of the Return to Freud in Psychoanalysis](#ch05.xhtml_tocbook-part-003) > The training of analysts to come

    Theoretical move: Lacan's "return to Freud" is argued to be a return to the structures of language operative in the unconscious, which grounds a critique of medicalized, dogmatic analytic training and calls for a perpetually self-renewing pedagogy open to the structuralized human sciences and mathematics — with the Real (as the impossible-yet-condition-of-possibility) underwriting both the necessity and the limits of analytic practice.

    The futility of 'saying it all,' while in one sense a condition of impossibility for associating analysand and interpreting analyst alike
  136. #136

    Reading Lacan's Écrits: From 'The Freudian Thing' to 'Remarks on Daniel Lagache' · Derek Hook, Calum Neill & Stijn Vanheule (eds.)

    [Psychoanalysis and its Teaching](#ch05.xhtml_tocbook-part-004) > Abstract

    Theoretical move: Against the imaginary reduction of psychoanalysis to ego-psychology, this passage argues that the unconscious must be understood as the locus of the Other's speech, structured by signifiers via metaphor and metonymy, with the death drive as the key to repetitive speech—and that analytic training requires restoring the symbolic chain rather than reducing analysis to an imaginary dyad.

    Not just the resistance of an analysand to analytic treatment, but of the analyst to psychoanalysis itself
  137. #137

    Reading Lacan's Écrits: From 'The Freudian Thing' to 'Remarks on Daniel Lagache' · Derek Hook, Calum Neill & Stijn Vanheule (eds.)

    [Psychoanalysis and its Teaching](#ch05.xhtml_tocbook-part-004) > The psychoanalytic unconscious of the psychological unconscious

    Theoretical move: Lacan argues that pre-Freudian (and ego-psychological) hierarchical dualisms between conscious and unconscious encode a political bias that is itself legible as the 'unconscious of scientific discourse'; true psychoanalytic insight locates conflict not in biological or archetypal sources but in the linguistic structure of the symptom as articulated in speech.

    In psychoanalysis, 'conflict is read and interpreted' in the analysand's 'chatting,' and that chatting is enriched by free association
  138. #138

    Reading Lacan's Écrits: From 'The Freudian Thing' to 'Remarks on Daniel Lagache' · Derek Hook, Calum Neill & Stijn Vanheule (eds.)

    [Psychoanalysis and its Teaching](#ch05.xhtml_tocbook-part-004) > The intersubjective game by which truth enters reality

    Theoretical move: The passage argues that the symptom is constituted by the diachronic and synchronic operations of the signifier rather than by object-relations or emotional causality, and that the signifier's arbitrary yet overdetermined nature means it cannot serve as a guide to adaptive reality but instead generates a complex web of meanings that impacts reality — a view that Lacan uses to critique the ego-psychological and object-relations reduction of psychoanalysis to adaptive "corrective emotional experience."

    promote one's own ego as the measure of health, which will be used to bring the analysand back to 'reality.'
  139. #139

    Reading Lacan's Écrits: From 'The Freudian Thing' to 'Remarks on Daniel Lagache' · Derek Hook, Calum Neill & Stijn Vanheule (eds.) · p.92

    [Psychoanalysis and its Teaching](#ch05.xhtml_tocbook-part-004) > Approaching neurosis in the imaginary vs. the symbolic

    Theoretical move: Lacan argues that the IPA's ego-strengthening approach to neurosis deepens alienation by keeping the subject in the imaginary register, and that only orienting analysis through the symbolic Other—rather than the imaginary other of identification—can treat neurosis as a genuine question rather than a lure; this critique extends to all empiricist, biologistic, and behaviorist appropriations of psychoanalysis that destroy its symbolic foundation.

    Far from situating the unconscious as the site of a question, psychoanalysis, practiced and theorized in a certain way, constitutes it as a lure, allowing the analysand to simply better 'skirt the question.'
  140. #140

    Reading Lacan's Écrits: From 'The Freudian Thing' to 'Remarks on Daniel Lagache' · Derek Hook, Calum Neill & Stijn Vanheule (eds.) · p.110

    [The Situation of Psychoanalysis and the Training of Psychoanalysts in 1956](#ch05.xhtml_tocbook-part-005) > The foundation of our research: free association

    Theoretical move: Lacan argues that the "golden age" of psychoanalysis was undone by the cultural absorption of its interpretive vocabulary, and that analysts' recourse to non-mediated access (the "third ear," affect, lived experience) represents a regression into the Imaginary; the remedy lies in privileging the Symbolic/signifier, whose irreducible triangularity (the Other as third) keeps psychoanalysis from collapsing into a dyadic imaginary relation.

    Patients became just as versed in psychoanalytic jargon as their psychoanalysts donning interpretations like ready-to-wear (387, 3).
  141. #141

    Reading Lacan's Écrits: From 'The Freudian Thing' to 'Remarks on Daniel Lagache' · Derek Hook, Calum Neill & Stijn Vanheule (eds.) · p.115

    [The Situation of Psychoanalysis and the Training of Psychoanalysts in 1956](#ch05.xhtml_tocbook-part-005) > Portrait of the unconscious as a young dog

    Theoretical move: The passage argues that the primacy of the signifier — demonstrated through Pavlov's conditioning experiment, Saussurean linguistics, and Augustinian semiotics — is the foundational principle of psychoanalytic practice, such that the unconscious, structured like a language, enslaves the subject through signifying chains, and clinical cure proceeds by uncovering the subject's relation to key signifiers rather than eliminating symptoms.

    an analysand, a musician, who when performing could not put her 'heart in it' developed severe anxiety accompanied by benign heart arrhythmia as a symptom
  142. #142

    Reading Lacan's Écrits: From 'The Freudian Thing' to 'Remarks on Daniel Lagache' · Derek Hook, Calum Neill & Stijn Vanheule (eds.) · p.118

    [The Situation of Psychoanalysis and the Training of Psychoanalysts in 1956](#ch05.xhtml_tocbook-part-005) > Defrosting the signifer

    Theoretical move: Lacan uses Rabelais' frozen words allegory to establish the symbolic order's primacy and exteriority to the subject as the very definition of the unconscious, then develops this into a critique of Jungian archetypes, Jonesian symbolism, and existential listening practices—ultimately arguing that proper analytic technique consists in attentiveness to the literal, phonemic, polysemous signifier rather than to signification or meaning.

    It is not the dream itself, but what the analysand says about the dream that matters.
  143. #143

    Reading Lacan's Écrits: From 'The Freudian Thing' to 'Remarks on Daniel Lagache' · Derek Hook, Calum Neill & Stijn Vanheule (eds.)

    [The Situation of Psychoanalysis and the Training of Psychoanalysts in 1956](#ch05.xhtml_tocbook-part-005) > The number two is odd

    Theoretical move: Lacan argues that the symbolic dimension irreducibly introduces a third term into the analyst-analysand dyad, making "two" structurally odd (*impair*), and uses this mathematical-structuralist move to critique ego psychology's reduction of drive to instinct, to align psychoanalysis with conjectural sciences, and to expose how the IPA's group dynamics reproduce the imaginary mechanisms of identification Freud himself theorized.

    the one plus one of the analyst-analysand does not equal two, rather it constitutes an odd number
  144. #144

    Reading Lacan's Écrits: From 'The Freudian Thing' to 'Remarks on Daniel Lagache' · Derek Hook, Calum Neill & Stijn Vanheule (eds.)

    [The Situation of Psychoanalysis and the Training of Psychoanalysts in 1956](#ch05.xhtml_tocbook-part-005) > Appendix

    Theoretical move: Lacan uses this appendix to mount a sustained critique of ego psychology and identification-based training analysis, arguing that genuine psychoanalytic cure produces separation from rather than identification with the analyst, and that a return to Freud's texts is the corrective to the conformist institutionalization of psychoanalysis.

    The illusion of creating an autonomous ego shipwrecks the analysand's discourse on the shore of the analyst's meaning.
  145. #145

    Reading Lacan's Écrits: From 'The Freudian Thing' to 'Remarks on Daniel Lagache' · Derek Hook, Calum Neill & Stijn Vanheule (eds.) · p.132

    [The Instance of the Letter in the Unconscious, or Reason Since Freud](#ch05.xhtml_tocbook-part-006) > Context

    Theoretical move: This contextual introduction argues that "The Instance of the Letter" must be read as a multi-front intervention — into structural linguistics, continental philosophy (Heidegger, Hegel via Kojève), the politics of psychoanalytic institutions, and the art of rhetoric — in order to grasp the full theoretical stakes of Lacan's reinvention of the Freudian unconscious through the concepts of metaphor, metonymy, and the letter.

    the spoken discourse of an analysand should be understood rhetorically, with all of its missteps, neologisms, jokes, silences, and slips
  146. #146

    Reading Lacan's Écrits: From 'The Freudian Thing' to 'Remarks on Daniel Lagache' · Derek Hook, Calum Neill & Stijn Vanheule (eds.) · p.137

    [The Instance of the Letter in the Unconscious, or Reason Since Freud](#ch05.xhtml_tocbook-part-006) > Introduction

    Theoretical move: The passage argues that Lacan's "Instance of the Letter" is positioned between speech and language (*parole* and *langue*), such that the unconscious is revealed not through the linguistic system as a whole but through the failures and anomalies of specific acts of speech—making rhetoric (the study of language effects) as important as grammar/structure for analytic practice.

    It is through an analysand's speech, specifically, the failures, lacunae, and anomalies of the subject's spoken discourse, that the unconscious is revealed.
  147. #147

    Reading Lacan's Écrits: From 'The Freudian Thing' to 'Remarks on Daniel Lagache' · Derek Hook, Calum Neill & Stijn Vanheule (eds.) · p.144

    [The Instance of the Letter in the Unconscious, or Reason Since Freud](#ch05.xhtml_tocbook-part-006) > The letter in the unconscious

    Theoretical move: Lacan's alignment of metaphor/metonymy with condensation/displacement establishes the signifier's logic as constitutive of both the unconscious and the subject itself: the subject is not the ego-cogito but the effect of signifying operations, and symptoms/desire are the two modes in which the letter insists through these operations.

    Analysands may have powerful reactions to specific objects or places, for example, that are connected only tangentially to a past experience of trauma.
  148. #148

    Reading Lacan's Écrits: From 'The Freudian Thing' to 'Remarks on Daniel Lagache' · Derek Hook, Calum Neill & Stijn Vanheule (eds.) · p.146

    [The Instance of the Letter in the Unconscious, or Reason Since Freud](#ch05.xhtml_tocbook-part-006) > The letter in the unconscious

    Theoretical move: Lacan's deployment of rhetorical trope (via Quintilian) over mere figure reframes metaphor and metonymy as active, structural operations of the unconscious that work independently of conscious intention—thereby establishing the primacy of the signifier and positioning psychoanalysis as necessarily interdisciplinary, in explicit opposition to ego psychology's "autonomous ego."

    analysands may employ trope without knowing that they do so, and thus reveal the operations of the unconscious that interest their analysts.
  149. #149

    Reading Lacan's Écrits: From 'The Freudian Thing' to 'Remarks on Daniel Lagache' · Derek Hook, Calum Neill & Stijn Vanheule (eds.) · p.159

    [The Instance of the Letter in the Unconscious, or Reason Since Freud](#ch05.xhtml_tocbook-part-006) > Conclusion

    Theoretical move: The passage argues that in Lacan's thought, metaphor and metonymy operate on two registers simultaneously—as a grammar of the unconscious (structural/linguistic) and as genuinely rhetorical figures in the concrete discourse of analysands—and that attentiveness to rhetoric as an art is therefore indispensable for clinical psychoanalytic practice.

    the enunciated discourse of analysands requires attunement to the art of rhetoric
  150. #150

    Reading Lacan's Écrits: From 'The Freudian Thing' to 'Remarks on Daniel Lagache' · Derek Hook, Calum Neill & Stijn Vanheule (eds.) · p.211

    [The Direction of the Treatment and the Principles of its Power](#ch05.xhtml_tocbook-part-008) > I. Who analyzes today?

    Theoretical move: Lacan's critique of post-Freudian (especially ego-psychological) psychoanalysis is mobilized to argue that authentic analytic practice requires orienting from the symbolic axis (Other, lack, desire) rather than from imaginary ego-to-ego relations, with the L-schema formalizing why the analytic situation must be understood as four-positional rather than dyadic.

    The analyst freely chooses the concrete actions or techniques he uses in the analytic situation… by the material the analysand brings forth.
  151. #151

    Reading Lacan's Écrits: From 'The Freudian Thing' to 'Remarks on Daniel Lagache' · Derek Hook, Calum Neill & Stijn Vanheule (eds.)

    [The Direction of the Treatment and the Principles of its Power](#ch05.xhtml_tocbook-part-008) > IV. How to act with one’s being?

    Theoretical move: The passage argues that the analyst's proper mode of being cannot be derived from technical rules, happiness, or comprehension, but must be grounded in the ethics of desire — specifically the desire of the analyst — and that the analyst's stance toward the analysand's demand (intransitive, without object) is the pivot around which the direction of treatment turns.

    the analyst should not respond to the analysand. This frustrates the analysand because he is asking ('demande') the analyst for an answer
  152. #152

    Reading Lacan's Écrits: From 'The Freudian Thing' to 'Remarks on Daniel Lagache' · Derek Hook, Calum Neill & Stijn Vanheule (eds.) · p.232

    [The Direction of the Treatment and the Principles of its Power](#ch05.xhtml_tocbook-part-008) > IV. How to act with one’s being?

    Theoretical move: The passage argues that the analyst's function is not to fulfil the analysand's demand but to allow the signifiers bound up with frustration to reappear, thereby distinguishing need, demand, and desire, while also warning against identification-based or "good-for-the-subject" treatments that merely compel repetition or install the superego in place of the analytic relation.

    the analysand might as well wait to be given 'it.' 'And even this nothing the analyst does not give'
  153. #153

    Reading Lacan's Écrits: From 'The Freudian Thing' to 'Remarks on Daniel Lagache' · Derek Hook, Calum Neill & Stijn Vanheule (eds.)

    [The Direction of the Treatment and the Principles of its Power](#ch05.xhtml_tocbook-part-008) > V. Desire must be taken literally

    Theoretical move: The passage argues that the analyst's desire operates by refusing to answer at the level of demand, thereby opening a space for the subject to encounter their own truth as construction — grounded in the irremediable lack in the Other — which Lacan identifies as the aim of analysis at this stage of his teaching.

    It is the subject, analysand or analyst, that has to deal with this emptiness
  154. #154

    Reading Lacan's Écrits: From 'The Freudian Thing' to 'Remarks on Daniel Lagache' · Derek Hook, Calum Neill & Stijn Vanheule (eds.)

    [Remarks on Daniel Lagache’s Presentation: “Psychoanalysis and Personality Structure”](#ch05.xhtml_tocbook-part-009) > III. On the ideals of the person

    Theoretical move: The passage argues that the psychoanalytic cure works by progressively exposing object *a* as the cause of the subject's desire and fading, thereby enabling the analysand to traverse their fundamental fantasy, reduce ego-ideal identifications, and face the irreducible aporia of castration as the proper terminus of analysis.

    the analysand is able to situate himself in the space "'behind the mirror'" – that is, behind the flat mirror – in a manner that is entirely different from what typically happens in neurosis
  155. #155

    Reading Lacan's Écrits: From 'The Freudian Thing' to 'Remarks on Daniel Lagache' · Derek Hook, Calum Neill & Stijn Vanheule (eds.)

    [The Freudian Thing, or the Meaning of the Return to Freud in Psychoanalysis](#ch05.xhtml_tocbook-part-003) > Analytic action

    Theoretical move: The L-schema is deployed to argue that the fundamental axis of analytic action is the Symbolic (between unconscious subjects), not the Imaginary (between egos), and that the analyst's strategic self-effacement/silence opens space for the unconscious to speak by dissolving the transference and instantiating the symbolic order as condition of possibility for the analysand's speech.

    unconscious knowledge, knowledge of the unconscious, resides on the side of the analysand rather than the analyst. This is something the analysand should be brought to appreciate through analysis itself
  156. #156

    Reading Lacan's Écrits: From 'The Freudian Thing' to 'Remarks on Daniel Lagache' · Derek Hook, Calum Neill & Stijn Vanheule (eds.) · p.141

    [The Instance of the Letter in the Unconscious, or Reason Since Freud](#ch05.xhtml_tocbook-part-006) > The meaning of the letter

    Theoretical move: The passage argues that Lacan's concept of the 'letter' — the insistence of a structural element of language within concrete speech — reformulates the Saussurean sign by elevating the signifier over the signified and exposing the bar as a resistance to signification, such that the operations of metonymy and metaphor reveal how the unconscious is structured like a language, producing truth-effects that exceed the speaking subject's intent.

    the speech of an analysand should be understood rhetorically, because the deployment of the letter can 'signify something altogether different from what it says'
  157. #157

    Embracing the Void: Rethinking the Origin of the Sacred · Richard Boothby · p.71

    Rereading Lacan (or, What Is the Other?) > The Disappearing Thing > The Signifying Matrix > It Speaks

    Theoretical move: The passage argues that the signifier operates on two irreducible dimensions—a semantic pole anchoring definite meaning and a "mantic" pole opening toward das Ding as pure lack—and that this bifold matrix grounds both the psychoanalytic method (free association, the slip of the tongue) and the quasi-religious capacity to create ex nihilo, illustrated by Heidegger's vase as the originary signifier of signifying itself.

    When the analyst plays 'the dummy' by stubbornly remaining silent, she submits the speech of the analysand to a measured pressure of depersonalization.
  158. #158

    Embracing the Void: Rethinking the Origin of the Sacred · Richard Boothby · p.154

    Rethinking Religion (or, What Is the Sacred?) > Embracing the Cross

    Theoretical move: The passage argues that crucifixion, read through the intersection of Lacanian and Hegelian frameworks, figures not as sacrificial atonement but as the subject's embrace of the Other's foreignness as an opening to what is unknown in itself — a "dying away" of the ego that parallels Lacan's rereading of Freud's *Wo Es war, soll Ich werden* and Hegel's dialectical conception of love as constitutive self-division, which in turn grounds a psychoanalytic ethics of non-judgement toward the analysand.

    Open the space for the internal complexity of the analysand, allow for the self-contradiction of the symptom. Facilitate analysands' own entry into that space, enabling their ownership of contradiction
  159. #159

    Enjoying What We Don't Have: The Political Project of Psychoanalysis · Todd McGowan · p.68

    I > 2 > I Can Get Satisfaction

    Theoretical move: McGowan argues that psychoanalysis is fundamentally an economic theory of the psyche in which the drive always-already produces satisfaction, meaning the analytic intervention is not a cure from dissatisfaction to satisfaction but a quantitative shortening of the circuitous path the subject takes to its inevitable enjoyment — a political critique of capitalism's logic of accumulation follows directly from this.

    The aim of the psychoanalyst — the analyst's desire — must be to remove the detours that the analysand has placed along the path of the drive in order to allow the analysand to take up completely her or his position in the drive.
  160. #160

    Enjoying What We Don't Have: The Political Project of Psychoanalysis · Todd McGowan · p.73

    I > 2 > Th e Secret of the Symptom

    Theoretical move: The symptom is not a barrier to enjoyment but its very source and foundation: psychoanalytic intervention works not by eliminating the symptom but by transforming the subject's relationship to the satisfaction it already obtains through symptomatic disruption, and desire itself is a fundamental misrecognition of the death drive.

    the intervention has nothing to do with alleviating dissatisfaction but with changing the way in which the analysand relates to her or his satisfaction.
  161. #161

    Enjoying What We Don't Have: The Political Project of Psychoanalysis · Todd McGowan · p.95

    I > 3 > Freedom and Injustice

    Theoretical move: Psychoanalysis offers a distinct critique of capitalism grounded not in justice (as in Marxism) but in freedom: class society deprives subjects of freedom and enjoyment at the level of the unconscious, and psychoanalysis emerges precisely to address the persistence of unfreedom after the Enlightenment's failure to achieve its own ideal.

    It is in this sense that we should revisit the status of the analysands that psychoanalysis treats.
  162. #162

    Enjoying What We Don't Have: The Political Project of Psychoanalysis · Todd McGowan · p.167

    I > Th e Appeal of Sacrifi ce > An Absence of Final Causes

    Theoretical move: McGowan argues that teleological thinking (the "final cause") structurally occludes enjoyment/jouissance, which operates as an "immanent cause" inhering in action itself rather than as a pursued end; psychoanalysis—through free association—is theorized as the method that brackets the final cause to expose this immanent causality, identifying the death drive as Freud's formal theorization of enjoyment-as-immanent-cause.

    When the analysand speaks, the analyst focuses on the signifiers themselves and what they say rather than on the meaning that the analysand intends to impart with these signifiers.
  163. #163

    Enjoying What We Don't Have: The Political Project of Psychoanalysis · Todd McGowan · p.307

    I > Th e Case of the Missing Signifi er > Notes > 1. The Formation of Subjectivity

    Theoretical move: This endnote cluster advances the theoretical argument that loss is constitutive of value, subjectivity, and drive, reinterpreting Freud's death drive as the theoretical elaboration of repetition compulsion and positioning Hegel—rather than Nietzsche or Schopenhauer—as Freud's closest philosophical predecessor through the shared recognition of a structural limit (nonknowledge/unconscious desire) within the project of knowledge.

    Freud's insistence that psychoanalysis would simply not work if it was given away for free or at a discount price stems from his understanding of the constitutive dimension of loss. The analysand's sacrifice of money gives the psychoanalytic session value.
  164. #164

    Enjoying What We Don't Have: The Political Project of Psychoanalysis · Todd McGowan · p.311

    I > Th e Case of the Missing Signifi er > Notes > 2. The Economics of the Drive

    Theoretical move: This endnotes section advances several load-bearing theoretical moves: it aligns the drive's structure with a satisfaction that bypasses aim (via Copjec/Lacan), contrasts psychoanalytic identification-with-the-symptom against Marxist elimination-of-the-symptom, links the drive's constancy to capitalism's logic of endless accumulation, and grounds the ego's rivalry-structure in the Imaginary to argue against ego-psychology.

    No one would come into analysis if she or he were not, on some level, dissatisfied, but this dissatisfaction occurs on a second level: aspiring analysands are dissatisfied with the way that they obtain their satisfaction.
  165. #165

    Enjoying What We Don't Have: The Political Project of Psychoanalysis · Todd McGowan · p.343

    I > Th e Case of the Missing Signifi er > Notes > 9. Beyond Bare Life

    Theoretical move: This endnotes section theoretically anchors the main argument by linking the capitalist valorization of "bare life," the death drive's role in value-creation, the fetishistic function of afterlife imagery, and the structural necessity of the unconscious (as science's elided gap) to Lacan, Heidegger, Marx, and Agamben — positioning psychoanalysis as the discipline that occupies the subject-shaped gap that science must repress.

    the key moment in this analysand's talking is what cannot be said rather than the seemingly endless stream of words that are said.
  166. #166

    An Introductory Dictionary of Lacanian Psychoanalysis · Dylan Evans

    <span id="9781134780112_Part22.xhtml_ncx_104"></span><span id="9781134780112_Part22.xhtml_page_0122"></span>***L*** > <span id="9781134780112_Part22.xhtml_ncx_106"></span>**language**

    Theoretical move: The passage traces four developmental phases of Lacan's theory of language, arguing that language (langage) functions as the single paradigm of all structure, that the unconscious is structured like a language of signifiers, and that language has both symbolic and imaginary dimensions—against any reduction of it to the symbolic order alone or to a mere code.

    tend to play down the importance of language and emphasise the 'non-verbal communication' of the analysand (his 'body language', etc.) at the expense of the analysand's speech.
  167. #167

    An Introductory Dictionary of Lacanian Psychoanalysis · Dylan Evans

    <span id="9781134780112_Part29.xhtml_ncx_173"></span><span id="9781134780112_Part29.xhtml_page_0195"></span>***S*** > <span id="9781134780112_Part29.xhtml_ncx_196"></span><span id="9781134780112_Part29.xhtml_page_0223"></span>**subject suppposed to know**

    Theoretical move: The passage elaborates the Subject Supposed to Know as a transferential function—not a person but a position the analyst comes to embody—whose establishment and dissolution structure the entire arc of analytic treatment, while also showing that the function is reversible: the analyst equally institutes the analysand as a subject supposed to know via the fundamental rule of free association.

    It is only when the analyst is perceived by the analysand to embody this function that the transference can be said to be established.
  168. #168

    An Introductory Dictionary of Lacanian Psychoanalysis · Dylan Evans

    <span id="9781134780112_Part11.xhtml_ncx_9"></span><span id="9781134780112_Part11.xhtml_page_0025"></span>***A*** > <span id="9781134780112_Part11.xhtml_ncx_11"></span>**act**

    Theoretical move: The passage establishes 'the act' as a distinctively Lacanian ethical concept: only that which is fully assumed—consciously and unconsciously—qualifies as a true act, thereby linking responsibility, unconscious desire, and the death drive into a single ethical framework that distinguishes the act from acting out, passage to the act, and mere behaviour.

    when it helps the analysand to move towards the end of analysis.
  169. #169

    An Introductory Dictionary of Lacanian Psychoanalysis · Dylan Evans

    <span id="9781134780112_Part14.xhtml_ncx_43"></span><span id="9781134780112_Part14.xhtml_page_0056"></span>***D*** > <span id="9781134780112_Part14.xhtml_ncx_48"></span>**demand**

    Theoretical move: Demand is theorised as structurally double: it articulates a biological need while simultaneously becoming a demand for love from the Other, and this gap between the two functions is precisely what generates desire as an insatiable leftover — a move that situates demand as the mediating term in the Need-Demand-Desire triad.

    By forcing the analysand to express himself entirely in speech, the psychoanalytic situation puts him back in the position of the helpless infant
  170. #170

    An Introductory Dictionary of Lacanian Psychoanalysis · Dylan Evans

    <span id="9781134780112_Part19.xhtml_ncx_87"></span><span id="9781134780112_Part19.xhtml_page_0105"></span>***I*** > <span id="9781134780112_Part19.xhtml_ncx_95"></span>**interpretation**

    Theoretical move: Lacan's renewed theory of interpretation displaces the classical model (which unmasks hidden meaning via symbolism/decoding) in favour of a technique that disrupts meaning altogether, reducing signifiers to non-sense so that irreducible, determinant signifiers emerge — thereby inverting the signifier/signified relation and returning the analysand's message to him in its true, inverted form.

    Far from offering the analysand a new message, the interpretation should serve merely to enable the analysand to hear the message he is unconsciously addressing to himself.
  171. #171

    An Introductory Dictionary of Lacanian Psychoanalysis · Dylan Evans

    <span id="9781134780112_Part26.xhtml_ncx_142"></span><span id="9781134780112_Part26.xhtml_page_0161"></span>***P*** > <span id="9781134780112_Part26.xhtml_ncx_161"></span>**punctuation**

    Theoretical move: Punctuation is theorized as the fundamental operation by which the receiver retroactively fixes meaning in the signifying chain; in clinical practice, the analyst's punctuation of the analysand's discourse—through repetition, silence, or session termination—exploits this retroactive structure to reveal unconscious meaning beyond the analysand's intended speech.

    by punctuating the analysand's discourse in an unexpected way, the analyst can retroactively alter the intended meaning of the analysand's speech
  172. #172

    An Introductory Dictionary of Lacanian Psychoanalysis · Dylan Evans

    <span id="9781134780112_Part11.xhtml_ncx_9"></span><span id="9781134780112_Part11.xhtml_page_0025"></span>***A*** > <span id="9781134780112_Part11.xhtml_ncx_18"></span><span id="9781134780112_Part11.xhtml_page_0034"></span>**analysand/psychoanalysand**

    Theoretical move: By introducing the term 'analysant' (gerund form) in 1967 to replace the passive 'analysé', Lacan theoretically repositions the analysand as the active agent of the analytic process, reversing the conventional assumption that the analyst performs the analysis on a passive patient.

    Lacan prefers this term because, being derived from the gerund, it indicates that the one who lies on the couch is the one who does most of the work.
  173. #173

    An Introductory Dictionary of Lacanian Psychoanalysis · Dylan Evans

    <span id="9781134780112_Part14.xhtml_ncx_43"></span><span id="9781134780112_Part14.xhtml_page_0056"></span>***D*** > <span id="9781134780112_Part14.xhtml_ncx_50"></span><span id="9781134780112_Part14.xhtml_page_0064"></span>**desire of the analyst**

    Theoretical move: The passage articulates a constitutive ambiguity in Lacan's concept of the desire of the analyst: on one side, it functions as an enigmatic attributed desire that engines the analytic process by sustaining the Che vuoi? question; on the other, it names a properly analytic desire oriented not toward identification or cure but toward 'absolute difference', situating it at the heart of the ethics of psychoanalysis and requiring a training analysis to constitute it.

    the task of the analyst throughout the treatment is to make it impossible for the analysand to be sure that he knows what the analyst wants from him
  174. #174

    An Introductory Dictionary of Lacanian Psychoanalysis · Dylan Evans

    <span id="9781134780112_Part15.xhtml_ncx_57"></span><span id="9781134780112_Part15.xhtml_page_0075"></span>***E*** > <span id="9781134780112_Part15.xhtml_ncx_61"></span>**end of analysis**

    Theoretical move: The passage systematically maps Lacan's evolving formulations of the 'end of analysis' across his teaching, arguing that the end-point is a logical terminus defined by subjective destitution, traversal of fantasy, and identification with the sinthome—not therapeutic cure, ego-strengthening, or identification with the analyst—and that it always involves the fall of the Subject Supposed to Know and the reduction of the analyst to objet petit a.

    the end of analysis involves a change in the subjective position of the analysand (the analysand's 'subjective destitution'), and a corresponding change in the position of the analyst
  175. #175

    An Introductory Dictionary of Lacanian Psychoanalysis · Dylan Evans

    <span id="9781134780112_Part30.xhtml_ncx_202"></span><span id="9781134780112_Part30.xhtml_page_0231"></span>***T*** > <span id="9781134780112_Part30.xhtml_ncx_210"></span>**treatment**

    Theoretical move: The passage defines psychoanalytic treatment as a directed structural process distinct from medical cure, whose aim is not the restoration of a healthy psyche but the analysand's articulation of desire and truth, structured by transference, resistance, and the desire of the analyst across distinct phases.

    the aim of analytic treatment is simply to lead the analysand to articulate his truth.
  176. #176

    An Introductory Dictionary of Lacanian Psychoanalysis · Dylan Evans

    <span id="9781134780112_Part28.xhtml_ncx_164"></span><span id="9781134780112_Part28.xhtml_page_0186"></span>***R*** > <span id="9781134780112_Part28.xhtml_ncx_172"></span><span id="9781134780112_Part28.xhtml_page_0193"></span>**resistance**

    Theoretical move: Lacan reframes resistance as a structural feature of the analytic process rooted in the imaginary register of the ego, not the ill will of the analysand, and distinguishes it from defence by locating resistance on the side of the object (transitory, imaginary) and defence on the side of the subject (stable, symbolic), while also implicating the analyst's own resistance as the true source of any obstruction to treatment.

    He can do this by recognising his own part in the analysand's resistance, for 'there is no other resistance to analysis than that of the analyst himself'
  177. #177

    An Introductory Dictionary of Lacanian Psychoanalysis · Dylan Evans

    <span id="9781134780112_Part13.xhtml_ncx_30"></span><span id="9781134780112_Part13.xhtml_page_0045"></span>***C*** > <span id="9781134780112_Part13.xhtml_ncx_38"></span>**Communication**

    Theoretical move: Lacan redefines communication against standard linguistic models by showing that in psychoanalytic speech the sender is always simultaneously a receiver, and that the analyst's interpretive work returns the analysand's own message in its inverted, unconscious form — making intentionality exceed consciousness.

    When speaking to the analyst, the analysand is also addressing a message to himself, but is not aware of this.
  178. #178

    An Introductory Dictionary of Lacanian Psychoanalysis · Dylan Evans

    <span id="9781134780112_Part29.xhtml_ncx_173"></span><span id="9781134780112_Part29.xhtml_page_0195"></span>***S*** > <span id="9781134780112_Part29.xhtml_ncx_195"></span>**Subject**

    Theoretical move: The passage traces the theoretical genealogy of Lacan's concept of the 'subject', arguing that it is irreducibly distinct from the ego, constituted through language and the symbolic order, essentially split, and identified with the Cartesian cogito reread as the subject of the unconscious rather than self-conscious agency.

    the term is also used to refer to the analysand (Ec, 83).
  179. #179

    An Introductory Dictionary of Lacanian Psychoanalysis · Dylan Evans

    <span id="9781134780112_Part11.xhtml_ncx_9"></span><span id="9781134780112_Part11.xhtml_page_0025"></span>***A*** > <span id="9781134780112_Part11.xhtml_ncx_22"></span>**autonomous ego**

    Theoretical move: Lacan's critique of the ego-psychology concept of the "autonomous ego" reframes the locus of autonomy: rather than the ego achieving freedom through adaptation and identification with the analyst, it is the symbolic order that is genuinely autonomous, exposing the ego's supposed mastery as a narcissistic illusion.

    helping the analysand's ego to become autonomous
  180. #180

    An Introductory Dictionary of Lacanian Psychoanalysis · Dylan Evans

    <span id="9781134780112_Part22.xhtml_ncx_104"></span><span id="9781134780112_Part22.xhtml_page_0122"></span>***L*** > <span id="9781134780112_Part22.xhtml_ncx_108"></span>**letter**

    Theoretical move: The passage establishes Lacan's concept of the Letter as the material, indivisible, and localised substrate of the Symbolic order that is itself Real (hence meaningless), persists through repetition, and positions the analyst as a reader of formal properties rather than meanings — against Saussure's privileging of the acoustic signifier.

    the analyst must focus not on the meaning or the signification of the analysand's discourse, but purely on its formal properties
  181. #181

    An Introductory Dictionary of Lacanian Psychoanalysis · Dylan Evans

    <span id="9781134780112_Part16.xhtml_ncx_66"></span><span id="9781134780112_Part16.xhtml_page_0084"></span>***F*** > <span id="9781134780112_Part16.xhtml_ncx_74"></span>**fragmented body**

    Theoretical move: The fragmented body (corps morcelé) is theorised as a constitutive counterpart to the Mirror Stage: the perception of bodily disunity drives identification with the specular image that forms the ego, while the memory of fragmentation continues to threaten that ego's synthetic unity, surfacing in aggressivity, negative transference, and hysterical symptoms governed by an 'imaginary anatomy'.

    the moment when the analysand's aggressivity emerges in the negative transference
  182. #182

    An Introductory Dictionary of Lacanian Psychoanalysis · Dylan Evans

    <span id="9781134780112_Part28.xhtml_ncx_164"></span><span id="9781134780112_Part28.xhtml_page_0186"></span>***R*** > <span id="9781134780112_Part28.xhtml_ncx_167"></span>**recollection**

    Theoretical move: Lacan distinguishes recollection (remémoration) as a symbolic process of reconstructing one's history from reminiscence as an imaginary reliving of experience, positioning the analytic process on the side of symbolic reconstruction rather than affective re-experiencing or acting out.

    what matters is what the analysand reconstructs of his past (S1, 13), the key word being 'reconstruct'.
  183. #183

    An Introductory Dictionary of Lacanian Psychoanalysis · Dylan Evans

    <span id="9781134780112_Part26.xhtml_ncx_142"></span><span id="9781134780112_Part26.xhtml_page_0161"></span>***P*** > <span id="9781134780112_Part26.xhtml_ncx_145"></span>**pass**

    Theoretical move: The passage defines and contextualises Lacan's institutional procedure of 'the pass' (la passe), arguing that it operationalises the principle that the end of analysis must be articulable in language and extractable as knowledge (savoir), thereby serving a teaching rather than clinical function.

    the passage from being an analysand to being an analyst, which may be testified to by 'the pass' in the first sense of the term
  184. #184

    An Introductory Dictionary of Lacanian Psychoanalysis · Dylan Evans

    <span id="9781134780112_Part13.xhtml_ncx_30"></span><span id="9781134780112_Part13.xhtml_page_0045"></span>***C*** > <span id="9781134780112_Part13.xhtml_ncx_42"></span>**countertransference**

    Theoretical move: Lacan reframes countertransference not as the analyst's affective reactions per se, but as the analyst's failure to make adequate use of those affects; ultimately, he dissolves the countertransference/transference binary by insisting on the non-symmetrical, unified structure of transference in which both analyst and analysand are implicated.

    the more likely he is to be frankly in love with, or be quite repulsed by, the analysand
  185. #185

    An Introductory Dictionary of Lacanian Psychoanalysis · Dylan Evans

    <span id="9781134780112_Part30.xhtml_ncx_202"></span><span id="9781134780112_Part30.xhtml_page_0231"></span>***T*** > <span id="9781134780112_Part30.xhtml_ncx_205"></span><span id="9781134780112_Part30.xhtml_page_0234"></span> **topology**

    Theoretical move: Topology is argued to be not merely a metaphor for structure but structure itself in Lacan's framework, privileging the function of the cut as a non-intuitive, purely intellectual means of expressing the symbolic order and distinguishing continuous from discontinuous transformations in psychoanalytic treatment.

    so an effective interpretation preferred by the analyst modifies the structure of the analysand's discourse in a radical way.
  186. #186

    An Introductory Dictionary of Lacanian Psychoanalysis · Dylan Evans

    <span id="9781134780112_Part11.xhtml_ncx_9"></span><span id="9781134780112_Part11.xhtml_page_0025"></span>***A*** > <span id="9781134780112_Part11.xhtml_ncx_15"></span>**aggressivity**

    Theoretical move: Lacan's concept of aggressivity is theorized as a fundamental imaginary relation rooted in the mirror stage and narcissism, distinct from mere aggression and from Freud's death drive, and is given clinical significance as negative transference that must be mobilized early in treatment.

    Lacan argues that it is important to bring the analysand's aggressivity into play early in the treatment
  187. #187

    An Introductory Dictionary of Lacanian Psychoanalysis · Dylan Evans

    <span id="9781134780112_Part29.xhtml_ncx_173"></span><span id="9781134780112_Part29.xhtml_page_0195"></span>***S*** > <span id="9781134780112_Part29.xhtml_ncx_200"></span>**Symbolic**

    Theoretical move: The passage defines the Symbolic as the central order in Lacan's tripartite schema, arguing that it constitutes the essentially linguistic, law-governed, and totalising dimension of human subjectivity—irreducible to biology, structuring the Imaginary, and encompassing the Unconscious, the Other, the Death Drive, and Lack—while distinguishing it sharply from Freud's 'symbolism' as fixed bi-univocal meaning.

    it is only by working in the symbolic order that the analyst can produce changes in the subjective position of the analysand
  188. #188

    An Introductory Dictionary of Lacanian Psychoanalysis · Dylan Evans

    <span id="9781134780112_Part30.xhtml_ncx_202"></span><span id="9781134780112_Part30.xhtml_page_0231"></span>***T*** > <span id="9781134780112_Part30.xhtml_ncx_211"></span>**truth**

    Theoretical move: Lacan's concept of truth is irreducibly plural in its functions: it is always particular (not universal), tied to desire and speech rather than exactitude or science, and structurally intertwined with deception, fiction, and the Real—making it impossible to reduce to a single definition while remaining central to psychoanalytic ethics and treatment.

    the aim of psychoanalytic treatment is to lead the analysand to articulate this truth... the analyst must take them into account
  189. #189

    An Introductory Dictionary of Lacanian Psychoanalysis · Dylan Evans

    <span id="9781134780112_Part30.xhtml_ncx_202"></span><span id="9781134780112_Part30.xhtml_page_0231"></span>***T*** > <span id="9781134780112_Part30.xhtml_ncx_207"></span><span id="9781134780112_Part30.xhtml_page_0236"></span>**training**

    Theoretical move: Lacan abolishes the IPA distinction between therapeutic and training analysis, arguing that all analyses are potentially training analyses, and that the formation of the analyst is an ongoing, subject-transforming process irreducible to institutional certification.

    the term 'training analysis' refers exclusively to a course of analytic treatment entered into by the analysand for the purpose of training as an analyst.
  190. #190

    An Introductory Dictionary of Lacanian Psychoanalysis · Dylan Evans

    <span id="9781134780112_Part11.xhtml_ncx_9"></span><span id="9781134780112_Part11.xhtml_page_0025"></span>***A*** > <span id="9781134780112_Part11.xhtml_ncx_21"></span><span id="9781134780112_Part11.xhtml_page_0037"></span>**art**

    Theoretical move: The passage argues that Lacan's engagement with art is not literary criticism or psychobiography but a methodological demonstration: works of art serve as models for how the analyst should read the analysand's discourse as a text, foregrounding the signifier over the signified, and as illustrative metaphors for psychoanalytic concepts — making psychoanalysis irreducibly a clinical practice rather than a general hermeneutic metadiscourse.

    The analyst must, in other words, treat the analysand's discourse as a text
  191. #191

    An Introductory Dictionary of Lacanian Psychoanalysis · Dylan Evans · p.67

    <span id="9781134780112_Part14.xhtml_ncx_43"></span><span id="9781134780112_Part14.xhtml_page_0056"></span>***D*** > <span id="9781134780112_Part14.xhtml_ncx_52"></span>**dialectic**

    Theoretical move: Lacan appropriates the Hegelian dialectic—particularly through Kojève's reading—to frame psychoanalytic treatment as a dialectical experience, while decisively breaking with Hegel by denying any final synthesis (Absolute Knowing), replacing the telos of progress with 'the avatars of a lack' anchored in the irreducibility of the unconscious.

    the analyst forces the analysand to confront the contradictions and gaps in his narrative
  192. #192

    An Introductory Dictionary of Lacanian Psychoanalysis · Dylan Evans

    <span id="9781134780112_Part29.xhtml_ncx_173"></span><span id="9781134780112_Part29.xhtml_page_0195"></span>***S*** > <span id="9781134780112_Part29.xhtml_ncx_192"></span>**Speech**

    Theoretical move: The passage elaborates Lacan's concept of *parole* (speech) as a theoretically overdetermined term drawing on anthropology, theology, and metaphysics, and pivots on the distinction between 'full speech' and 'empty speech' as the axis along which the subject's relation to desire and truth is articulated in psychoanalytic treatment.

    One of the analyst's tasks when listening to the analysand is to discern the moments when full speech emerges.
  193. #193

    An Introductory Dictionary of Lacanian Psychoanalysis · Dylan Evans

    <span id="9781134780112_Part29.xhtml_ncx_173"></span><span id="9781134780112_Part29.xhtml_page_0195"></span>***S*** > <span id="9781134780112_Part29.xhtml_ncx_187"></span>**Signifier**

    Theoretical move: The passage establishes Lacan's transformation of the Saussurean signifier: by asserting the primacy and autonomy of the signifier over the signified, grounding it in differential structure, and defining it as "that which represents a subject for another signifier," Lacan reconstitutes language as the field of the Other and the unconscious as an effect of the signifier's operation on the subject.

    Lacan's insistence that the analyst attend to the signifiers in the analysand's speech is not really an innovation in technique but an attempt to theorise Freud's own method in more rigorous terms.
  194. #194

    Irrepressible Truth: On Lacan's 'The Freudian Thing' · Adrian Johnston · p.10

    **Preface**

    Theoretical move: Johnston argues that Lacan's notorious difficulty is not obscurantism but a deliberate pedagogical strategy that collapses the theory/technique distinction, compelling readers to practice analytic interpretation rather than mere reading—and that the middle-period Lacanian Symbolic and the later Real are more continuous than prevailing reception assumes.

    handling practical issues that come up in relations with diferent types of analysands
  195. #195

    Irrepressible Truth: On Lacan's 'The Freudian Thing' · Adrian Johnston · p.32

    **1** > <span id="page-28-0"></span>**4 A. Johnston**

    Theoretical move: Johnston argues that Lacan's polemic in "The Freudian Thing" diagnoses ego psychology's Americanization of psychoanalysis as a structural inversion of the proper analyst-analysand knowledge-relation, in which the analyst's surrender to the transference demand to occupy the position of "subject supposed to know" constitutes the fundamental betrayal of Freud's discovery of the unconscious.

    knowledge about the causes of the analysand's suffering, as itself caused by unconscious knowledge, can come solely from the analysand him/her-self.
  196. #196

    Irrepressible Truth: On Lacan's 'The Freudian Thing' · Adrian Johnston · p.71

    **3** > <span id="page-63-0"></span>Soon after, I add:

    Theoretical move: The passage argues that the Lacanian unconscious is constituted by and invariably expresses itself through language, such that the "talking cure" works not by using speech as a medium to access a non-linguistic reality but by operating immanently within language itself — and that non-Lacanian analysts err precisely by abandoning the literal text of free associations in favour of extra-linguistic phenomena (transference, affect, gesture) that are, in truth, always already woven into discourse.

    the analyst's evenly-hovering attunement to the devilish details of the literal text of the analysand's symbolico-linguistic productions (i.e. discourse, language, speech, etc.) is the surest manner by which to maintain close contact with the speaking unconscious
  197. #197

    Irrepressible Truth: On Lacan's 'The Freudian Thing' · Adrian Johnston · p.80

    <span id="page-74-0"></span>**4**

    Theoretical move: Johnston argues that Lacan's "Parade" section of "The Freudian Thing" performs a double theoretical move: it exposes how ego psychology and object-relations theory misidentify the speaking subject of the unconscious by substituting the second topography (id-ego-superego) for the first, and it defends the primacy of free-associational speech and the signifier—against both anti-linguist and pan-linguist camps—as the sole royal road to the Freudian unconscious.

    psychoanalytic experience and the theories to which it gives rise originate in Freud's clinical practice as itself grounded upon his analysands' free associations, namely, their speech, their linguistic articulations on the analytic couch.
  198. #198

    Irrepressible Truth: On Lacan's 'The Freudian Thing' · Adrian Johnston · p.106

    **5** > He continues:

    Theoretical move: The passage argues that Lacan's retranslation of Freud's "Wo Es war, soll Ich werden" reframes the analytic goal not as ego-mastery over the id but as the subject's ethical duty to identify with and own its unconscious dimensions—a position that simultaneously requires treating the analytic symptom as a signifying structure irreducible to the medical model of the sign.

    an analysand goes from disowning the 'it' of bird shit to owning this same shit as (part of) his/her 'I,' blemishes and all
  199. #199

    Irrepressible Truth: On Lacan's 'The Freudian Thing' · Adrian Johnston · p.124

    **6** > <span id="page-113-0"></span>**Resistance to the Resisters** > He continues in the subsequent paragraph:

    Theoretical move: Against ego-psychological defense analysis, Johnston argues that Lacan's Hegelian-Freudian conception of truth—whereby the unconscious always at least half-says the truth through even the ego's resistances—requires analysts to treat everything said (and unsaid) as analytically interpretable, repositioning the Symbolic big Other as the true interlocutor rather than the imaginary dyad of egos.

    The analysand spontaneously self-objectifies in talking about him/her-self on the couch.
  200. #200

    Irrepressible Truth: On Lacan's 'The Freudian Thing' · Adrian Johnston · p.134

    **6** > <span id="page-128-0"></span>**7 Interlude**

    Theoretical move: Lacan's critique of ego psychology, developed through the prosopopoeia of a talking lectern in "The Freudian Thing," demonstrates that ego psychology's own theoretical premises cannot distinguish the ego from an inanimate object, thereby refuting its claims to autonomous ego-subjectivity and exposing its capitulation to Anglo-American cultural and scientific norms as a betrayal of Freud.

    the 'me' serving as the object of a consciously self-reflexive/reflexive analysand articulating his/her autobiographical narrative on the couch.
  201. #201

    Irrepressible Truth: On Lacan's 'The Freudian Thing' · Adrian Johnston · p.152

    **8**

    Theoretical move: The passage argues that the ego's structural duality—as both a vehicle for unconscious speech and a weapon of resistance against it—makes it a negative index for the analyst: the weak/fragmented ego betrays unconscious truth (full speech), while the strong/whole ego fortifies méconnaissance, which is why Lacanian clinical practice targets ego-weakness rather than ego-strength, in direct opposition to ego psychology.

    two of the tasks of the analyst are, first, to draw the analysand's attention to these interruptions of and inconsistencies in his/her conscious discourse of (self-)mastery and, second, gently to encourage (auto-)interpretive curiosity on the part of the analysand.
  202. #202

    Irrepressible Truth: On Lacan's 'The Freudian Thing' · Adrian Johnston · p.167

    **9**

    Theoretical move: Johnston argues that Lacan's mockery of the ego as an automaton-like recording device amounts to a critique of ego psychology that can be formalized as an inversion of the Turing test: rather than producing a machine that passes for human, ego-psychological treatment produces a human who passes for a machine, trapping the analysand in alienated repetition.

    cannot but leave analysands stuck in a groove-like rut of alienation
  203. #203

    Irrepressible Truth: On Lacan's 'The Freudian Thing' · Adrian Johnston · p.178

    **10** > <span id="page-170-0"></span>**Analytic Action**

    Theoretical move: The passage argues that the L Schema formalizes how analytic interpretation works by distinguishing the Imaginary axis of ego-to-ego empty speech from the Symbolic axis of full speech addressed to the big Other, and then extends this to show how the mirror stage's constitutive gap is the ontogenetic condition of possibility for the human subject's relation to mortality and symbolic self-constitution.

    what the analysand's ego understands itself as saying and to whom this ego believes it is addressing what it says (i.e., at the level of '(ego) a' and 'a′ other') amount to a méconnaissance
  204. #204

    Irrepressible Truth: On Lacan's 'The Freudian Thing' · Adrian Johnston

    **10** > <span id="page-170-0"></span>**Analytic Action** > Or, as I put the same ideas elsewhere:

    Theoretical move: The passage argues that the analyst's structural position condenses multiple figures of death and unknowability — through silence, self-effacement, and the embodiment of finitude — such that the analytic Other functions as a "neighbor-Thing" whose inscrutable jouissance threatens the subject with annihilation, making the analyst literally a presenter of death.

    representing the quasi-immortal longue durée of trans-individual and trans-generational symbolico-social history... the analyst indeed 'makes death present'
  205. #205

    Irrepressible Truth: On Lacan's 'The Freudian Thing' · Adrian Johnston · p.196

    **11**

    Theoretical move: Johnston argues that Lacan's early-to-mid-1950s account of the unconscious articulates a structural Symbolic order (automaton) arising out of Real contingency (tuché), grounding both the compulsive repetition of unrecognized desire in transference and the curative mechanism of analysis in Hegelian-Kojèvian recognition theory, while simultaneously positioning Lacan as a proto-post-structuralist who preserves a place for the Real beyond Lévi-Straussian structuralism, and linking the Symbolic unconscious to sexuality via the Maussian/Lévi-Straussian incest prohibition and the master/slave dialectic.

    the analysand unknowingly reiterates his/her unmet demands and unsatisfied desires, directing them to the analyst as a stand-in mistaken for past representatives of Real Otherness
  206. #206

    Irrepressible Truth: On Lacan's 'The Freudian Thing' · Adrian Johnston · p.234

    **12**

    Theoretical move: Johnston argues that Lacan's reinterpretation of the Scholastic formula *adaequatio rei et intellectus* via homophony transforms truth-as-adequation into truth-as-symbolic-debt, making the analysand's unconscious accountability to the Freudian Thing (das Ding / la Chose) the telos of analytic termination rather than a reification of the object.

    Te analysand's intellect measuring and measuring up to the things to which it has been unconsciously indebted is a necessary, if not also sufcient, condition for adequately concluding an analysis.
  207. #207

    Irrepressible Truth: On Lacan's 'The Freudian Thing' · Adrian Johnston · p.239

    **13** > <span id="page-236-0"></span>**The Training of Analysts to Come**

    Theoretical move: Lacan's "return to Freud" is reframed as an institutional and pedagogical program: analysts must be trained across linguistics, history, mathematics, and the structuralized human sciences in order to resist the "social-psychological objectification" that degrades psychoanalytic knowledge into ideological conformism, with the structural properties of the unconscious demanding mathematical-style formalization to achieve scientificity.

    analysts, in order more fully to understand the speech and language of their myriad different analysands, must be sensitized to the nuances of linguistic and language-like symbolism
  208. #208

    Irrepressible Truth: On Lacan's 'The Freudian Thing' · Adrian Johnston · p.246

    **13** > <span id="page-236-0"></span>**The Training of Analysts to Come**

    Theoretical move: Johnston argues that the Lacanian Real functions as an Anstoss — simultaneously a condition of impossibility and of possibility for psychoanalysis — because the subject perpetually slips away from the Symbolic's concatenations of signifiers, making the "impossible profession" of analysis both structurally necessary and interminably generative.

    prospective analysands, thanks to analysis's wider cultural popularity, start sometimes automatically self-interpreting along these lines, presenting during preliminary meetings with potential analysts statements in the vein of 'I might be having some Oedipal issues'
  209. #209

    Irrepressible Truth: On Lacan's 'The Freudian Thing' · Adrian Johnston · p.256

    **13** > <span id="page-248-0"></span>**Conclusion Taking It to the Dogs: Actaeon's Revenge**

    Theoretical move: Drawing on the Actaeon/Diana myth from Ovid's Metamorphoses as an extended allegory, Johnston argues that the unconscious operates through traumatic contingent encounter, compulsive acting-out, and violent resistance, and that Lacan's "return to Freud" constitutes an ethical conspiracy against the IPA's distortion of psychoanalytic truth—with the unconscious itself (la Chose freudienne) guaranteeing the eventual vindication of that truth.

    These can be frighteningly dangerous or even outright harmful for the analysand behaving thusly, almost as though he/she were transformed by his/her unconscious into someone (or something) else
  210. #210

    Irrepressible Truth: On Lacan's 'The Freudian Thing' · Adrian Johnston

    **13** > <span id="page-269-0"></span>**Index**

    Theoretical move: This is an index passage (partial, letters B–F) from Adrian Johnston's book; it is non-substantive bibliographic/reference material with no theoretical argument being advanced.

    analysands and 84, 98–99, 105–106, 114, 124–126, 131–132, 144–145, 147, 153, 206–207
  211. #211

    Irrepressible Truth: On Lacan's 'The Freudian Thing' · Adrian Johnston · p.139

    **6** > <span id="page-128-0"></span>**7 Interlude**

    Theoretical move: By reading phenomenological and existentialist defences of consciousness as Hegelian "beautiful souls," Lacan reduces ego-level reflective sentience to an asubjective topological surface, then pivots to the Symbolic (speech/parole) as the only genuine mark distinguishing analysands from inanimate objects—thereby indicting ego psychology and phenomenology alike for their defensive neglect of language.

    this is language as spoken and addressed to another, as in the case of the analysand's free-associational monologues in the presence of the analyst.
  212. #212

    Irrepressible Truth: On Lacan's 'The Freudian Thing' · Adrian Johnston · p.255

    **13** > <span id="page-248-0"></span>**Conclusion Taking It to the Dogs: Actaeon's Revenge**

    Theoretical move: The passage traces the continuity and evolution of Lacan's "return to Freud" from "The Freudian Thing" (1955) through the early 1970s seminars, arguing that while Lacan jettisons his mid-1950s Heideggerianism (recasting ontology as "hontology"), he remains faithful to Freudian truth-as-unconscious, now reframed through the mythological figures of Diana and Actaeon as condensations of das Ding, the sexual non-rapport, jouissance, and the half-said.

    the sudden surfacing of certain words from the analysand and the interpretations they correspondingly elicit from the analyst might strike both parties like a proverbial bolt out of the blue, an abrupt upsurge of the unconscious markedly punctuating the analysis.
  213. #213

    Écrits: The First Complete Edition in English · Jacques Lacan · p.84

    JACQUES LACAN ECRITS > *The Truth of Psychology and the Psychology of Truth* 79 > *A Phenomeno logical Description of Psychoanalytic Experience*

    Theoretical move: The passage argues that analytic experience is fundamentally structured by language as address (signifying *to* someone before signifying *something*), and that transference emerges precisely when the analyst refuses the interlocutor role, causing the subject to replace the analyst with an imaginary imago whose repeated, unrecognized presence across behavior, narrative, and memory constitutes the core object of analytic work.

    The subject solicits him to assume this role, implicitly at first, but soon explicitly.
  214. #214

    Écrits: The First Complete Edition in English · Jacques Lacan · p.120

    The Mirror Stage as Formative of the / Function > A Theoretical Introduction to the Functions of Psychoanalysis in Criminology

    Theoretical move: The passage argues that the human sciences—unlike physical sciences—cannot evade the question of truth as constitutive of their object, and that psychoanalysis, precisely because its efficacy is conditioned by the truth of revelation, offers a privileged methodological contribution to criminology's dual search for the truth of the crime and the truth of the criminal.

    psychoanalysts who, in their understanding of what their subjects confide to them
  215. #215

    Écrits: The First Complete Edition in English · Jacques Lacan · p.822

    Appendix II: Metaphor of the Subject<sup>1</sup> > NOTES TO INTRODUCTION TO JEAN HYPPOLIT E S COMMENTARY ON FREUD' S 'VERNEINUNG' " > NOTE S TO "TH E SITUATION OF PSYCHOANALYSIS AND THE TRAININ G OF PSYCHOANALYSTS IN 1956"

    Theoretical move: This passage consists entirely of editorial/translator footnotes to Lacan's "The Situation of Psychoanalysis and the Training of Psychoanalysts in 1956," providing philological, bibliographic, and terminological glosses on specific French words and allusions; it contains no substantive theoretical argumentation of its own.

    the analyst and the analysand, like Vladimir and Estragon in Samuel Beckett's play, Waiting for Godot, are waiting for the third party, the Other or Godot, to appear.
  216. #216

    Écrits: The First Complete Edition in English · Jacques Lacan · p.832

    Appendix II: Metaphor of the Subject<sup>1</sup> > NOTES TO INTRODUCTION TO JEAN HYPPOLIT E S COMMENTARY ON FREUD' S 'VERNEINUNG' " > NOTE S TO "TH E SITUATION OF PSYCHOANALYSIS AND THE TRAININ G OF PSYCHOANALYSTS IN 1956" > NOTE S T O TH E DIRECTIO N O F TH E TREATMEN T

    Theoretical move: This passage consists of editorial and translator's notes to Lacan's "Direction of the Treatment," clarifying terminological choices, identifying intertextual references, and glossing key concepts such as repetition, transference, metaphor, metonymy, desire, and the drive—thereby serving as a secondary apparatus rather than advancing a primary theoretical argument.

    La personne de Vanalyse (the analysand as a person) and la personne de Uanalyste (the analyst as a person)
  217. #217

    Seminar I · Freud's Papers on Technique · Jacques Lacan · p.211

    **XVII**

    Theoretical move: Lacan critically exposes the theoretical dead end of Balint's object-relation theory, which defines the object purely as satisfier of need and models all libidinal life on a closed, harmonious mother-infant complementarity—arguing this framework cannot account for the subject's encounter with the Other as a genuine subject, and thus deviates from the fundamental analytic conception of the libido.

    Balint thus belongs to this Hungarian tradition which blossomed around the questions raised by the relation of the analysand and analyst, conceived of as an interhuman situation involving persons
  218. #218

    Seminar I · Freud's Papers on Technique · Jacques Lacan · p.290

    xxn > A spoken commentary on Freud's *Verneinung,* by Jean Hyppolite\*

    Theoretical move: Hyppolite's commentary on Freud's *Verneinung* argues that negation (*Verneinung/dénégation*) is not simply the negation internal to judgement but the very genesis of thought: by presenting one's being in the mode of not being it, the subject achieves a *Aufhebung* of repression that separates the intellectual from the affective, and the analysand's intellectual acceptance of what was denied constitutes a "negation of the negation" that still leaves the repressive process intact.

    the patient, let us call him the person being psychoanalysed [psychanalyse], says to his analyst: 'Now you'll think I mean to say something insulting, but really I've no such intention.'
  219. #219

    Seminar I · Freud's Papers on Technique · Jacques Lacan · p.17

    **I**

    Theoretical move: Lacan argues that the contemporary confusion in analytic technique stems from a reduction of psychoanalysis to a two-body (intersubjective) psychology, and proposes that the analytic experience must instead be formulated as a three-term relation in which speech is the central organizing element.

    the elaboration of the notion of the relation between analyst and analysand is the path taken by contemporary analytic doctrines in trying to rediscover a firm basis for the realities of that experience.
  220. #220

    Seminar I · Freud's Papers on Technique · Jacques Lacan · p.38

    **m**

    Theoretical move: Lacan uses a clinical case from Margaret Little to argue that ego-to-ego interpretation — premised on hic et nunc intentionality and projective reciprocity — is structurally indistinguishable from projection and therefore generates errors prior to truth and falsity; genuine interpretation of defences requires at minimum a third term beyond the dyadic ego-relation, and resistance must be understood in Freud's broader sense as anything that interrupts analytic work, not merely as psychical obstacle to interpretation.

    The subject was perfectly justified in accepting Margaret Little's interpretation, for the simple reason that, in a relationship as intimate as that which exists between analysand and analyst, he was sufficiently aware of the analyst's feelings.
  221. #221

    Seminar I · Freud's Papers on Technique · Jacques Lacan · p.296

    xxn > A spoken commentary on Freud's *Verneinung,* by Jean Hyppolite\*

    Theoretical move: Hyppolite argues that Freud's *Verneinung* cannot be reduced to positive psychology but must be read as a grand myth founding a fundamental asymmetry: affirmation (Bejahung) is the *Ersatz* of Eros/unification, while negation (Verneinung) is the *Nachfolge* of the destruction drive and expulsion (Ausstossung), and it is precisely the *symbol* of negation — not affirmation — that creates a margin of thought independent of the pleasure principle and makes possible the ego's méconnaissance-structured recognition of the unconscious.

    'There is no stronger evidence that we have been successful in our effort to uncover the unconscious than when the analysand reacts with the phrase: "I didn't think that"'
  222. #222

    Seminar I · Freud's Papers on Technique · Jacques Lacan · p.112

    **IX**

    Theoretical move: Lacan argues that the efficacy of analytic experience rests on full speech as a performative, symbolic act of recognition—not on imaginary transference or indoctrination—and critiques object-relations and superego-based accounts (Strachey, Klein) for remaining trapped on the imaginary plane, proposing instead to relocate the question to the narcissistic/ego economy of the subject.

    the analytic method, if it aims at attaining full speech, starts off on a path leading in the diametrically opposed direction, in so far as it instructs the subject to delineate a speech as devoid as possible of any assumption of responsibility
  223. #223

    Seminar I · Freud's Papers on Technique · Jacques Lacan · p.32

    **II** > **Sorry? What's that?**

    Theoretical move: Lacan reframes counter-transference and resistance not as signs of the analyst's authoritarian character but as the very conditions that allow resistance to be rendered objective and therapeutically manageable; recognising resistance is what distinguishes Freud's method from the dominatory logic of hypnotic suggestion.

    The only thing that allows the analyst to be intelligent, is when this resistance makes the analysand look like an idiot. It promotes heightened self-esteem.
  224. #224

    Seminar XI · The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis (alt. translation) · Jacques Lacan · p.85

    THE SPLIT BETWEEN THE EYE AND THE GAZE > OF THE GAZE

    Theoretical move: Lacan argues that the primal scene is constitutively traumatic—not grounded in libidinal empathy or instinctual maturation but in a 'factitious fact' structured by the tuche (the encounter with the Real)—and that the split in the subject persists as the deeper division between the dream-image and the invocatory/scopic solicitation of the gaze and voice.

    it is not sexual empathy that sustains the modulations of the analysable, but a factitious fact.
  225. #225

    Seminar XI · The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis (alt. translation) · Jacques Lacan · p.8

    PREFACE TO THE ENGLISH-LANGUAGE EDITION

    Theoretical move: Lacan's preface performs a series of theoretical pivots: it redefines the unconscious as real (not imaginary), articulates the lying structure of truth, anchors the analyst's position in the hystorization of desire rather than institutional validation, and grounds the pass-procedure in the object as cause of desire and the real as the 'lack of lack.'

    Like satisfaction, it is acquired only with use, with the use of an individual—who, in psycho-analysis (psych = fiction of), is called an analysand.
  226. #226

    Seminar XI · The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis (alt. translation) · Jacques Lacan · p.248

    OF THE SUBJECT WHO IS SUPPOSED TO KNOW, OF THE FIRST DYAD, AND OF THE GOOD > OF THE SUBJECT WHO IS SUPPOSED TO KNOW

    Theoretical move: The passage argues that the transference is constituted precisely by the subject's positioning of another as the "subject supposed to know," and that the analysand's withholding of information from the analyst reveals that what most limits the analytic process is not fear of deception by the analyst but fear of being understood too quickly—i.e., fear that the analyst will reduce the symptom to an organic or biographical cause, foreclosing the analytic work itself.

    Because, the analysand may reply, I had told you earlier, you might have regarded it as responsible, in part at least, perhaps even wholly, for my disorders and I am not here for you to find an organic cause for them.
  227. #227

    Seminar XI · The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis (alt. translation) · Jacques Lacan · p.147

    PRESENCE OF THE ANALYST > THE TRANSFERENCE AND THE DRIVE

    Theoretical move: Lacan critiques Szasz's ego-psychological conception of transference — wherein transference analysis reduces to reality-testing by a "healthy part of the ego" — as a theoretical blind alley that, by placing the analyst beyond critique, paradoxically endangers psychoanalysis itself; the implicit counter-move is that transference cannot be resolved by appeal to ego integrity or consensual reality-testing.

    it is a question of agreement between the analysand and the analyst, except that here the analyst is a judge against whom there is neither appeal nor recourse
  228. #228

    Seminar XI · The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis (alt. translation) · Jacques Lacan · p.249

    OF THE SUBJECT WHO IS SUPPOSED TO KNOW, OF THE FIRST DYAD, AND OF THE GOOD > THE FIELD OF THE OTHER

    Theoretical move: The passage argues that the Subject Supposed to Know cannot be fully dismantled even when the analyst is put in question, because the analysand still credits the analyst with a residual infallibility; and that recognition of the good (Socratic/Platonic tradition) is never sufficient to produce action toward it, since jouissance itself imposes a recoil that splits knowing from wanting.

    the patient may think that the analyst may be misled if he gives him certain facts. He holds back certain facts so that the analyst may not go too quickly.
  229. #229

    Seminar XI · The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis · Jacques Lacan · p.8

    PREFACE TO THE ENGLISH-LANGUAGE EDITION

    Theoretical move: Lacan's preface performs a series of theoretical pivots: it redefines the unconscious as real (not imaginary), repositions the analyst as one who 'hystorizes only from himself', introduces the 'pass' as a test of analytic truth, and locates the object as cause of desire as the only conceivable idea of the object—with the lack of the lack constituting the Real.

    Like satisfaction, it is acquired only with use, with the use of an individual—who, in psycho-analysis (psych = fiction of), is called an analysand.
  230. #230

    Seminar XI · The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis · Jacques Lacan · p.85

    THE SPLIT BETWEEN THE EYE AND THE GAZE > OF THE GAZE

    Theoretical move: The passage argues that the fundamental relation to sexuality in analytic experience is not grounded in libidinal empathy or instinctual maturation, but in a traumatic, factitious fact (the primal scene), and that the subject's split—exemplified by the dream-awakening structure—points toward a more profound split between the representative image and the invocatory/scopic causality (voice and gaze) that underlies it.

    it is not sexual empathy that sustains the modulations of the analysable, but a factitious fact
  231. #231

    Seminar XI · The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis · Jacques Lacan · p.147

    PRESENCE OF THE ANALYST > THE TRANSFERENCE AND THE DRIVE

    Theoretical move: Lacan critiques Szasz's ego-psychological account of transference — which reduces it to a defence mechanism analysable only through the "healthy part of the ego" — exposing the theoretical blind alley this creates: if transference is merely illusion to be corrected by reality-testing, the analyst becomes an unappealable judge and analysis collapses into "pure, uncontrolled hazard."

    it is a question of agreement between the analysand and the analyst, except that here the analyst is a judge against whom there is neither appeal nor recourse
  232. #232

    Seminar XI · The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis · Jacques Lacan · p.152

    ANALYSIS AND TRUTH OR THE CLOSURE OF THE UNCONSCIOUS > ANALYSIS AND TRUTH

    Theoretical move: The passage argues that the analytic relation is structurally asymmetric and irreducibly oriented toward truth: the analyst is posited as the one who knows (Subject Supposed to Know), while the analysand is constitutively situated in the dimension of self-deception (se tromper), making truth — not reciprocity or integrity — the proper frame for understanding the transference.

    From the latter, the thought immediately arises that not only must he not make a mistake (se tromper), but also that he can be misled (on peut le tromper).
  233. #233

    Seminar XI · The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis · Jacques Lacan · p.248

    OF THE SUBJECT WHO IS SUPPOSED TO KNOW, OF THE FIRST DYAD, AND OF THE GOOD > OF THE SUBJECT WHO IS SUPPOSED TO KNOW

    Theoretical move: The passage argues that transference is constituted by the subject's attribution of the place of the Subject Supposed to Know to some individual, and that the initial analytic situation is complicated not by the patient's fear of being deceived by the analyst, but rather by the patient's fear that the analyst will be deceived *by them* — a structural reversal that limits the analysand's openness to the analytic rule.

    Because, the analysand may reply, I had told you earlier, you might have regarded it as responsible, in part at least, perhaps even wholly, for my disorders and I am not here for you to find an organic cause for them.
  234. #234

    Seminar XI · The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis · Jacques Lacan · p.283

    IN YOU MORE THAN YOU > TO CONCLUDE

    Theoretical move: The passage pivots on the distinction between specular identification (grounded in the Ego Ideal as the point in the Other from which the subject sees itself) and the objet petit a as the paradoxical object that disrupts the deceptive mirroring of love in the transference, introducing mutilation and the gift-of-shit as the truth of analytic alienation.

    I give myself to you, the patient says again, but this of my person—as they say—Oh, mystery! is changed inexplicably into a gift of skit
  235. #235

    Seminar XII · Crucial Problems for Psychoanalysis (alt. translation) · Jacques Lacan · p.185

    **Presentation by Monsieur Valabrega**

    Theoretical move: The passage argues that the successful termination of analysis consists in the analysand's "conquest of the name" — the separation from identificatory names (father's name, analyst's name) and the founding of a singular subjective identity — with transference liquidation as the structural hinge between alienated and autonomous subjectivity.

    This appeal of the analysand to the analyst, takes on from the beginning and at the end the form of two proper names.
  236. #236

    Seminar XII · Crucial Problems for Psychoanalysis (alt. translation) · Jacques Lacan · p.256

    **Seminar 19: Wednesday 19 May 1965** > (18) In other words let us deceive ourselves together.

    Theoretical move: The analyst's desire is theorized not as a counterforce to the patient's defensiveness but as a ruse that inhabits the patient's own defensive structure—occupying the pole of sexual reality's impossibility—so that what constitutes the analysand's original fantasy can be separated out and the objet petit a revealed as the substitute for the missing sexual relationship; this operation is articulated through the Möbius strip topology of the unexpected.

    the subject who knows, who is not the analyst but the analysand, has been for a long time established within his own game
  237. #237

    Seminar XII · Crucial Problems for Psychoanalysis (alt. translation) · Jacques Lacan · p.26

    **Seminar 3 : Wednesday 16 December 1964**

    Theoretical move: Lacan argues that the transmission of psychoanalytic experience cannot be grounded in ego-ideal identification or immanent developmental schemas (à la Piaget), but must be seized at the level of structure—specifically the structure of language as a topology that is irreducible to any instrumental or biunivocal logic, implicating the subject as such.

    Is the analysand someone who transmits a certain mode of the experiences of the one who analysed him, as he himself has received it, how can these experiences be oriented with respect to one another
  238. #238

    Seminar XII · Crucial Problems for Psychoanalysis (alt. translation) · Jacques Lacan · p.296

    **Seminar 22: Wednesday 9 June 1965.**

    Theoretical move: Lacan organizes his year's work around the triad Sinn/Zwang/Wahrheit, arguing that the Freudian discovery of compulsion (Zwang as Entzweiung/Spaltung of the subject) and Plato's identification of the Good with Number together illuminate the distinctive status of Truth in psychoanalytic experience—a truth that is irreducibly personal and constituted through means that exceed ordinary medical reference.

    if this book were opened by someone who might want to find in it the paths of the perfect psychoanalysand, you can rest assured: he would find himself much less solicited by it than by other works
  239. #239

    Seminar XII · Crucial Problems for Psychoanalysis (alt. translation) · Jacques Lacan · p.331

    **Seminar 22: Wednesday 9 June 1965.** > **Seminar 24: Wednesday 23 June 1965**

    Theoretical move: The passage argues that American psychoanalysis has undergone a pathological inversion by becoming an 'o-object' (objet petit a) of conspicuous display and ideological suture — masking the class struggle under the 'pursuit of happiness' and the promise of adaptation — while true psychoanalysis is defined by assuming the irreparable, i.e. the lack of being, and the properly oriented desire of the analyst.

    Only if the analysand by going to have himself analysed wants to show ostentatiously that he has the money for it
  240. #240

    Seminar XII · Crucial Problems for Psychoanalysis · Jacques Lacan · p.108

    **Seminar 8: Wednesday 3 February 1965**

    Theoretical move: The child's "all-powerfulness" is not magical omnipotence but derives from the child's structural position as the objet petit a for the desiring adult; the analyst's failure to recognise this makes her into an object herself, turning counter-transference into a transference neurosis that renders analysis interminable.

    there is highlighted what is more or less legitimately called counter-transference and which is, as is always the case in a transference neurosis, what is said to be at the source of interminable analyses.
  241. #241

    Seminar XII · Crucial Problems for Psychoanalysis · Jacques Lacan · p.189

    **Presentation by Monsieur Valabrega** > **Presentation by Melle Markovitz (not in French typscript)**

    Theoretical move: The passage advances the argument that the fundamental fantasy (Poord'jeli) is legible as the intersection of the proper name, the unconscious signifying chain, transference, and the drive—showing that the analytic encounter is constitutively structured as an "incestuous adventure" in which the analyst's desire and the subject's becoming are articulated through phonematic and metonymic condensation, culminating in the subject's constitution as desiring through the analyst's name.

    the collusion of the proper names of the analyst and of the analysand
  242. #242

    Seminar XII · Crucial Problems for Psychoanalysis · Jacques Lacan · p.26

    **Seminar 3 : Wednesday 16 December 1964**

    Theoretical move: Lacan dismantles psychological and Piagetian models of intelligence by showing that language is not the instrument of intelligence but its constitutive difficulty, and pivots to the claim that the subject is only a subject by being implicated in structure—thereby grounding analytic transmission not in ego-ideal identification but in the topology of the signifier.

    Is the analysand someone who transmits a certain mode of the experiences of the one who analysed him, as he himself has received it, how can these experiences be oriented with respect to one another
  243. #243

    Seminar XII · Crucial Problems for Psychoanalysis · Jacques Lacan · p.331

    **Seminar 22: Wednesday 9 June 1965.** > **Seminar 24: Wednesday 23 June 1965**

    Theoretical move: Lacan (via a presenter's reading of Zinberg) diagnoses the "ethical illness" of American psychoanalysis as its transformation into an objet petit a — an object of ostentatious display and adaptation ideology — whose inversion of the analytic aim (assumption of irreparable lack) replaces the desire of the analyst with the pursuit of happiness as social suture; Lacan then defends his own teaching as what preserves a "breathable" theoretical atmosphere against these impasses.

    Only if the analysand by going to have himself analysed wants to show ostentatiously that he has the money for it
  244. #244

    Seminar XII · Crucial Problems for Psychoanalysis · Jacques Lacan · p.256

    **Seminar 19: Wednesday 19 May 1965** > (18) In other words let us deceive ourselves together.

    Theoretical move: The analyst's desire operates not as the imposition of knowledge onto the analysand but as a structural ruse that separates the analysand's defensiveness—directed not against the analyst but against the reality of sexual difference—into an ever-purer form of fantasy, with the objet petit a standing in for the impossible real of the sexual relation; the unexpected (figured topologically via the Möbius strip) is proposed as the operative mode of analytic desire against the field of anxious expectation.

    the subject who knows, who is not the analyst but the analysand, has been for a long time established within his own game
  245. #245

    Seminar XII · Crucial Problems for Psychoanalysis · Jacques Lacan · p.296

    **Seminar 22: Wednesday 9 June 1965.**

    Theoretical move: Lacan recapitulates his year-long triadic schema (Sinn/Zwang/Wahrheit) to argue that the Freudian discovery of Spaltung/Entzweiung gives a new philosophical status to truth, and that psychoanalysis is constitutively the practice of truth-as-means, distinguishing it from all other sciences and grounding its therapeutic effects in a reduplicated sense of truth proper to the subject.

    if this book were opened by someone who might want to find in it the paths of the perfect psychoanalysand
  246. #246

    Seminar XII · Crucial Problems for Psychoanalysis · Jacques Lacan · p.272

    **Seminar 20: Wednesday 26 May 1965**

    Theoretical move: By reading Plato's Sophist through the problem of non-being, falsity, and the simulacrum (fantasma), Lacan argues that the gap (écart) constitutive of the simulacrum is also constitutive of the subject, and that the Sophist—precisely as the one who lacks a sure reference and operates through this gap—figures the analyst himself, who likewise occupies a place of non-knowledge in relation to the analysand.

    He speaks to us and about us every day on our couches. That he speaks in us when we hear speaking those who are speaking.
  247. #247

    Seminar XIII · The Object of Psychoanalysis (alt. translation) · Jacques Lacan · p.47

    IV - IDENTITY AND NON-IDENTITYTO ONESELF: THE DEATH DRIVE

    Theoretical move: Lacan critically engages with Conrad Stein's theory of narcissistic regression in the analytic situation, using it as a foil to sharpen the distinction between imaginary dual relations and the properly Lacanian categories of the big Other, the small other, and objet petit a — arguing that the analytic situation cannot be reduced to fusional narcissism but involves an articulated structure of desire and the object.

    Presenting himself as a fool, he makes of the psychoanalyst his king. He is going to suffer for pleasure namely try to deny the reality of existence
  248. #248

    Seminar XIII · The Object of Psychoanalysis (alt. translation) · Jacques Lacan · p.54

    IV - IDENTITY AND NON-IDENTITYTO ONESELF: THE DEATH DRIVE

    Theoretical move: Lacan intervenes to reframe Melman's reading of Stein's article: the analyst's word cannot be situated at a place of narcissistic fusion or primitive Bejahung (affirmation), but must instead be aligned with Verneinung (negation/denial) — since truth serves itself and cannot be "served," the analyst's position is defined by a structural cut rather than by fulfillment or lure.

    through these free associations the analysand 'in the perfect accomplishment of his gift' tries to realise his word towards that same place which is that aimed at by the analyst
  249. #249

    Seminar XIII · The Object of Psychoanalysis (alt. translation) · Jacques Lacan · p.43

    IV - IDENTITY AND NON-IDENTITYTO ONESELF: THE DEATH DRIVE

    Theoretical move: The passage, presented by André Green as a commentary on Lacan's o-object, argues that the psychoanalytic subject is constituted through the effacing of the trace—a logic linking the Death Drive, the Name of the Father, castration, and metonymy—and that this logic of effacement (cutting/suturing) is what structuralism (Lévi-Strauss) fails to capture, reducing symbolic difference to mere homology rather than recognizing the barred lack as the cause of desire.

    If the death drive infiltrates the word of the analysand, in the silence towards which it always pushes him, the analyst has to deal with a living word; living in its refusal to be reduced to silence.
  250. #250

    Seminar XIII · The Object of Psychoanalysis (alt. translation) · Jacques Lacan · p.100

    **Seminar 8: Wednesday 26 January 1966**

    Theoretical move: Dr Stein, presenting within Lacan's closed seminar, develops a formal theory of predication to elucidate the psychoanalytic proposition "it speaks" (ça parle), distinguishing the "subject of the predicate" from the "predicating subject" in order to articulate the imaginary limit-structure of the analytic session as one in which the speaking subject cannot be assigned to either patient or analyst individually.

    In the analytic situation, it is a matter of someone that one habitually calls the patient and if one wished to examine with this method the content of any dialogue whatsoever… the patient must always remain the same whether he is being spoken about, whether he is being spoken to, or whether he speaks himself.
  251. #251

    Seminar XIII · The Object of Psychoanalysis · Jacques Lacan · p.54

    IV - IDENTITY AND NON-IDENTITYTO ONESELF: THE DEATH DRIVE

    Theoretical move: Lacan intervenes to reframe Melman's reading of Stein's article: the analyst's word is not a 'preaching' that serves truth but must be situated at the place of the objet petit a, and the analyst's position is better defined through Verneinung (negation/denial) than through Bejahung (affirmation), because truth serves itself — it cannot be served.

    through these free associations the analysand 'in the perfect accomplishment of his gift' tries to realise his word towards that same place which is that aimed at by the analyst
  252. #252

    Seminar XIII · The Object of Psychoanalysis · Jacques Lacan · p.43

    IV - IDENTITY AND NON-IDENTITYTO ONESELF: THE DEATH DRIVE

    Theoretical move: The passage argues that the Death Drive operates through the effacement of the trace—a logic linking the signifier's self-cancellation to castration, paternity, and the cause of desire—and that this logic (not structuralist homology) is what distinguishes psychoanalysis from Lévi-Strauss's anthropology, while also grounding a structural technique built on the non-identity of the signifier to itself.

    if the death drive infiltrates the word of the analysand, in the silence towards which it always pushes him, the analyst has to deal with a living word
  253. #253

    Seminar XIII · The Object of Psychoanalysis · Jacques Lacan · p.111

    Another question.

    Theoretical move: The passage stages a seminar discussion in which participants (Conté, Melman, Lacan) critically interrogate Stein's theoretical framework, converging on the argument that his account of the analyst's word, narcissism, desire, and predication remains incomplete precisely because it lacks a structural reference to the big Other as the third locus from which the subject receives his own word — a lacuna that collapses the treatment into a dual imaginary game between analyst and patient.

    the lack, for example, of the analysand trying to posit himself as the object lacking to the analyst
  254. #254

    Seminar XIII · The Object of Psychoanalysis · Jacques Lacan · p.46

    IV - IDENTITY AND NON-IDENTITYTO ONESELF: THE DEATH DRIVE

    Theoretical move: Lacan critically engages Stein's account of narcissistic regression in the analytic situation, using it as a foil to distinguish the imaginary dual relation from the big Other and to locate the o-object (objet petit a) within the structure of desire rather than as a supplement to fusional narcissism—thereby insisting that the analytic situation has an articulated symbolic structure, not merely a fusional lack of distinction.

    Fearing regression the patient tries to reduce the analyst to silence, to escape from fluctuation by becoming the one who organises it, and to preserve a mastery over it
  255. #255

    Seminar XIII · The Object of Psychoanalysis · Jacques Lacan · p.115

    Another question.

    Theoretical move: The passage argues that predication is not a logical act but an act of desire's forcing, and that the analytic relation cannot be grounded in a specular grammar of pronouns (I/you equivalence); the remainder that escapes specularisation is what opens the dialectic between the barred Other and truth, and the transference's misunderstanding consists in the analysand supposing the analyst knows everything except the truth.

    in this grammatical universe in which Stein seemed to me to situate the relationships of the analyst to the analysand
  256. #256

    Seminar XIV · The Logic of Phantasy (alt. translation) · Jacques Lacan · p.185

    the smallest whole number which is not written on this board > **Seminar 17: Wednesday 19 April 1967**

    Theoretical move: The passage argues that jouissance-value originates in the structural lack inaugurated by the castration complex, which reverses subjective enjoyment into objectal libido — irreducible to narcissistic libido — and that the objet petit a is the product ('waste-product') of the operation of language on the One/Other dyad, serving as the cornerstone for rethinking logic, the subject, and the analytic act.

    it is only around this point that there can take their correct place, especially everything that happens in the field of the analytic act, whether it is a matter of the relation of the analysand-analyst or the effects of regression.
  257. #257

    Seminar XIV · The Logic of Phantasy · Jacques Lacan · p.161

    the smallest whole number which is not written on this board > **Seminar 15: Wednesday 15 March 1967.**

    Theoretical move: Lacan uses an introductory address to Dr. André Green to rehearse the logic of the alienation operation—specifically the forced/inaugural choice between "I am not thinking" and "I am not"—and to argue that psychoanalytic candidates must maintain critical vigilance rather than subordinating thought to the completion of their training analysis.

    the proper position of a candidate is criticism … They wait until their analysis is finished to think about it.
  258. #258

    Seminar XIV · The Logic of Phantasy · Jacques Lacan · p.217

    the smallest whole number which is not written on this board > **Seminar 20: Wednesday 24 May 1967**

    Theoretical move: Lacan argues that castration is not a narrative fantasy but a structural condition—being "normed" with respect to the sexual act—and that the passage from masturbatory jouissance to the sexual act requires the introduction of jouissance to a value-function through negation/castration, while simultaneously repudiating ego-psychological entity-multiplication and the notion of primary narcissism as an analytic foundation.

    if the analysed subject, if the analysable subject, adopts what is called a regressive, or again, pre- … position … in order to evade the operation, the impact of castration
  259. #259

    Seminar XIV · The Logic of Phantasy · Jacques Lacan · p.185

    the smallest whole number which is not written on this board > **Seminar 17: Wednesday 19 April 1967**

    Theoretical move: The passage argues that jouissance-value originates from the lack instituted by the castration complex, which produces an irreversible reversal: jouissance becomes objectal (not narcissistic), the phallus functions as the unit marking the distance between Objet petit a and sex, and the o-object itself is revealed as the product of the operation of language — the "metaphorical child" of the One and the Other, born as refuse from inaugural repetition, and the foundational starting-point for rethinking logic and the analytic act.

    it is only around this point that there can take their correct place, especially everything that happens in the field of the analytic act, whether it is a matter of the relation of the analysand-analyst or the effects of regression.
  260. #260

    Seminar XV · The Psychoanalytic Act (alt. translation) · Jacques Lacan · p.175

    **THE SEMINAR OF JACQUES LACAN** > **Seminar 10: Wednesday 21 February 1968** > **Seminar 13: Wednesday 13 March 1968** > **Seminar 15: Wednesday 27 March 1968**

    Theoretical move: Lacan advances the paradox that "man and woman have nothing to do with one another" as a strictly logical consequence of psychoanalytic doctrine—not a naturalist scandal—while simultaneously arguing that the psychoanalytic act culminates in the analysand rejecting the analyst as objet petit a (the "o-object"), a formulation he notes has gone entirely uncontested.

    it is as a piece of shit that the analyst is rejected. That depends uniquely on the psychoanalysand.
  261. #261

    Seminar XV · The Psychoanalytic Act (alt. translation) · Jacques Lacan · p.199

    **Annex 3**

    Theoretical move: Lacan's annex summary argues that the psychoanalytic act is the pivotal moment of passage from analysand to analyst, structurally constituted by the objet petit a, and that this act—which dismisses the very subject it establishes—grounds an ethics of jouissance, exposes the fault in the subject supposed to know, and requires that there is no Other of the Other (no metalanguage) as the condition for a consistent theory of the unconscious.

    the elective moment when psychoanalysand passes to psychoanalyst... If the psychoanalysand makes the psychoanalyst, there is still nothing added except the bill.
  262. #262

    Seminar XV · The Psychoanalytic Act (alt. translation) · Jacques Lacan · p.69

    **THE SEMINAR OF JACQUES LACAN** > **Seminar 4: Wednesday 6 December 1967** > **Seminar 5: Wednesday 10 January 1968.**

    Theoretical move: At the culmination of a training analysis ("the pass"), the analysand discovers that the subject supposed to know has been reduced to the objet petit a (the analyst as residue/rubbish), and that the subject of every act is constitutively absent from the act itself — a subject without essence, mirroring the o-object's lack of essence, which is the structural truth that the unconscious shares with the end of analysis.

    he knows that here is the désêtre that through him, the psychoanalysand, has struck the being of the analyst.
  263. #263

    Seminar XV · The Psychoanalytic Act (alt. translation) · Jacques Lacan · p.87

    **THE SEMINAR OF JACQUES LACAN** > **Seminar** 7: **Wednesday 24 January 1968**

    Theoretical move: Lacan uses the tetrahedron of alienation (the "either/or," "I am not/I do not think," etc.) to articulate the structure of the psychoanalytic act, arguing that the analyst's unique advantage is knowing from experience what is involved in the Subject Supposed to Know, and that the telos of the analytic act is to reduce that subject to the function of the objet petit a.

    This 'I do not think' is what allows us to give its sense, to this word truly manipulated in a way that up to the present was rather abject, in this sense that it reduced the position of the psychoanalysand, the patient, to an attitude that I would qualify as disparaged
  264. #264

    Seminar XV · The Psychoanalytic Act (alt. translation) · Jacques Lacan · p.152

    **THE SEMINAR OF JACQUES LACAN** > **Seminar 10: Wednesday 21 February 1968** > **Seminar 13: Wednesday 13 March 1968** > **Seminar 14: Wednesday 20 March 1968**

    Theoretical move: The psychoanalytic act produces the divided subject ($) as its truth-effect, with the analyst serving as support for the objet petit a that causes this division; Lacan then pivots to argue that the logical function of the universal quantifier ("all") is itself grounded in — and displaced from — the objet petit a, making undecidability (Gödel-style incompleteness) a structural consequence of the subject's relation to the not-all, rather than a technical curiosity.

    We can identify this psychoanalysand, to the divided and related couple of the spectator and the chorus.
  265. #265

    Seminar XV · The Psychoanalytic Act (alt. translation) · Jacques Lacan · p.48

    **THE SEMINAR OF JACQUES LACAN** > **Seminar 4: Wednesday 6 December 1967**

    Theoretical move: Lacan uses the triad "I read / I write / I lose" to differentiate three levels of knowing and to position the psychoanalytic act as structured around failure and parapraxis, arguing that the analyst's act is irreducible to teaching (thesis) or doing (faire), and that the passage from analysand to analyst marks the critical, untheorised limit at which the act encounters its own obstacle.

    The psychoanalysand as I recently introduced the word, a pinpointing that spread rapidly, which proves that it is not inopportune and that moreover it is obvious.
  266. #266

    Seminar XV · The Psychoanalytic Act (alt. translation) · Jacques Lacan · p.107

    **THE SEMINAR OF JACQUES LACAN** > **Seminar 9: Wednesday 7 February 1968**

    Theoretical move: The psychoanalyst operates *as* the objet petit a rather than *being* it, and the psychoanalytic act constitutes a paradoxical act of faith precisely insofar as it puts in question the very support (the subject supposed to know) that makes the analytic work possible—this structural paradox is then leveraged to re-read the Marxist critique of alienation, suggesting that capitalist production of the worker-as-subject mirrors the analyst's production of the psychoanalysand.

    if it is true that in the field of the psychoanalytic act what produces the psychoanalysand is the psychoanalyst
  267. #267

    Seminar XV · The Psychoanalytic Act (alt. translation) · Jacques Lacan · p.79

    **THE SEMINAR OF JACQUES LACAN** > **Seminar 4: Wednesday 6 December 1967** > **Seminar 5: Wednesday 10 January 1968.** > **Seminar 6: Wednesday 17 January 1968**

    Theoretical move: Lacan argues that the psychoanalytic act is structurally grounded in the analyst's prior traversal of analysis, whereby the analyst's *désêtre*—his shedding of the Subject Supposed to Know—positions him as pure support for the objet petit a, and that this logic illuminates the status of every act, distinguishing the Freudian dialectic of enjoyment from both Cartesian and Hegelian suspensions of knowledge.

    It is the subject who has accomplished the task at the end of which he has realised himself as subject in castration, qua something lacking in the enjoyment of sexual union.
  268. #268

    Seminar XV · The Psychoanalytic Act (alt. translation) · Jacques Lacan · p.97

    **THE SEMINAR OF JACQUES LACAN** > **Seminar 9: Wednesday 7 February 1968**

    Theoretical move: Lacan argues that the Aristotelian logical category of the subject—understood as that which slips away beneath predication, represented by the empty box in Peirce's schema—is precisely captured by his formula "the subject is what a signifier represents for another signifier," thereby grounding the analytic situation in a logic of the subject as non-being, and linking the history of logical debate to the concealed question of desire.

    how contest the fact that the psychoanalysand, in his place in the discourse is at the place of the subject? … He is essentially the one who speaks.
  269. #269

    Seminar XV · The Psychoanalytic Act (alt. translation) · Jacques Lacan · p.43

    **THE SEMINAR OF JACQUES LACAN** > **Seminar 3: Wednesday 29 November 1967**

    Theoretical move: The passage argues that the analytic act is constituted by a structural feint: the analyst must pretend (while knowing otherwise from their own analysis) that the Subject Supposed to Know is tenable, in order to set the process in motion—but the act itself exceeds doing (faire) and produces a renewal of the subject's presence precisely by excluding the analyst-as-subject from its agency.

    It is to this bench that one harnesses, that one puts the psychoanalysand, it is the bench of a doing. He does something. Call that what you will, poetry or breaking in, he does something.
  270. #270

    Seminar XV · The Psychoanalytic Act (alt. translation) · Jacques Lacan · p.102

    **THE SEMINAR OF JACQUES LACAN** > **Seminar 9: Wednesday 7 February 1968**

    Theoretical move: By deploying Aristotelian syllogistic logic—specifically the middle term—Lacan argues that the Objet petit a functions as the true middle term connecting the psychoanalysand-as-subject to the psychoanalyst-as-predicate, such that the psychoanalyst is defined not as a pre-given identity but as a production of the psychoanalysing task, sustained by the analyst's identification with the o-object in itself.

    the psychoanalysand and the psychoanalyst placed by us in these distinct positions which are, respectively, what is going to be the status of a subject defined by this discourse
  271. #271

    Seminar XV · The Psychoanalytic Act (alt. translation) · Jacques Lacan · p.158

    **THE SEMINAR OF JACQUES LACAN** > **Seminar 10: Wednesday 21 February 1968** > **Seminar 13: Wednesday 13 March 1968** > **Seminar 14: Wednesday 20 March 1968**

    Theoretical move: Lacan argues that the not-all logic of the unconscious prevents any totalisation of psychoanalytic knowledge, and that the psychoanalyst's proper position is defined not by mastery-knowledge but by occupying the place of the objet petit a — cause of desire and object of demand — a position exemplified through the Gaze as the most occluded partial drive in clinical practice.

    Is the psychoanalyst that the psychoanalysand is, at the end of his task, what it is? ... There is no one psychoanalysed, there is someone 'who has been a psychoanalysand'
  272. #272

    Seminar XV · The Psychoanalytic Act (alt. translation) · Jacques Lacan · p.178

    **THE SEMINAR OF JACQUES LACAN** > **Seminar 10: Wednesday 21 February 1968** > **Seminar 13: Wednesday 13 March 1968** > **Seminar 15: Wednesday 27 March 1968**

    Theoretical move: Lacan argues that the analyst's proper function is not mastery of knowledge about sexuality but rather occupancy of the place of the objet petit a—the structural void that conditions desire—and that the analyst's inability to sustain this position drives the institutional fiction of "private life," which insulates analytic hierarchy from the truth of the analyst's own structural impotence.

    From the moment one does an analysis, there is no longer a private life… There is an intermediary lock: it is a psychoanalysed, or psychoanalysing life.
  273. #273

    Seminar XV · The Psychoanalytic Act (alt. translation) · Jacques Lacan · p.66

    **THE SEMINAR OF JACQUES LACAN** > **Seminar 4: Wednesday 6 December 1967** > **Seminar 5: Wednesday 10 January 1968.**

    Theoretical move: The psychoanalytic act is located not at the beginning of an analysis (which belongs to the analysand as task) but at its end, where the fall of the Subject Supposed to Know and its replacement by the objet petit a as cause of the subject's division constitutes the act that makes one a psychoanalyst — thereby grounding the logic of the phantasy in the structure of alienation, desire, castration, and the lost object.

    Beginning to be a psychoanalyst, as everyone knows, begins at the end of a psychoanalysis ... The analysand who has come to the end of the analysis in the act, if there is one, which carries him to become a psychoanalyst.
  274. #274

    Seminar XV · The Psychoanalytic Act (alt. translation) · Jacques Lacan · p.3

    **THE SEMINAR OF JACQUES LACAN** > **Seminar 1: Wednesday 15 November 1967**

    Theoretical move: Lacan inaugurates the concept of the "psychoanalytic act" by distinguishing it from both motor activity/discharge (the physiologising, reflex-arc model favoured by ego-psychological theorists) and from mere action, arguing that an act is constitutively tied to a signifying inscription — and thereby implicates the Subject and the unconscious in a way that demands a wholly different theoretical framework.

    It is sure that we encounter the act on entering analysis... to decide to do what is called a psychoanalysis. This decision involves a certain commitment.
  275. #275

    Seminar XV · The Psychoanalytic Act (alt. translation) · Jacques Lacan · p.33

    **THE SEMINAR OF JACQUES LACAN** > **Seminar 3: Wednesday 29 November 1967**

    Theoretical move: Lacan uses a critique of Ego Psychology's normative ideal (Fenichel's "genital character") and Winnicott's object-relations framework to establish that the psychoanalytic act — constitutively tied to the manipulation of transference — is precisely what analysts have most systematically evaded theorising, and that there is no analytic act outside this transference dimension.

    I absolutely never meant the discourse of the analysed person - as he is improperly called it would be better to say the analysand
  276. #276

    Seminar XV · The Psychoanalytic Act · Jacques Lacan · p.107

    **THE SEMINAR OF JACQUES LACAN** > **Seminar 9: Wednesday 7 February 1968**

    Theoretical move: The passage argues that the psychoanalytic act is constitutively paradoxical: the analyst operates *as* the objet petit a (not *being* it fully) while simultaneously being the only one capable of putting in question the Subject Supposed to Know on which transference—and the very possibility of the analytic act—depends; this produces the analysand as a kind of manufactured product, linking psychoanalytic alienation to the Marxist problematic of alienated labour.

    if it is true that in the field of the psychoanalytic act what produces the psychoanalysand is the psychoanalyst
  277. #277

    Seminar XV · The Psychoanalytic Act · Jacques Lacan · p.78

    **THE SEMINAR OF JACQUES LACAN** > **Seminar 4: Wednesday 6 December 1967** > **Seminar 5: Wednesday 10 January 1968.** > **Seminar 6: Wednesday 17 January 1968**

    Theoretical move: The passage argues that the psychoanalytic act constitutes a structural "tipping over" of the completed analysis: the analysand who has realized himself in castration rotates into the position of the analyst, who must embody the désêtre of the Subject Supposed to Know and offer himself as the little o-object — thus the logic of alienation that initiates analysis is preserved and repeated at a new level, renewing the question of the status of every act.

    It is the subject who has accomplished the task at the end of which he has realised himself as subject in castration, *qua* something lacking in the enjoyment of sexual union.
  278. #278

    Seminar XV · The Psychoanalytic Act · Jacques Lacan · p.158

    **THE SEMINAR OF JACQUES LACAN** > **Seminar 10: Wednesday 21 February 1968** > **Seminar 13: Wednesday 13 March 1968** > **Seminar 14: Wednesday 20 March 1968**

    Theoretical move: Lacan argues that the "not-all" logic of quantification—applied to the proposition "not all knowledge is conscious"—does not entail the existence of a positive unconscious knowledge; instead, the analyst's proper position is determined by their identification with the objet petit a (as cause of desire and object of demand), and each register of this object (gaze, voice, breast, anal) carries an immunity to negation that grounds the psychoanalytic act.

    Is the psychoanalyst that the psychoanalysand is, at the end of his task, what it is?
  279. #279

    Seminar XV · The Psychoanalytic Act · Jacques Lacan · p.65

    **THE SEMINAR OF JACQUES LACAN** > **Seminar 4: Wednesday 6 December 1967** > **Seminar 5: Wednesday 10 January 1968.**

    Theoretical move: The psychoanalytic act is located not at the beginning of analysis (on the side of the analysand) but at its end, where the fall of the Subject Supposed to Know gives way to the Objet petit a as cause of the subject's division — and it is this terminal act that grounds the analyst's capacity to begin each new analysis.

    A psychoanalysis is a task, and some people even say that it is a trade... They are going to say it now because the word has become popular. Nevertheless, that is what it means.
  280. #280

    Seminar XV · The Psychoanalytic Act · Jacques Lacan · p.87

    **THE SEMINAR OF JACQUES LACAN** > **Seminar** 7: **Wednesday 24 January 1968**

    Theoretical move: The psychoanalytic act is structurally defined through the tetrahedron of alienation (the forced choice between "I do not think" and "I am not"), and the analyst's function is to reduce the Subject Supposed to Know to the objet petit a — a move that distinguishes genuine analytic structure from mere discourse and rehabilitates resistance as a structural necessity rather than a defect of the analysand.

    This 'I do not think' is what allows us to give its sense, to this word truly manipulated in a way that up to the present was rather abject, in this sense that it reduced the position of the psychoanalysand, the patient, to an attitude that I would qualify as disparaged, if the psychoanalysand... resisted.
  281. #281

    Seminar XV · The Psychoanalytic Act · Jacques Lacan · p.69

    **THE SEMINAR OF JACQUES LACAN** > **Seminar 4: Wednesday 6 December 1967** > **Seminar 5: Wednesday 10 January 1968.**

    Theoretical move: The passage argues that at the conclusion of a training analysis, the analyst is reduced to the objet petit a (a residue without essence), and the subject supposed to know is simultaneously subverted — a moment Lacan calls "the pass" — such that the analysand-becoming-analyst installs the o-object at the place of the subject supposed to know, discovering that the subject of every act is a subject not-present-in-the-act, and that all o-objects are without essence.

    he knows that here is the désêtre that through him, the psychoanalysand, has struck the being of the analyst
  282. #282

    Seminar XV · The Psychoanalytic Act · Jacques Lacan · p.33

    **THE SEMINAR OF JACQUES LACAN** > **Seminar 3: Wednesday 29 November 1967**

    Theoretical move: Lacan uses the Fenichel/Winnicott discussion to distinguish a normative, ego-psychological discourse about psychoanalysis from the analytical act proper, arguing that transference cannot be legitimised by an appeal to the analyst's objectivity but is itself constitutive of analytic practice—and that the analytic act has been systematically eluded, even by Freud's own treatment of parapraxis.

    the discourse of the analysed person - as he is improperly called it would be better to say the analysand
  283. #283

    Seminar XV · The Psychoanalytic Act · Jacques Lacan · p.48

    **THE SEMINAR OF JACQUES LACAN** > **Seminar 4: Wednesday 6 December 1967**

    Theoretical move: Lacan distinguishes three levels of "mathesis" (I read / I write / I lose) to argue that the psychoanalytic act is constitutively structured around failure and loss, and that teaching (thesis/antithesis) is not itself an act — but the act's topology, in which failure is primary, is what analysis uniquely inaugurates and what analysts themselves resist recognising.

    The psychoanalysand as I recently introduced the word, a pinpointing that spread rapidly, which proves that it is not inopportune and that moreover it is obvious.
  284. #284

    Seminar XV · The Psychoanalytic Act · Jacques Lacan · p.41

    **THE SEMINAR OF JACQUES LACAN** > **Seminar 3: Wednesday 29 November 1967**

    Theoretical move: The passage advances the claim that the Subject Supposed to Know is constitutive of the analytic situation from its very inception, and that the psychoanalytic act is defined precisely by the analyst's feigned (and potentially forgotten) displacement of that function—a displacement that is the condition of truth, not of knowledge.

    The subject, let us say the analysand is not something flat, as suggested by the image of the drawing. Inside, he is himself the subject as such already determined and inscribed in the world as caused by a certain effect of the signifier.
  285. #285

    Seminar XV · The Psychoanalytic Act · Jacques Lacan · p.3

    **THE SEMINAR OF JACQUES LACAN** > **Seminar 1: Wednesday 15 November 1967**

    Theoretical move: Lacan inaugurates his seminar on the psychoanalytic act by arguing that 'act' cannot be reduced to motor activity or energetic discharge (as in ego-psychology and physiologising theories); rather, the act is constituted by its correlative inscription in the Symbolic order, thereby implicating the subject—and specifically the unconscious—in a way that distinguishes it categorically from mere action or behaviour.

    It is all the same something that merits the name of act to decide, with everything that this involves, to decide to do what is called a psychoanalysis.
  286. #286

    Seminar XV · The Psychoanalytic Act · Jacques Lacan · p.199

    **Annex 3**

    Theoretical move: Lacan's seminar summary argues that the psychoanalytic act—the transition from analysand to analyst—is constituted by and through the objet petit a, such that it enacts a 'subjective dismissal' (destitution of the subject supposed to know) and grounds a new ethics of psychoanalysis organized around the structural negativity of the sexual relation and jouissance rather than norms or sublimation.

    the elective moment when psychoanalysand passes to psychoanalyst... Does the psychoanalysand, at the end of the task assigned to him, know 'better than anyone' the subjective dismissal
  287. #287

    Seminar XV · The Psychoanalytic Act · Jacques Lacan · p.102

    **THE SEMINAR OF JACQUES LACAN** > **Seminar 9: Wednesday 7 February 1968**

    Theoretical move: Lacan uses Aristotelian syllogistic logic—specifically the middle term—to argue that the Objet petit a functions as the logical middle term connecting the psychoanalysand (as vanishing subject) to the psychoanalyst (as product/predicate), while also theorizing that the analyst's position is constituted by an 'in itself' identification with the o-object, distinguished from narcissistic human relations by the exclusion of the 'I like you' (tu me plais).

    such a subject whose exercise is in a way to put himself to the test of his own resignation, when can we say to what is a predicate applied?
  288. #288

    Seminar XV · The Psychoanalytic Act · Jacques Lacan · p.175

    **THE SEMINAR OF JACQUES LACAN** > **Seminar 10: Wednesday 21 February 1968** > **Seminar 13: Wednesday 13 March 1968** > **Seminar 15: Wednesday 27 March 1968**

    Theoretical move: Lacan uses the impossibility of the statement "I am not" to anchor the split subject of the unconscious, then extends this logical paradox to the claim that "man and woman have nothing to do with one another" — not as naturalist provocation but as a structural consequence of desire being constructed through the unconscious, with the psychoanalytic act defined as the analyst being rejected like the objet petit a at the end of analysis.

    That depends uniquely on the psychoanalysand. It is necessary to know whether for him shit is really what was at stake.
  289. #289

    Seminar XV · The Psychoanalytic Act · Jacques Lacan · p.35

    **THE SEMINAR OF JACQUES LACAN** > **Seminar 3: Wednesday 29 November 1967**

    Theoretical move: By reading Plato's *Meno* alongside the analytic act, Lacan argues that the theory of reminiscence — knowledge already in the soul, recoverable through questioning — is the archaic, mythical form of the function he calls the 'subject supposed to know,' which underpins every question about knowledge and is inseparable from the structure of transference and the unformulated end of the training analysis.

    In the training analysis, the psychoanalytic act is not on the part of the subject who, as it is put, submits to it.
  290. #290

    Seminar XV · The Psychoanalytic Act · Jacques Lacan · p.89

    **THE SEMINAR OF JACQUES LACAN** > **Seminar** 7: **Wednesday 24 January 1968**

    Theoretical move: The passage argues that the psychoanalytic act is constituted by the analyst's refusal to act, which structurally opens the space for transference and the Subject Supposed to Know; simultaneously, Lacan grounds the necessity of signifying sequence for any 'consequence' to be conceivable, and maps the objet petit a as the horizon-end of every act, not just the analytic one.

    psychoanalysand with the function occupied in the dynamic by him, the psychoanalysand as subject, the little o-object.
  291. #291

    Seminar XV · The Psychoanalytic Act · Jacques Lacan · p.97

    **THE SEMINAR OF JACQUES LACAN** > **Seminar 9: Wednesday 7 February 1968**

    Theoretical move: Lacan argues that the psychoanalytic act forces a return to the foundational problem of logic — the status of the subject — and that his formula "the subject is what a signifier represents for another signifier" re-opens what mathematical logic elides: the initiating positing of any signifier. Using Peirce's schema of the empty box, he demonstrates that the subject is constituted as nothing (no stroke), an effect of discourse rather than a bearer of being (ousia), and that psychoanalysis uniquely ties together the history of logic's ambiguities about the subject by revealing desire as the hidden stake behind logical debates.

    how contest the fact that the psychoanalysand, in his place in the discourse is at the place of the subject? Whatever reference we arm ourselves with to better situate him, it is naturally in the first place with the linguistic reference. He is essentially the one who speaks.
  292. #292

    Seminar XVI · From an Other to the other · Jacques Lacan · p.383

    Seminar 24: Wednesday 18 June 1969

    Theoretical move: The hysteric is structurally constituted as a psychoanalysand because she already embodies the 'subject supposed to know' in her flesh, making the cut that separates this supposition from the unconscious structure (master/woman) the pivotal operation of analytic treatment; in parallel, the obsessional's relation to the master reveals that his desire is constitutively impossible.

    the hysteric, as one might say, is already a psychoanalysand, namely, already on the path of a solution
  293. #293

    Seminar XVI · From an Other to the other · Jacques Lacan · p.239

    Seminar 15: Wednesday 19 March 1969

    Theoretical move: Lacan uses a semi-autobiographical digression on surrealism, Sartre, and student militancy to frame a critique of ideology-critique as self-defeating repetition, then pivots to position sublimation—especially courtly love—as the more productive terrain before gesturing toward the drive-level account of sublimation (the bell/grelot figure) and the broader subversion of the function of knowledge that psychoanalysis enables.

    They have put the work definitively into the hands of the psychoanalysand. They reserve the listening for themselves.
  294. #294

    Seminar XVI · From an Other to the other · Jacques Lacan · p.363

    Seminar 22: Wednesday 4 June 1969

    Theoretical move: Lacan argues that the psychoanalytic act is distinguished from masochistic practice by a double sense of 'faire le maître': the analysand produces/makes the analyst through the act, while the analyst merely plays/pretends at mastery—yet the analyst's genuine function is to bring the full weight of the objet petit a into play, not to master the operation. This distinction grounds a further claim that for the neurotic, knowledge is the enjoyment of the subject supposed to know, which is precisely why the neurotic cannot sublimate.

    the psychoanalysand makes (fait), in the strong sense of the term, the psychoanalyst.
  295. #295

    Seminar XVII · The Other Side of Psychoanalysis · Jacques Lacan · p.50

    *[A porter appears]*

    Theoretical move: Lacan argues that the Discourse of the Hysteric underlies both philosophical discourse (Hegel as "the most sublime of hysterics") and analytic experience, and that the structure of psychoanalytic interpretation operates through a logic of the "half-said" — figured as either a riddle (stating without statement) or a quotation (statement invoking authorial authority) — with the analyst functioning as Objet petit a and cause of desire rather than Subject Supposed to Know.

    the one who accepts in advance to be the product of the cogitations of the psychoanalysand, namely the psychoanalyst, becomes the pledge and the hostage of
  296. #296

    Seminar XVII · The Other Side of Psychoanalysis · Jacques Lacan · p.21

    **ANALYTICON**

    Theoretical move: Lacan distinguishes the four discourses (Master, Hysteric, University, Analyst) and argues that psychoanalytic knowledge cannot be transmitted like ordinary university knowledge, because the being of the psychoanalyst—what is produced when a psychoanalysand commits to becoming an analyst—is the real question, a point left open in his seminar on the psychoanalytic act.

    These are called psychoanalysands... What is generated by the fact that one fine day a psychoanalysand commits himself to be a psychoanalyst?
  297. #297

    Seminar XVII · The Other Side of Psychoanalysis · Jacques Lacan · p.275

    Seminar 15: Wednesday 17 June 1970

    Theoretical move: The passage argues that "dying of shame" is the only affect that registers the Real as such — shame is the genealogically certain sign of a failed signifier, and this logic is used to diagnose University discourse as a perverted Master's discourse that evades the Real. The passage then deploys the Subject Supposed to Know as the mechanism by which the psychoanalysand constructs transference, explicitly warning that identifying the analyst with knowledge of truth would be fatal to that transference.

    The supposed knowledge from which the psychoanalysand constructs the transference
  298. #298

    Seminar XVII · The Other Side of Psychoanalysis · Jacques Lacan · p.105

    *[A porter appears]* > Seminar 7: Wednesday 18 February 1970

    Theoretical move: The Discourse of the Master is identified as the structural inverse of the Analytic Discourse (symmetry with respect to a point, not a line or plane), and the Master Signifier is shown to determine castration by transmitting itself toward the means of enjoyment (knowledge); this move simultaneously distinguishes the unconscious as a disjointed, mythical knowledge irreducible to scientific discourse.

    the one who is in the position of analysand whom we allow, in a way, to make his way into his own quarry
  299. #299

    Seminar XVIII · On a Discourse That Might Not Be a Semblance · Jacques Lacan · p.5

    **Seminar [l:\Vednesday](file://l:/Vednesday) 13 January 1971**

    Theoretical move: Lacan opens Seminar XVIII by arguing that discourse is a structure irreducible to any speaking subject, that the subject is necessarily alienated and split within it, and that the question of "a discourse that might not be a semblance" can only be posed from within the artefact of discourse itself — there being no metalanguage, no Other of the Other, and no true of the true from which to judge it.

    someone, starting from the analytic discourse, places himself with respect to you in the position of an analysand. This is not new, I already said it but no one paid any attention to it.
  300. #300

    Seminar XIX · …or Worse · Jacques Lacan · p.129

    Seminar 9: Wednesday 10 May 1972

    Theoretical move: Lacan uses mathematical logic (Boole, Frege, Cantor) to argue that Truth can only "half-say" itself — that 0 is not the negation of 1 but the mark of a constitutive lack, such that the impossibility of reaching 2 from 0 and 1 formally mirrors the impossibility of the sexual relationship and the inaccessibility of the Real; the analyst's position as semblance of Objet petit a grounds a non-initiatory knowledge of truth that is structural, not esoteric.

    the analyst can understand nothing except in the name of what the analysand says, namely, to see himself, not as cause but as effect of this discourse
  301. #301

    Seminar XIX · …or Worse · Jacques Lacan · p.76

    Seminar 5: Wednesday 9 February 1972

    Theoretical move: The passage argues that the Objet petit a emerges not from any single term (demand, refusal, offer) but from their triadic knotting—a Borromean-style structure where each term only holds meaning through the others, and the "it's not that" at the heart of every demand is precisely the irreducible gap that generates the object of desire in analytic discourse.

    what grounds the discourse of the analysand, is precisely that, I am asking you to refuse me what I am offering you, because it is not that!
  302. #302

    Seminar XIX · …or Worse · Jacques Lacan · p.81

    Seminar **6:** Wednesday **8** March 1972

    Theoretical move: Lacan argues that enjoyment is always "from the Other" but never sexual (there is no sexual relation), and that the Other must be barred — emptied out — to become the locus where the sexuation formulae and knowledge are inscribed; this move connects the barred Other S(Ø) to lalangue, fantasy, repetition (Nachträglichkeit), and the necessity of writing for psychoanalysis to be possible at all.

    I am at the place, the same one, and this is what is educative about it, I am at the place of the analysand.
  303. #303

    Seminar XIX · …or Worse · Jacques Lacan · p.126

    Seminar 9: Wednesday 10 May 1972

    Theoretical move: Lacan distinguishes the unary trait (support of imaginary identification via the mirror stage) from the *Yad'lun* (there-is-One), while arguing that the Not-all grounds both the crowd and the question of Woman; he then re-situates the Subject Supposed to Know as a pleonasm pointing to the analyst's legitimate occupation of the position of semblance with respect to jouissance.

    under the title of analysand, they are standing surety for in his enunciation as subject
  304. #304

    Seminar XIX · …or Worse · Jacques Lacan · p.94

    Seminar **6:** Wednesday **8** March 1972 > Seminar 7: Wednesday IS March 1972

    Theoretical move: Lacan introduces the neologism "Yad'lun" (there is One / il y a de l'Un) as a foundational ontological proposition, distinguishing the One as a structural feature of analytic discourse from both the Platonic dyadic Eros and the Freudian death-drive pairing, while showing that analytic experience turns on the analysand's encounter with division within the One rather than a fusion of two.

    the analysand who is what is at stake, the first mode of the manifestation of this One, is obviously to reproach you with only being One among others.
  305. #305

    Seminar XIX · …or Worse · Jacques Lacan · p.181

    J Lacan - Pierce as astronomer > Seminar 12: Wednesday 21 Jane 1972

    Theoretical move: Lacan substitutes Peirce's schema with his own articulation of analytic discourse, identifying the *objet petit a* as the sole representamen in analysis — the analyst embodies this object as semblance/waste-product so that the analysand can be born to interpreting speech; the passage closes by reframing the analytic relation as fraternal brotherhood rooted in shared subjection to discourse, while warning that bodily fraternity without symbolic mediation gives rise to racism.

    The interpreter, is the analysand... it is the couple representation-object which has always to be reinterpreted, this is what is at stake in analysis.
  306. #306

    Seminar XIX bis · The Knowledge of the Psychoanalyst · Jacques Lacan · p.17

    The Psychoanalyst's Knowledge

    Theoretical move: Lacan argues that the "incomprehension of Lacan" is not a symptom, using this occasion to distinguish the symptom-as-truth-value (a one-directional equivalence introduced by Marxist thinking and refined by psychoanalysis) from mere misunderstanding or resistance, while also clarifying the structure of the Subject Supposed to Know as the ground of transference independently of any certainty about the analyst's actual knowledge.

    since it is I who speak, it is I who am here in the position of the analysand.
  307. #307

    Seminar XIX bis · The Knowledge of the Psychoanalyst · Jacques Lacan · p.120

    The Psychoanalyst's Knowledge > Pascal's Triangle

    Theoretical move: By working through Pascal's triangle and set theory (the empty set as element, pure difference as sameness), Lacan argues that the One operative in analytic theory is not the One of similitude/Platonic universality but the One of pure difference that grounds repetition — the S1 produced at the level of surplus-jouissance in the analytic discourse.

    this major incidence in the talk of the analysand that it exposes with a certain repetition, with regard to what? A signifying structure.
  308. #308

    Seminar XIX bis · The Knowledge of the Psychoanalyst · Jacques Lacan · p.57

    The Psychoanalyst's Knowledge

    Theoretical move: Lacan uses the topology of the tetrahedron to ground the Four Discourses as a structural necessity derived from the properties of four points in space, then pivots to the question of the function of speech as the unique form of action that posits itself as truth—establishing the epistemological basis for the knowledge of the psychoanalyst.

    this is what this discourse reveals to each and every one, who simply commit themselves to it in an oriented fashion as an analysand.
  309. #309

    Seminar XIX bis · The Knowledge of the Psychoanalyst · Jacques Lacan · p.70

    The Psychoanalyst's Knowledge

    Theoretical move: The passage argues that the analyst's knowledge is constituted by a "scrap of knowledge" drawn from the subject's own jouissance—unconscious knowledge that is not "supposed" but emerges from slips, dreams, and the analysand's work—and locates this within the Four Discourses structure where S2 occupies the place of truth and $ occupies the place of enjoyment, distinguishing scientific (mathematical/topological) writing from the zone of discourse where meaning is always partial and borrowed from another discourse.

    It is in this stumbling, in this failed action, in the dream, in the work of the analysand that there results this knowledge
  310. #310

    Seminar II · The Ego in Freud's Theory and in the Technique of Psychoanalysis · Jacques Lacan · p.26

    II

    Theoretical move: By reading the Meno episode of the slave's geometry lesson, Lacan establishes a structural distinction between the Imaginary (intuitive, reminiscent, formal) and the Symbolic (irreducible, forcing, non-homogeneous with intuition), arguing that the Symbolic cannot be derived from the Imaginary and that this cleavage is the founding move for understanding the ego in Freudian — rather than general psychological — terms.

    Meno isn't the analysand, he's the analyst - the bulk of analysts.
  311. #311

    Seminar XX · Encore: On Feminine Sexuality, the Limits of Love and Knowledge · Jacques Lacan · p.110

    **VII** > 92 Complement

    Theoretical move: Lacan uses the distinction between the infinite and the finite to recast the logic of the not-all (pas-toute): in the finite, not-all implies a particular exception, but in the infinite the not-all produces only an indeterminate existence that cannot be constructed—grounding his claim that Woman cannot be written (barred) and that feminine jouissance exceeds the phallic function.

    We can deal with the unconscious only on the basis of what is said, of what is said by the analysand. That is a saying (dire).
  312. #312

    Seminar XX · Encore: On Feminine Sexuality, the Limits of Love and Knowledge · Jacques Lacan · p.7

    On Feminine Sexuality The Limits of Love and Knowledge > **PREFACE**

    Theoretical move: This is a translator's preface by Bruce Fink to Seminar XX, making no substantive theoretical argument; it addresses translation methodology, the problem of misrepresentation of Lacan by secondary commentators, and the challenges of rendering Lacan's polyvalent French into English.

    As is true in the case of an analyst listening to the discourse proffered by an analysand, there is no escaping a theoretical frame of sorts
  313. #313

    Seminar XX · Encore: On Feminine Sexuality, the Limits of Love and Knowledge · Jacques Lacan · p.11

    On Feminine Sexuality The Limits of Love and Knowledge > On jouissance

    Theoretical move: Lacan grounds Seminar XX's inquiry by defining jouissance as "what serves no purpose," distinguishing it from love (which is always mutual and demands more), positioning the superego as the imperative of jouissance ("Enjoy!"), and asserting that jouissance of the Other's body is not the sign of love — thereby opening the problem of what, beyond necessity or sufficiency, can answer with jouissance.

    while it is true that with respect to you I can only be here in the position of an analysand due to my 'I don't want to know anything about it'
  314. #314

    Seminar XX · Encore: On Feminine Sexuality, the Limits of Love and Knowledge · Jacques Lacan · p.93

    **VII** > A love letter *(une lettre d'amour)*

    Theoretical move: Lacan advances that analytic discourse emerges from scientific discourse precisely to reveal that speaking of love is itself a jouissance, and that the soul—far from being a psychological presupposition—is an effect of love ('hommosexual' elaboration), while feminine jouissance points toward the question of the Other's knowledge, which scientific discourse forces us to think without recourse to any Supreme Being's supposed knowledge of the Good.

    the very watchword of the analysand's discourse - is what leads to the Lustprinzip
  315. #315

    Seminar XX · Encore: On Feminine Sexuality, the Limits of Love and Knowledge · Jacques Lacan · p.189

    **Seminar 10: Wednesday 10 April 1973 ..**

    Theoretical move: The passage introduces a structural crisis within linguistics itself — the shift from Saussurean structuralism to transformational grammar, and then the internal antinomies (realist/nominalist, intensional/extensional) within transformational linguistics — in order to ground Lacan's own concept of *linguisterie* as a distinct field that takes the unconscious as accessible only through the said, not through scientific linguistics.

    we can only deal with the unconscious starting from the said, the said of the analysand
  316. #316

    Seminar XX · Encore: On Feminine Sexuality, the Limits of Love and Knowledge · Jacques Lacan · p.163

    Semina r **5:** Wednesday **16 January 1973** > **Seminar 7: Wednesday 20 February 1973**

    Theoretical move: Lacan articulates the structural connection between the barred Woman (not-all), the barred Other S(Ø), and Other jouissance, arguing that what ancient metaphysics designated as the Supreme Good (Aristotle's unmoved mover) is in fact a mythical placeholder for the enjoyment of the Other—and that psychoanalysis must dissociate the imaginary small o from the symbolic barred O to accomplish what psychology has failed to do: the splitting that reveals the sexual non-relationship at the foundation of all knowledge.

    to say anything at all, which is the very watchword of the discourse of the analysand, is what leads to the Lustprinzip
  317. #317

    Seminar XXII · R.S.I. · Jacques Lacan · p.73

    **Introduction** > **Seminar 5: Tuesday 11 February 1975**

    Theoretical move: Lacan argues that the Borromean knot provides the model for a "Real meaning effect" in analytic interpretation: by homogenising the three registers (Symbolic, Imaginary, Real) as equally consistent and showing their non-chain knotting, he repositions the analytic saying (*dire*) as what makes a knot—not mere word-use—while introducing "ek-sistence" as the Real correlate of the knotted Imaginary.

    The word is an object of elaboration for the analysand, but what the analyst says – for he says – what the analyst says has effects
  318. #318

    Seminar XXIII · The Sinthome · Jacques Lacan · p.67

    **Seminar 4: Wednesday 13 January 1976** > W w e W.

    Theoretical move: Lacan uses Joyce's riddle (the fox burying his grandmother) as an exemplar of the analytic response — necessarily "stupid" relative to the poem-like symptom — and argues that meaning is produced by suturing/splicing the Imaginary to the Symbolic, while simultaneously splicing the sinthome to the parasitic Real of enjoyment; the Borromean knot is the structural model for this therapeutic operation.

    the object of the analyst's response to the presentation by the analysand all along of his symptom.
  319. #319

    Seminar XXIV · L'insu que sait de l'une-bévue s'aile à mourre · Jacques Lacan · p.63

    So then what is this lack? > **Seminar 6: Wednesday 8 February 1977**

    Theoretical move: Lacan introduces topological figures (flattening of the Borromean knot) to generate the Real/Imaginary distinction, then cedes the floor to Alain Didier Weill, who constructs a multi-stage circuit using the Graph of Desire and the Purloined Letter schema to theorise the *Passe* as a process by which successive inversions of knowledge between subject (Bozef) and Other (the King) propel the subject through positions of innocence, duplicity, and finally radical exposure before the Other.

    the analyser quite often as we know chooses his analyst while saying unconsciously to himself... 'I am choosing him, this particular one, because I know I am going to be able to best him'
  320. #320

    Seminar XXIV · L'insu que sait de l'une-bévue s'aile à mourre · Jacques Lacan · p.110

    **Seminar 9: Wednesday 15 March 1977** > **Seminar 10: Wednesday 19 April 1977**

    Theoretical move: Lacan argues that lalangue—the mother tongue as obscene, pre-structural substrate—is what the analytic session truly circulates around (via the analysand's kinship discourse), and that the symptom (sinthome), not truth, is what the analyst actually reads; "varité" (a portmanteau of truth and variety) names the only accessible approximation of truth, rendering psychoanalysis structurally an "autism à deux" redeemed only by lalangue's communal character.

    depends on the reading that he makes of his analyser, of what his analyser says to him in so many words…What his analyser believes he is saying to the analyst in question, has nothing to do…with the truth.
  321. #321

    Seminar XXV · The Moment to Conclude · Jacques Lacan · p.16

    **Seminar 3: Wednesday 20 December 1977**

    Theoretical move: Lacan argues that both analytic speech and analytic intervention are fundamentally acts of writing/equivocation rather than saying, and develops a topological identification of fantasy with the torus within the Borromean knot structure, mapping three coupled pairs (drive–inhibition, pleasure principle–unconscious, Real–fantasy) onto a 'six-fold torus'; simultaneously, he reframes the end of analysis as recognising what one is captive of (the sinthome), and characterises science, history, and psychoanalysis itself as forms of poetry rooted in fantasy.

    The analyser speaks. He produces poetry. He produces poetry when he manages to do so – it is not frequent – but it is art.
  322. #322

    Seminar III · The Psychoses · Jacques Lacan

    **II** > **Ill** > **The Other and psychosis**

    Theoretical move: Lacan uses a polemical aside about analytic literature to set up a methodological contrast: the analyst's clinical practice demands the abolition of personal judgment toward patient utterances, whereas the accumulated body of psychoanalytic literature is marked by flagrant, unacknowledged contradictions around basic concepts — implicitly motivating Lacan's own rigorous conceptual return.

    as I was reminded by my analysands [analyses] several times on the one day
  323. #323

    Seminar V · Formations of the Unconscious · Jacques Lacan · p.432

    **THE SIGNIFICATION OF THE PHALLUS IN** THE TREATMENT

    Theoretical move: The passage argues that the resolution of the castration complex does not hinge on having or not having the phallus as an organ, but on the subject's recognition that she/he *is not* the phallus; the Phallus functions as the signifier of desire itself, and the case of the obsessional woman illustrates how misrecognizing this—treating the phallus as an object to be possessed rather than a signifier of desire—leads to analytic impasse.

    the analyst does everything at this moment to suggest to the subject that there is in her a desire to possess the phallus. In itself, this is perhaps not, my goodness, the worst thing he could say, if it were not for the fact that for him that means that the subject has the desire to be a man. Which she doesn't stop contradicting
  324. #324

    Seminar V · Formations of the Unconscious · Jacques Lacan · p.424

    **THE SIGNIFICATION OF THE PHALLUS IN** THE TREATMENT

    Theoretical move: Lacan uses a close reading of his schema—distinguishing the line of articulated demand from the upper horizon of the demand for love—to argue that desire is structurally located in the intermediary zone between need and that horizon, always structured by the Other; he then critiques a clinical case where reduction to a dyadic, two-person (homosexual transference) framework systematically misses the symbolic/phallic elements visible in the dream material.

    It's perfectly clear that the orientation of the treatment opens the door to an entire imaginary collaboration in the two-person relation between the analysand and the analyst
  325. #325

    Seminar V · Formations of the Unconscious · Jacques Lacan · p.489

    **EXPLANATION OF THESCHEMAS** > **1 The signifying chain**

    Theoretical move: The passage argues that the signifying chain is the irreducible structural condition of human subjectivity, the unconscious, and intersubjectivity alike — and that failing to grasp this leads to technical deviations (e.g. Bouvet's imaginary-centric technique), which Schema L is designed to correct by showing how the vector from the Other to the subject must traverse, not reduce to, the imaginary relation.

    the homosexual relationship between the analyst and the analysand, and to imaginary fellatio
  326. #326

    Seminar VIII · Transference · Jacques Lacan · p.52

    **Jacques Lacan** > **THE M AINSPRING OF LOVE** > *Phaedrus*

    Theoretical move: Lacan establishes love as a Metaphor (signifier substitution) by articulating the structural non-coincidence between what the lover (erastès) lacks and what the beloved (erômenos) unknowingly has, grounding transference in this same gap and positioning the trajectory of analysis as the revelation of the unconscious Other through an analogous structure.

    He who seeks us out does so on the basis of the assumption that he doesn't know what he has, and the whole unconscious, the fundamental 'he doesn't know,' is already implied therein.
  327. #327

    Seminar VIII · Transference · Jacques Lacan · p.194

    **M EDICAL H A R M O N Y** > **THE OBJECT OF DESIRE A N D THE DIALECTIC OF CASTRATION** > <span id="page-192-0"></span>**A CRITIQUE OF CO UNTERTRANSFERENCE**

    Theoretical move: Lacan argues that the unconscious is first encountered as the Other's unconscious, which reframes the countertransference debate: analytic apathy is not grounded in the analyst's thorough self-analysis (reduction of unconscious blind spots) but in the analyst being possessed by a desire stronger than other desires—a transformed economy of desire specific to the analytic position.

    the question ... is fundamental to the position of the analysand in relation to the analyst, even if he does not formulate it to himself - 'What does he [the analyst] want?'
  328. #328

    Seminar VIII · Transference · Jacques Lacan · p.193

    **M EDICAL H A R M O N Y** > **THE OBJECT OF DESIRE A N D THE DIALECTIC OF CASTRATION** > <span id="page-179-0"></span>**TRANSFERENCE IN THE PRESENT**

    Theoretical move: Lacan argues that desire is constitutively the Other's desire, and uses this to reread Socrates' role in the Symposium as an unwitting analyst who redirects Alcibiades' transference love toward his true desire — thereby grounding the analytic situation in the structural relation between two desires rather than in object-relations theory.

    how the final articulation of the Symposium... allows us to structure the situation of the analysand in the presence of the analyst around the position of two desires
  329. #329

    Seminar VIII · Transference · Jacques Lacan · p.343

    **M EDICAL H A R M O N Y** > **CAPITAL I A N D LITTLE** *a* > **SLIPPAGE IN THE M EA N IN G OF THE IDEAL**

    Theoretical move: The passage argues that the analyst's function cannot be theorized neutrally from outside the analytic group, because post-Freudian technique underwent a symptomatic "slippage" in which the ego-ideal (Ich-Ideal) was quietly replaced by the ideal ego (ideales Ich) — a displacement that reflects the analyst's own subjective involvement and traces back to the 1920 turning point, where analytic discourse ceased to recognize itself as a discourse bearing on the discourse of the unconscious.

    there is no overlap between what the analyst is for the analysand at the beginning of the analysis and what the analysis of transference will allow us to reveal
  330. #330

    Seminar VIII · Transference · Jacques Lacan · p.200

    **M EDICAL H A R M O N Y** > **THE OBJECT OF DESIRE A N D THE DIALECTIC OF CASTRATION** > <span id="page-192-0"></span>**A CRITIQUE OF CO UNTERTRANSFERENCE**

    Theoretical move: Lacan critiques the Kleinian theory of countertransference by showing that what analysts call "countertransference" — the analyst's feelings determined by the analysand — is not an incidental imperfection but a structural feature that must be theorized through the Graph of Desire (especially the relation between demand, the Other, and the superego), not simply attributed to projection of the "bad object."

    the analysand has a partner. You should not be surprised to discover that the analysand's own ego is attached to the same place.
  331. #331

    Seminar VIII · Transference · Jacques Lacan · p.221

    **M EDICAL H A R M O N Y** > **D E M A N D A N D DESIRE IN THE ORAL A N D A N A L STAGES**

    Theoretical move: The passage argues that the analyst must preserve the gap between demand and desire by resisting premature interpretation: the "margin of incomprehension" is precisely the margin of desire, and collapsing it—whether by satisfying the obsessive's demand, offering phallic communion, or nourishing the subject with metaphor—forecloses desire in favour of symptom, while the object of desire is shown to pre-exist the subject who seeks it.

    what it is most important to understand in the analysand's demand is what is beyond that demand.
  332. #332

    Seminar VIII · Transference · Jacques Lacan · p.210

    **M EDICAL H A R M O N Y** > **D E M A N D A N D DESIRE IN THE ORAL A N D A N A L STAGES**

    Theoretical move: Lacan argues that the gap between demand and desire is irreducible: every demand structurally evokes a counter-demand from the Other, and it is precisely the meeting of these two demands—not a meeting of tendencies—that produces the discordance in which desire exceeds and survives (or is extinguished by) satisfaction, illustrated paradigmatically through oral demand and the nursing relationship.

    the analyst's necessary involvement in the transferential situation, which is precisely why we must distrust this unsuitable term. For, in fact, countertransference simply concerns the necessary consequences of the phenomenon of transference itself
  333. #333

    Seminar VIII · Transference · Jacques Lacan · p.246

    **M EDICAL H A R M O N Y** > **D E M A N D A N D DESIRE IN THE ORAL A N D A N A L STAGES** > <span id="page-232-0"></span>**PSYCHE A N D THE CASTRATION COMPLEX**

    Theoretical move: The analyst's desire must take the form of "nescience qua nescience" — not ignorance but the structural position of holding lack without filling it — such that the only sign the analyst can give is the sign of the lack of a signifier, which alone opens the analysand to the unconscious; this is grounded in the phallus as signifier structuring the entire economy of desire through the tension between being and having.

    He must be but one short step away from being as ignorant as his analysand... he is only effective when he gives himself over to true surprise, which is untransmittable, and of which he can give only a sign.
  334. #334

    Seminar VIII · Transference · Jacques Lacan · p.330

    **M EDICAL H A R M O N Y** > **PENSÉE'S DESIRE** > **STRUCTURAL DECOM POSITION**

    Theoretical move: Lacan reframes the question of transference from countertransference to the analyst's ontological participation ('our being'), then uses this reframing to adjudicate the Kleinian (analyst as object) versus Anna Freudian/ego-psychological (analyst as subject, therapeutic alliance) poles, before pivoting to myth as the structural category that underlies psychoanalytic fate—the analysand's quest for what he calls his 'destiny'—and links it to the matheme of fantasy ($ ◇ a).

    What does the analysand come looking for in analysis? He comes looking for what there is to be found, or, more precisely, if he comes looking, it is because there is something to be found.
  335. #335

    Seminar VIII · Transference · Jacques Lacan · p.443

    **M EDICAL H A R M O N Y** > <span id="page-411-0"></span>**Translator's Endnotes** > **Chapter XXVII - Mourning the Loss of the Analyst**

    Theoretical move: This passage consists entirely of translator's endnotes to Seminar VIII, Chapter XXVII, providing philological, intertextual, and editorial clarifications; it contains no substantive theoretical argument of its own, though several notes gesture toward Lacanian concepts (barred signifier, fantasy, desire, the analyst as object) in passing cross-references.

    it being unclear whether it is the analyst who mourns or the analysand who mourns the loss of the analyst.
  336. #336

    Seminar VIII · Transference · Jacques Lacan · p.425

    **M EDICAL H A R M O N Y** > <span id="page-411-0"></span>**Translator's Endnotes** > **Chapter ΧΠ - Transference in the Present**

    Theoretical move: This passage is a set of translator's endnotes providing bibliographic and conceptual glosses on Seminar VIII's discussion of transference, desire, and the Graph of Desire; it is largely non-substantive but contains two theoretically pointed glosses: one clarifying the aim of *Aidos* as the fall of the Other (A) into *objet a*, and one identifying the analysand's desire as the question "What does the analyst want?"

    The 'analysand's constitutive desire' is the question, 'What does the analyst want?'
  337. #337

    Seminar IX · Identification · Jacques Lacan · p.6

    *Seminar 1: Wednesday 15 November 1961*

    Theoretical move: By interrogating the Cartesian cogito through the logical paradox of the liar ("I am lying"), Lacan argues that "I think" cannot ground "I am" because it confuses the planes of enunciation and statement (énoncé/énonciation), thereby opening the question of the split subject and the impossibility of self-grounding identity in psychoanalysis.

    I remember one of them - one can quote a dream -: 'Why?' dreamt one of my analysands, 'does he not tell the truth about the truth?'
  338. #338

    Seminar IX · Identification · Jacques Lacan · p.193

    *Seminar 14*: *Wednesday 21 March 1962* > *Seminar 18*: *Wednesday 2 May 1962*

    Theoretical move: Piera Aulagnier, invited by Lacan, argues that anxiety is not typed by content (oral, castration, death) but is structurally defined as the collapse of all identificatory reference points—the ego's dissolution before the un-symbolisable—and that its resolution or temporary suspension is bound to the coincidence of demand and desire in jouissance, with castration functioning as the transitional passage that converts the penis into the phallic signifier.

    can cause the subject from time to time to pose the question of the analyst's desire, a desire always presumed never known and for this reason always potentially the place from which anxiety can arise for the analysand.
  339. #339

    The Triumph of Religion · Jacques Lacan · p.70

    III. The Triumph of Religion

    Theoretical move: Lacan sharply distinguishes psychoanalytic speech from religious confession, arguing that the analytic setting is not confessional but oriented toward free speech about anything; religion's potential triumph over psychoanalysis is explained not by any structural resemblance between the two but by religion's constitutive invincibility.

    We begin by explaining to people that they are not there in order to confess. It is the first step of the art. They are there to talk - to talk about anything.
  340. #340

    The Triumph of Religion · Jacques Lacan · p.82

    V. The Word BringsJouissance

    Theoretical move: Lacan reframes the Gospel of John's "In the beginning was the Word" by insisting that the Word precedes the beginning and is the fundamental condition of human suffering ('ravaged by the Word'), while simultaneously grounding the clinical practice of analysis in the Word as a source of jouissance — the reason analysands return.

    why would they come back so regularly for years on end? Can you imagine that!
  341. #341

    Negative Psychoanalysis for the Living Dead: Philosophical Pessimism and the Death Drive · Julie Reshe · p.19

    <span id="page-8-0"></span>Introduction: Welcome to Hell

    Theoretical move: Reshe argues that the death drive constitutes an irreparable "negative insight" that undermines psychoanalysis from within, revealing it as a self-defeating practice: the therapeutic frame structurally contradicts—and thereby cancels—any genuine acknowledgement of suffering as constitutive and incurable, making the psychoanalyst a fraud and psychoanalysis itself a living-dead institution.

    This is when the analysand sabotages a favourable outcome of the analysis, which contradicts the initial demand of the analysand, that is, alleviating their suffering.
  342. #342

    Negative Psychoanalysis for the Living Dead: Philosophical Pessimism and the Death Drive · Julie Reshe · p.138

    <span id="page-126-0"></span>Human Animal, Positive Psychology, and Trauma: A Conversation Between Alenka Zupancič and Julie Reshe ̌

    Theoretical move: Zupančič argues that psychoanalysis uniquely enables access to the structural causes of suffering by attending to the signifier rather than pre-established therapeutic schemas; suppression of the unconscious through positive-thinking regimes or pharmaceuticals does not eliminate its content but forecloses it, producing a return of the Real — a logic she homologizes to the climate crisis as a structural surplus-waste problem.

    a handle that can help the analysand move something in this structure she inhabits, and which inhabits her
  343. #343

    A Voice and Nothing More · Mladen Dolar · p.167

    Silence

    Theoretical move: Dolar argues that silence must be theorized across Lacan's three registers—symbolic (silence as structural differential element), imaginary (silence as supposed plenitude), and real (silence as the mute insistence of the drives)—and that the analyst's silence is not merely an absence of speech but an act that homologizes the silence of the drives, making it the operative lever of analytic practice.

    Psychoanalysis, in its elementary form, places side by side an analysand who speaks—the only rule being that he or she should freely say anything that comes to mind—and an analyst who keeps silent.
  344. #344

    Beyond the Pleasure Principle and Other Writings · Sigmund Freud

    III

    Theoretical move: Freud argues that the compulsion to repeat—manifest in transference neurosis, fate patterns, and traumatic dreams—operates beyond and more primally than the pleasure principle, forcing a theoretical revision that displaces pleasure as the sole regulator of psychical excitation and anticipates the hypothesis of the death drive.

    The patient is unable to remember all that is repressed within him… Instead he is driven to repeat the repressed matter as an experience in the present, instead of remembering it as something belonging to the past
  345. #345

    Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection · Julia Kristeva · p.40

    POWERS OF HORROR > PHILOSOPHICAL SADNESS AND THE SPOKEN DISASTER OF THE ANALYST

    Theoretical move: Kristeva argues that analytic speech achieves a "poetic" catharsis by passing through abjection rather than sublating or purifying it, positioning the analyst's mimetic identification with the analysand as the site where Freudian jouissance disrupts the Kantian-Hegelian tradition of ethical consciousness that would reduce defilement to normative sadness and silence.

    that identification allows for securing in their place what, when parcelled out, makes them suffering and barren...analytic speech is one that becomes 'incarnate' in the full sense of the term. On that condition only, it is 'cathartic'—meaning thereby that it is the equivalent, for the analyst as well as for the analysand, not of purification but of rebirth
  346. #346

    Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection · Julia Kristeva · p.60

    POWERS OF HORROR > WHY DOES LANGUAGE APPEAR TO BE "ALIEN"?

    Theoretical move: Kristeva argues that the collapse of the paternal/condensation function in borderline patients dissolves the sign's constitutive unity of word-presentation and thing-presentation, producing a desperate erotization of abjection as the only remaining anchor to the Other—a position that demands psychoanalysis attend to the heterogeneity of signifiance rather than reducing language to a purely philosophical or Saussurian model.

    'I displace, therefore you must associate and condense for me,' says such an analysand, who, in short, is asking the analyst to build up an imagination for him.
  347. #347

    Powers of Horror: An Essay on Abjection · Julia Kristeva · p.76

    POWERS OF HORROR > DEFILEMENT AS RITUAL RESCUE FROM PHOBIA AND PSYCHOSIS > THE FUNDAMENTAL WORK OF MARY DOUGLAS

    Theoretical move: Kristeva, engaging critically with Mary Douglas and structural anthropology, argues that abjection is a universal, subjective-symbolic phenomenon coextensive with the social-symbolic order, proposing that defilement rituals function as collective elaborations of the same border-logic that constitutes the speaking subject — thereby requiring Lacanian symbolic order and subjective dynamics to supplement (and correct) purely syntactic anthropological accounts.

    as analytic listening discovers them synchronically in the speech of analysands
  348. #348

    Abolishing Freedom: A Plea for a Contemporary Use of Fatalism · Frank Ruda

    Freud against the Illusion of Psychical Freedom > *Einfall*: Associate Freely Now!

    Theoretical move: Free association, far from enacting psychical freedom, operates as a coercive rule that exposes unconscious determination: by repeating the illusion of freedom it simultaneously dismantles it, thereby revealing a concept of freedom internal to—rather than opposed to—determinism.

    The analysand is required to be an attentive and detached observer of the associative movement of his own thought, such that his speech mimetically repeats this associative movement.
  349. #349

    Abolishing Freedom: A Plea for a Contemporary Use of Fatalism · Frank Ruda

    Freud against the Illusion of Psychical Freedom > How to Remain a Rationalist?

    Theoretical move: Ruda argues that Freudian psychoanalysis establishes a "materialist rationalism" whose founding gesture—taking parapraxes and other seemingly trivial phenomena seriously—entails a non-exclusive universalism about rational explanation, a new concept of existence that encompasses what "inexists" (the unsaid, the unconscious), and an immaterial materiality ('un-matter') that constitutes the Real underlying psychoanalytic inquiry.

    Freud therefore came up with the idea that the analyst's 'evenly suspended attention' (*gleichschwebender Aufmerksamkeit*) corresponds to the analysand's 'free association,' to which I will return.
  350. #350

    The Singularity of Being: Lacan and the Immortal Within · Mari Ruti · p.235

    8. *The Sublimity of Love* > *Notes* > *2. The Rewriting of Destiny*

    Theoretical move: This passage, constituted by scholarly endnotes, theorizes the constitutive incoherence of the big Other (barred, lacking any Other of the Other), the pre-symbolic law of the mother as foundational subjection, the distinction between classical and modern tragedy as forms of destined versus destituted subjectivity, and the analytic end-point as confrontation with helplessness and the absence of a Sovereign Good — all articulating how drive, fantasy, and the real internally limit symbolic consistency.

    the analysand's interpretation or construction of the Other's desire can be thrown into question only insofar as the analyst does not react as the analysand expects
  351. #351

    The Singularity of Being: Lacan and the Immortal Within · Mari Ruti · p.67

    2. *The Rewriting of Destiny* > *The Agency of the Signifi er* > *The Analyst as Daimon*

    Theoretical move: Analysis functions as an "interpellation beyond ideological interpellation" by repositioning the analyst as the enigmatic cause of desire, replacing fantasmatic fixations with a transferential relation that reorganizes the analysand's existential orientation and opens new possibilities of singularity.

    Instead of staying forever stuck in repetitive fantasies, the analysand's desire becomes amenable to working through and reconfiguration.
  352. #352

    The Singularity of Being: Lacan and the Immortal Within · Mari Ruti · p.69

    2. *The Rewriting of Destiny* > *The Agency of the Signifi er* > *The Possibility for New Possibilities*

    Theoretical move: Lacanian analysis is theorized as a process that dismantles fantasy-generated fixity—the unconscious reproduction of the Other's desire as one's own—and converts symptomatic repetition into a more fluid, singular capacity for desire, where the goal is not happiness but the tolerance of anxiety and the opening of new existential possibilities.

    The analysand emerges with new relations to life's possibilities, and that increases the capacity for joy—as well as for genuine sorrow
  353. #353

    The Singularity of Being: Lacan and the Immortal Within · Mari Ruti · p.252

    8. *The Sublimity of Love* > *Notes* > *8. The Sublimity of Love*

    Theoretical move: This notes section develops a series of theoretical positions linking Das Ding, lost object, courtly love, and the enigma of the Other's desire to show how love operates as a vehicle for the subject's approach to the Thing—always fleetingly—and how love's interpellation can momentarily suspend ordinary socio-symbolic identification.

    the clinical practice of psychoanalysis can take advantage of the enigmatic desire of the analyst to induce a reorganization of the analysand's psychic life
  354. #354

    The Singularity of Being: Lacan and the Immortal Within · Mari Ruti · p.63

    2. *The Rewriting of Destiny* > *The "Truth" of Desire*

    Theoretical move: Against reductive readings that cast Lacan as a defender of hegemonic law, this passage argues that Lacanian analysis aims not at social adaptation but at releasing the singularity of the subject's desire from beneath the Other's oppressive signifiers—and that refusing to cede on one's desire constitutes both the clinical goal and a form of political resistance.

    for the analyst to make himself 'the guarantor of the possibility that a subject will in some way be able to find happiness . . . is a form of fraud'
  355. #355

    The Singularity of Being: Lacan and the Immortal Within · Mari Ruti · p.42

    1. *The Singularity of Being* > *When Miracles Happen*

    Theoretical move: The passage argues that transcendent experiences function as a counter-interpellation that breaks the hypnotic hold of sociosymbolic investments, thereby releasing congealed drive energies and opening access to subjective singularity — situating this claim at the intersection of Lacanian Real, Santner's theology-inflected post-Lacanian theory, and Althusserian interpellation.

    Lacan's own statement about miracles is much less sanguine, for he makes it in the context of complaining about the fact that analysands are invariably looking for 'a place where miracles happen'
  356. #356

    Read My Desire: Lacan Against the Historicists · Joan Copjec

    <span id="Copj_9781781688892_epub_nts_r1.htm_page237"><span id="Copj_9781781688892_epub_nts_r1.htm_pg237" class="pagebreak" title="237"></span></span>**Notes** > **Chapter 2**

    Theoretical move: This endnotes section for Chapter 2 develops the theoretical argument that the gaze arises from linguistic rather than voyeuristic/fetishistic assumptions, that the cinema is better understood through the concept of the "nonspecularizable" than through the mirror/screen analogy, and that a properly Lacanian account of the subject requires distinguishing the unreturned gaze from imaginary identification and aggressivity.

    It was only with the second, the privileging of the analyst/analysand relationship, that psychoanalysis (properly speaking) was begun.
  357. #357

    Blown Away: Refinding Life After My Son's Suicide · Richard Boothby · p.117

    <span id="Boot_9781635422610_epub3_c09_r1.xhtml_page_117" class="pagebreak" role="doc-pagebreak" title="117"></span>*9*

    Theoretical move: Through the analytic session, the passage traces how a lifelong pattern of self-imposed exile and isolation—from family, from intimacy, from presence—constitutes a compulsive repetition that the analysand only recognizes as such mid-session, connecting childhood withdrawal to adult philosophical "theoria" and forcing a revision of his idealized self-narrative.

    I am chronically uncomfortable on the couch. Working myself up to speak feels like sticking a finger down my throat.
  358. #358

    Blown Away: Refinding Life After My Son's Suicide · Richard Boothby · p.81

    <span id="Boot_9781635422610_epub3_c07_r1.xhtml_page_76" class="pagebreak" role="doc-pagebreak" title="76"></span><span id="Boot_9781635422610_epub3_c07_r1.xhtml_page_77" class="pagebreak" role="doc-pagebreak" title="77"></span>*7*

    Theoretical move: The passage enacts the analytic session as a site where dream-work, traumatic association, and unconscious guilt converge: the dreaming subject's images (black lake, renovated cottage, self-shooting) are mobilized in the transference with the analyst (Barbara), ultimately forcing the analysand to articulate the guilt-laden fantasy that his son's death was his own fault — a move from free association to confession that the analytic frame makes both possible and unbearable.

    The need to know, to make some sense of what happened, that's what drove me into analysis. Yet the labor of the sessions seems impossible. I have to force myself to speak.
  359. #359

    Blown Away: Refinding Life After My Son's Suicide · Richard Boothby · p.39

    <span id="Boot_9781635422610_epub3_c05_r1.xhtml_page_39" class="pagebreak" role="doc-pagebreak" title="39"></span>*5*

    Theoretical move: The passage performs a live demonstration of free association on the analytic couch, illustrating how the analyst's minimal interventions (repetition, silence, well-timed questions) function as quilting points that retroactively reorganize the analysand's speech, and how the unconscious says more than is consciously intended—the most basic tenet Lacan's teaching according to the author.

    I lie back awkwardly and try to relax, painfully aware of the woman sitting unseen behind me.
  360. #360

    Blown Away: Refinding Life After My Son's Suicide · Richard Boothby · p.53

    <span id="Boot_9781635422610_epub3_c05_r1.xhtml_page_39" class="pagebreak" role="doc-pagebreak" title="39"></span>*5*

    Theoretical move: This passage enacts, in a clinical session, the psychoanalytic dynamic of digression-as-avoidance: the analysand's free-associative detour through childhood memories is retrospectively revealed as a defence against the unbearable grief of the son's death, illustrating how the pleasure of reminiscence functions as a resistance to the traumatic Real.

    Why am I recounting this stream of memories? I don't know. I'm savoring them now, but it seems ridiculous to be paying such an exorbitant amount for the hearing of them.
  361. #361

    Blown Away: Refinding Life After My Son's Suicide · Richard Boothby · p.207

    <span id="Boot_9781635422610_epub3_c15_r1.xhtml_page_207" class="pagebreak" role="doc-pagebreak" title="207"></span>*15*

    Theoretical move: The passage performs a clinical-psychoanalytic move in which dream-work becomes the site for recognizing disavowed aggression and tracing an intergenerational transmission of denied ambition; the analyst's intervention forces the analysand to own the dream's transformative energy as his own, turning the dream from passive observation into an act of unconscious desire.

    As I lie down again on the couch, I feel like a prizefighter flopping onto the corner stool and leaning back against the ropes.
  362. #362

    Blown Away: Refinding Life After My Son's Suicide · Richard Boothby · p.12

    <span id="Boot_9781635422610_epub3_c02_r1.xhtml_page_8" class="pagebreak" role="doc-pagebreak" title="8"></span><span id="Boot_9781635422610_epub3_c02_r1.xhtml_page_9" class="pagebreak" role="doc-pagebreak" title="9"></span>*2*

    Theoretical move: The passage performs an autobiographical-theoretical pivot: the author's grief-driven compulsion to *know* what led to his son's suicide, and his subsequent entry into analysis, set up the book's central argument that analytic work ultimately displaces the demand for knowledge with an acceptance of unknowing — a move that challenges the author's own philosophical commitments to theoretical clarity.

    It was that desperate need for understanding that drove me into the terrible silence of an analyst's consulting room.
  363. #363

    Blown Away: Refinding Life After My Son's Suicide · Richard Boothby · p.203

    <span id="Boot_9781635422610_epub3_c14_r1.xhtml_page_198" class="pagebreak" role="doc-pagebreak" title="198"></span><span id="Boot_9781635422610_epub3_c14_r1.xhtml_page_199" class="pagebreak" role="doc-pagebreak" title="199"></span>*14*

    Theoretical move: The passage stages a classic analytic move: the analysand's resistance to self-knowledge (contempt for "pat Freudian formulas") is itself interpreted as a defence against a painful discovery — that projected opacity onto the other (ex-wife, son) screens disavowed rage within the self, illustrating how projection and denial function in the transference relationship.

    For a moment, I'm pulled up short by a wave of contempt for the whole apparatus of psychoanalysis.
  364. #364

    Self and Emotional Life: Philosophy, Psychoanalysis, and Neuroscience · Adrian Johnston & Catherine Malabou · p.14

    Self > Preface

    Theoretical move: The passage establishes a programmatic argument that a genuinely materialist psychoanalysis must engage with the life sciences, and proposes a four-category taxonomy (theorizable/treatable) to map the limits and possibilities of Freudian-Lacanian analysis when confronted with neuroscientific findings, particularly neuropathologies—defending the position that such cases belong to a 'theorizable but not treatable' category rather than being wholly outside analytic reach.

    honestly admitting uncertainty and puzzlement about what it is that they're doing (or not doing) that's responsible for the therapeutic progress of their analysands
  365. #365

    Self and Emotional Life: Philosophy, Psychoanalysis, and Neuroscience · Adrian Johnston & Catherine Malabou · p.16

    Self > Preface

    Theoretical move: Johnston argues that psychoanalysis, enriched rather than foreclosed by neuroscience, can theorize (if not always cure) neuropathological conditions, and proposes a novel neuro-psychoanalytic account of affective subjectivity built on a Hegelian-inflected tripartite distinction between affects, emotions, and feelings—culminating in the concept of "misfelt feelings" as distorted conscious registrations of unconscious affects.

    the more sorts of analysands with more severe psychopathologies he/she is willing to put on the analytic couch
  366. #366

    Self and Emotional Life: Philosophy, Psychoanalysis, and Neuroscience · Adrian Johnston & Catherine Malabou · p.120

    9. > F r e u d a n d t h e U n r e s o lv e d P r o b l e m of Unconscious Guilt

    Theoretical move: The passage traces Freud's unresolved metapsychological tension around unconscious guilt—an affect that cannot, by his own theory, be unconscious—showing how this problem drives the concepts of negative therapeutic reaction, moral masochism, the superego's sadism, and civilizational guilt, while Johnston argues that the phenomenon of "misfelt feelings" is the best way to make sense of Freud's compelled but hedged positing of an unconscious sense of guilt.

    these analysands are driven to wallow in their pain and anguish by guilt; on a certain level, they are convinced that they should be miserable, that they don't deserve to be, as it were, relatively happy and healthy
  367. #367

    Self and Emotional Life: Philosophy, Psychoanalysis, and Neuroscience · Adrian Johnston & Catherine Malabou · p.146

    11.

    Theoretical move: The passage argues that both Freud and Lacan are genuinely inconsistent in their theorizations of affect, and traces Lacan's shifting positions from an initial dialectical entanglement of the affective and intellectual toward an increasingly unidirectional priority of signifier-ideas over affects—a move Johnston critiques as a motivated misreading that subordinates affect to the ideational order of the unconscious.

    it sounds as though therapeutic progress is measured mainly by the degree to which an analysand is willing and able to struggle to voice affects as he/she is being affected by them between the four walls of the analyst's consulting room
  368. #368

    Self and Emotional Life: Philosophy, Psychoanalysis, and Neuroscience · Adrian Johnston & Catherine Malabou · p.233

    13. > Affects Are Si gnifier s

    Theoretical move: The passage argues that the Lacanian distinction between affects and signifiers collapses under the combined pressure of Freud and affective neuroscience: affects are not merely consciously felt feelings (Empfindungen) but can mislead as to *what* they are—not just why—which means the affect/signifier distinction is better understood as a distinction internal to the category of the signifier itself, yielding the "infinite judgment" that affects are signifiers.

    an analysand who consistently lies to his/her analyst, fabricating all of his/her reported dreams, fantasies, and so on, still discloses to the analyst the truths of his/her unconscious
  369. #369

    Reading Marx · Slavoj Žižek, Frank Ruda & Agon Hamza · p.143

    *Unexpected Reunions* > <span id="chapter03.xhtml_notesSet"></span>**Notes**

    Theoretical move: The passage argues that reading Marx through Hegelian dialectics, Platonic anamnesis, and Lacanian subjectivity reveals: (1) capitalism's internal contradictions become visible only at its full realization; (2) liberation requires a master-function that constitutes volunteers as such; and (3) Hegel's theory of labor as negativity corrects both workerist and OOO misreadings of the subject.

    For does this mean that the prisoners are in the position of the analysand? And if so, should one not here also recall the basic fact that (in psychoanalysis) an analysand is constitutively a volunteer?
  370. #370

    Sex and the Failed Absolute · Slavoj Žižek

    **Sex and the Failed Absolute** > The Three <span id="theorem_iii_the_three_unorientables.xhtml_IDX-862"></span><span id="theorem_iii_the_three_unorientables.xhtml_IDX-1095"></span><span id="theorem_iii_the_three_unorientables.xhtml_IDX-2455"></span>Unorientables > [<span id="theorem_iii_the_three_unorientables.xhtml_p259" class="pagebreak" title="259"></span>A Snout in Plato’s Cave](#contents.xhtml_ahd18)

    Theoretical move: By reinterpreting Plato's cave through topology (Möbius strip, Klein bottle) and the Lacanian Real, Žižek argues that the Self is a fragile surface between two outsides, that authentic emancipation requires a dialectics of master and volunteer structurally homologous to the analytic relation, and that capitalist "freedom" and emancipatory "servitude" are two inversions of the same Möbius-strip reversal of freedom/servitude.

    does this mean that those who need a master are—always already—in the position of the analysand?
  371. #371

    The Sublime Object of Ideology · Slavoj Žižek

    INTRODUCTION

    Theoretical move: Fantasy is theorized as a double operation: it answers the unbearable gap of the Other's desire ('Che vuoi?') by filling the void with an imaginary scenario, while simultaneously constructing the very coordinates that make desire possible; this structure illuminates hysteria as failed interpellation, anti-Semitism as racist fantasy, Christianity vs. Judaism as contrasting strategies for 'gentrifying' the desire of the Other, and sainthood/Antigone as ethical positions of not giving way on one's desire.

    the final moment of the psychoanalytic process is, for the analysand, precisely when he gets rid of this question - that is, when he accepts his being as non-justified by the big Other
  372. #372

    The Lacanian Subject: Between Language and Jouissance · Bruce Fink · p.86

    <span id="page-53-0"></span>**The Lacanian Subject** > **Alienation, Separation, and the Traversing of Fantasy in the Analytic Setting**

    Theoretical move: The analytic setting operationalizes alienation and separation as clinical techniques: the analyst's enigmatic desire disrupts the analysand's fantasy ($ ◇ a), while the Freudian injunction "Wo Es war, soll Ich werden" frames the Lacanian subject as ethically tasked with subjectifying the otherness of primal repression — making the subject appear where the drive/Other once dominated.

    Imagine, for a moment, an analysand-ensconced upon the analyst's couch, talking about his or her dream from the night before, filling the room with his or her discourse, hoping that it will be interesting and satisfying to the analyst
  373. #373

    The Lacanian Subject: Between Language and Jouissance · Bruce Fink · p.46

    <span id="page-42-0"></span>The Creative Function of the Word: The Symbolic and the Real > **Trauma**

    Theoretical move: Fink distinguishes two orders of the Real: a pre-symbolic R1 (residuum never fully symbolized, seat of trauma and fixation) and a second-order Real generated *by* the symbolic order itself through structural exclusion (the *caput mortuum*), arguing that what the symbolic chain necessarily cannot write causally determines what it does write — thereby introducing the Real as the structural cause of the chain rather than merely its outside.

    By getting an analysand to dream, daydream, and talk, however incoherently, about a traumatic 'event,' we make him or her connect it up with words, bring it into relation with ever more signifiers.
  374. #374

    The Lacanian Subject: Between Language and Jouissance · Bruce Fink · p.41

    <span id="page-32-0"></span>The Nature of Unconscious Thought, or How the Other Half "Thinks" > **The Unconscious Assembles**

    Theoretical move: The unconscious operates as a formal, non-semantic ciphering system: it is structured not by meaning but by letter-assemblages functioning like set-theoretical inscriptions, so that psychoanalytic interpretation aims not at unveiling meaning but at reducing signifiers to their non-meaning in order to locate the determinants of the subject's behavior.

    What must be glimpsed by the analysand, beyond the meaning inherent in interpretation itself, is 'the signifier-which has no meaning, and is irreducible and traumatic-to which he, as subject, is subjected'
  375. #375

    The Lacanian Subject: Between Language and Jouissance · Bruce Fink · p.14

    **THE LACANIAN SUBJECT** > Pour Heloise

    Theoretical move: Fink's preface argues that the Lacanian subject has two faces—fixated symptom and subjectivization—mirrored by two faces of the object (objet petit a as Other's desire and as letter/signifierness), and that this non-parallel, "Gödelian" structure grounds a theory of sexual difference and underwrites psychoanalysis as an autonomous discourse irreducible to science.

    a paradoxical move by the analysand, prepared by a specific approach on the analyst's part, to subjectify the cause of his or her existence
  376. #376

    The Lacanian Subject: Between Language and Jouissance · Bruce Fink · p.63

    <span id="page-53-0"></span>**The Lacanian Subject** > **The Cartesian Subject and Its Inverse**

    Theoretical move: Fink argues that Lacan inverts the Cartesian cogito by demonstrating that the subject cannot simultaneously possess thought and being; instead of the ego's "false being" (conscious rationalization mistaken for true subjectivity), the Lacanian subject is constituted by a forced choice that permanently separates it from being — a structural inversion of Descartes rather than a mere critique.

    this false being manifests itself every time an analysand says, 'I'm the kind of person who's independent and free-thinking'
  377. #377

    The Lacanian Subject: Between Language and Jouissance · Bruce Fink · p.105

    <span id="page-101-0"></span>Object (a): Cause of Desire > *Imaginary Objects, Imaginary Relations*

    Theoretical move: The passage traces Lacan's early theorisation of the ego as imaginary object (*a*), showing how imaginary relations (love/identification and hate/rivalry) operate through the logic of same/different, and contrasts this with the later emergence of the real object cause of desire (objet petit a), while situating countertransference as an inescapably imaginary phenomenon that the analyst must set aside.

    the analyst is often taken by the analysand (especially at the outset) as a stand-in for the imaginary other
  378. #378

    The Lacanian Subject: Between Language and Jouissance · Bruce Fink · p.79

    <span id="page-53-0"></span>**The Lacanian Subject** > <span id="page-77-0"></span>*Object* a: *The Other's Desire*

    Theoretical move: Through the operation of separation, the Other's inscrutable desire constitutes object a as the remainder of a hypothetical mother-child unity, and it is only by cleaving to this remainder in fantasy that the split subject sustains an illusion of wholeness and procures a sense of being beyond mere symbolic existence.

    When analysands recount fantasies to their analyst, they are informing the analyst about the way in which they want to be related to object a.
  379. #379

    The Lacanian Subject: Between Language and Jouissance · Bruce Fink · p.163

    <span id="page-156-0"></span>Psychoanalysis and Science > **The Three Registers and Differently "Polarized" Discourses**

    Theoretical move: Lacan's late discourse theory in Seminar XXI reorganizes discourses not by agent/position (as in the four discourses) but by the sequential *order* in which the three registers (RSI/IRS/etc.) are traversed, and this allows Fink to argue that psychoanalysis—as an IRS discourse that "imagines the real of the symbolic"—is a praxis unifying theory and clinical practice, sharing this orientation with mathematics and potentially the best of science.

    the analyst, in the analytic setting, listens for the real (impossibilities) in the analysand's symbolic and attempts to hit that real with interpretation
  380. #380

    The Lacanian Subject: Between Language and Jouissance · Bruce Fink · p.56

    <span id="page-53-0"></span>**The Lacanian Subject** > **The Lacanian Subject Is Not the "Individual" or Conscious Subject of Anglo-American Philosophy**

    Theoretical move: The passage distinguishes the Lacanian subject from both the ego (as theorized in ego psychology) and the conscious subject of analytic philosophy, arguing that the ego is a narcissistic construct of crystallized ideal images whose very nature is distortion and error — making it precisely what the Lacanian subject is NOT.

    The point of analysis is not to strive to give the analysand a 'true' or correct image of him or her self, for the ego is by its very nature a distortion. an error, a repository of misunderstanding.
  381. #381

    The Lacanian Subject: Between Language and Jouissance · Bruce Fink · p.108

    <span id="page-101-0"></span>Object (a): Cause of Desire > <span id="page-105-0"></span>*The Other as Object, Symbolic Relations*

    Theoretical move: By tracing the analyst's proper position through a critique of both imaginary and symbolic identifications, Fink argues that situating the analyst as the omniscient Other of demand traps the analysand at the level of demand rather than desire, and that only by relinquishing the position of subject supposed to know—redirecting knowledge-authority to the analysand's own unconscious—can analysis constitute the subject as desiring rather than demanding.

    The analyst, rather than considering him or herself to be the representative of knowledge in the analytic situation, must take the analysand's unconscious as the representative of knowledge.
  382. #382

    The Lacanian Subject: Between Language and Jouissance · Bruce Fink · p.164

    <span id="page-156-0"></span>Psychoanalysis and Science > **Formalization and the Transmissibility of Psychoanalysis**

    Theoretical move: Lacan's mathemes are theorized as a non-quantitative, qualitative mode of formalization whose value lies not in guaranteeing perfect communication but in the transmissibility of the written trace itself across time and interpreters; the "pass" is offered as an allied institutional mechanism for establishing a scientificity peculiar to psychoanalysis.

    The pass is a process wherein someone who has gone through analysis talks about his or her analysis in detail with two other people (passeurs) who in turn report on what they have heard to a committee (Cartel de la passe).
  383. #383

    The Lacanian Subject: Between Language and Jouissance · Bruce Fink · p.166

    <span id="page-156-0"></span>Psychoanalysis and Science > **The Ethics of Lacanian Psychoanalysis**

    Theoretical move: Fink argues that Lacanian psychoanalysis is constitutively a praxis of jouissance rather than a pragmatic social therapy, and that its proper teaching discourse is the hysteric's discourse—one that perpetually challenges authority and resists systematization—while also staging a methodological argument about the peculiar temporal logic required to read Lacan, against the American academic demand for immediate critical mastery.

    analysts act instead so as to further their analysands' Eros. That aim is constitutive of the praxis that is psychoanalysis.
  384. #384

    The Lacanian Subject: Between Language and Jouissance · Bruce Fink · p.149

    THE PHALLUS: ONE OF W~ S PARTNERS > <span id="page-147-0"></span>**The** Four Discourses

    Theoretical move: The Four Discourses are introduced as structural matrices governing different social bonds, with the Master's Discourse functioning as the primary or originary discourse from which the other three are generated by quarter-turn rotations; each discourse's positions (agent, truth, other, product/loss) assign different roles to the same four mathemes (S1, S2, $, a), making discourse a structural — not psychological — category.

    Psychoanalysis deploys the power of the cause of desire in order to bring about a reconfiguration of the analysand's desire.
  385. #385

    The Lacanian Subject: Between Language and Jouissance · Bruce Fink · p.97

    <span id="page-53-0"></span>**The Lacanian Subject** > *The Subject as Breach*

    Theoretical move: The subject is theorized not as a sedimentation of meanings but as the act of forging links between signifiers (Bahnung/frayage); the analytic aim is to "dialectize" isolated master signifiers, which simultaneously precipitates subjectivity, produces metaphorization, and initiates separation—a process Lacan presents as surpassing Freud's "rock of castration."

    the analysand is no longer stuck at that particular point of his or her associations; after running up against the same term off and on for what may have been months on end, it begins to give.
  386. #386

    The Lacanian Subject: Between Language and Jouissance · Bruce Fink · p.23

    <span id="page-21-0"></span>Language and Otherness > A Slip of the Other's Tongue

    Theoretical move: The passage argues that alienation in language is constitutive of the subject: the Other (as the pre-given totality of language) is not merely an external resource but an intrusive force that molds need into desire, installs an unconscious Other-discourse alongside ego-discourse, and thereby fundamentally alienates every speaking being from themselves.

    the analysand (i.e., the person engaged in analyzing him or herself)
  387. #387

    The Lacanian Subject: Between Language and Jouissance · Bruce Fink · p.31

    <span id="page-21-0"></span>Language and Otherness > **Foreign Bodies**

    Theoretical move: The passage argues that the body is fundamentally "written by signifiers" — that language and the symbolic order override biological organization to produce psychosomatic symptoms, erogenous zones, and fantasies — and uses this to ground the claim that different relations to the Other (as language, demand, desire, jouissance) constitute the basis for the clinical structures.

    A former analysand of mine complained of a plethora of psychosomatic symptoms which changed all the time
  388. #388

    The Lacanian Subject: Between Language and Jouissance · Bruce Fink · p.34

    <span id="page-32-0"></span>The Nature of Unconscious Thought, or How the Other Half "Thinks"

    Theoretical move: The passage argues that language operates autonomously as an Other that subjects are "used by" rather than merely using, and that unconscious thought processes — structured by condensation/metaphor and displacement/metonymy — constitute a parallel chain of discourse whose autonomous functioning Lacan sought to model through artificial/formal languages and combinatories.

    Virtually every analysand is astonished early on in the analytic process, in his or her initial attempts to understand dreams and fantasies
  389. #389

    The Lacanian Subject: Between Language and Jouissance · Bruce Fink · p.81

    <span id="page-53-0"></span>**The Lacanian Subject** > **A Further Separation: The Traversing of Fantasy**

    Theoretical move: The traversing of fantasy is theorized as a "further separation" in which the alienated subject paradoxically assumes its own traumatic cause—the Other's desire that produced it as split subject—thereby subjectifying jouissance and relocating from the position of effect to that of cause, in contrast to the Ego Psychology solution of identification with the analyst.

    The analyst must steer clear of the role in which analysands often cast him or her, that of an all-knowing and all-seeing Other who is the ultimate judge of their value as human beings
  390. #390

    The Lacanian Subject: Between Language and Jouissance · Bruce Fink · p.91

    <span id="page-53-0"></span>**The Lacanian Subject** > **The Signified**

    Theoretical move: Lacan's theory of metaphor is leveraged to distinguish between ordinary "understanding" (assimilation of signifiers into a pre-existing chain, which is imaginary) and a "true" transformative process at the border of the symbolic and the real, where new meaning is created and the subject is implicated — making "insight" irrelevant to the analytic process.

    Hence the irrelevance of the term 'insight' in the analytic process: the analysand's subjective frustration at not understanding what is going on... in no way hinders the efficacy of psychoanalysis.
  391. #391

    The Lacanian Subject: Between Language and Jouissance · Bruce Fink · p.48

    <span id="page-42-0"></span>The Creative Function of the Word: The Symbolic and the Real > **Interpretation Hits the Cause**

    Theoretical move: Interpretation functions by hitting the traumatic cause that the analysand's discourse circles but cannot enunciate; through the analyst's intervention a signifier is introduced or pronounced that begins the subjectivization of the cause, with phonemes and garbled speech marking the bridge between the Symbolic and the Real.

    an analysand speaking in the analytic setting is often unable to say, formulate, or come out with certain things; certain words, expressions, or thoughts are unavailable to him or her at a particular moment
  392. #392

    The Lacanian Subject: Between Language and Jouissance · Bruce Fink · p.197

    <span id="page-191-0"></span>*Glossary of Lacanian Symbols* \_\_\_\_\_\_\_ \_ > **Chapter 1 Language and Otherness**

    Theoretical move: This passage consists entirely of endnotes for Chapter 1, providing bibliographic references, clarifications of key Lacanian terms, and cross-references to other chapters and seminars. It is non-substantive in terms of original theoretical argument.

    Unable to 'read' such letters, the analysand brings them to analysis.
  393. #393

    The Lacanian Subject: Between Language and Jouissance · Bruce Fink · p.44

    <span id="page-42-0"></span>The Creative Function of the Word: The Symbolic and the Real

    Theoretical move: The passage argues that the Real is not simply temporally prior to language but is constitutively defined as that which resists or has not yet been symbolized; the Symbolic's "cutting into" the Real produces Reality (existence), while the Real itself only "ex-sists" outside language — a distinction with direct ethical and clinical consequences for Lacanian versus other psychoanalytic practice.

    part of the psychoanalytic process clearly involves allowing an analysand to put into words that which has remained unsymbolized for him or her.
  394. #394

    The Real Gaze: Film Theory After Lacan · Todd McGowan · p.27

    **Introduction: From the Imaginary Look to the Real Gaze** > **Privileging the Unconscious**

    Theoretical move: McGowan reverses the political logic of early Lacanian film theory by arguing that conscious critical distance from cinematic fascination is itself an ideological operation, and that the encounter with the Real Gaze requires full submission to the filmic experience—modelled on the analytic session—rather than Brechtian alienation effects or lighted-theatre vigilance.

    While invested in the film, the subject (like the analysand free associating) is able to encounter the gaze as a disruption within spectatorship.
  395. #395

    The Shortest Shadow: Nietzsche's Philosophy of the Two · Alenka Zupančič · p.125

    <span id="page-33-0"></span>part i

    Theoretical move: The passage argues that truth in Lacan (and Nietzsche) is neither correspondence nor hidden essence but "the staging of the Real by means of the Symbolic" — a conception in which truth "aims at" the Real without being identical to it, illustrated through the play-within-the-play structure in Hamlet; simultaneously, the dialectics of desire/will always already presupposes a "willing nothingness" as its internal condition, with the objet petit a functioning as a stand-in for the void.

    the analysand reports on his or her experiences in analysis... We could say that, in this process, the analysand 'lets go of her or his truth.'
  396. #396

    Theory Keywords · Various · p.84

    **Transference**

    Theoretical move: The passage makes two theoretical moves: first, it extends Lacan's reformulation of transference via the 'subject supposed to know' from the clinical dyad to the reader-text relation, arguing that reading is structurally transferential; second, it argues—against a scarcity model of trauma—that psychoanalysis locates the real source of trauma in excess (especially excess jouissance/sexuality), not in physical suffering or deprivation.

    The analysand places the analyst in the position of an all-knowing expert who has all the answers
  397. #397

    Theory Keywords · Various · p.4

    **Anxiety**

    Theoretical move: This passage is a keyword-glossary compilation that defines and elaborates several Lacanian and Hegelian concepts — Anxiety, Analysand, Appearance, Sublation (Aufhebung), the Barred subject, Beautiful Soul, Beyond (Jenseits), and Castration — drawing on Žižek, Fink, McGowan, and Kalkavage to show how each concept performs a specific theoretical function within the broader structure of desire, subjectivity, and dialectical mediation.

    it is the person in therapy who does the work of analyzing, not the analyst.
  398. #398

    Theory Keywords · Various · p.30

    **Fantasy**

    Theoretical move: Fantasy is theorised as the subject's orchestration of its relation to objet petit a and the Other's desire, with the purpose of producing jouissance — an excitement that exceeds the pleasure/pain binary and may manifest as disgust or horror, as Freud's Rat Man case illustrates.

    When analysands recount fantasies to their analyst, they are informing the analyst about the way in which they want to be related to object a
  399. #399

    Theory Keywords · Various · p.89

    **Transference** > **Unconscious**

    Theoretical move: The passage advances a multi-pronged account of the Lacanian unconscious: it is structured like a language (via the metaphor/metonymy–condensation/displacement homology), it is spatial and relational (between subject and Other), it operates independently of meaning/signification, and its logic can be extended to critique ideological systems like capitalism where surface avowals conceal the real engine (loss/sacrifice) driving the system.

    when a patient makes a Freudian slip–mentions her father but then when asked, denies it–that denial is the closing, and in uttering the denial, the analysand makes an opening into her unconscious
  400. #400

    Žižek Responds! · Todd McGowan & Dominik Finkelde (eds.) · p.174

    Žižek Responds! > [The Subject Is Not Enough](#contents.xhtml_ch7) > Latching On

    Theoretical move: The passage argues that effective ideological critique requires not only a "negative" moment of critical destabilization but also a "positive" moment of "latching on"—an opening toward something new—and that this dialectical structure parallels both the Hegelian movement of self-consciousness and the Lacanian end of analysis, making critique genuinely transformative rather than merely cynical.

    The experience of such a liberation was described by an analysand at the end of the analysis, when he said that 'I feel that everything has changed—and yet I am still the same as when I came here the first time.'
  401. #401

    Transgender Psychoanalysis: A Lacanian Perspective on Sexual Difference · Patricia Gherovici · p.18

    **INTRODUCTION** > **The moment is now** > **Transitions**

    Theoretical move: The introduction argues that the transgender experience functions as a theoretical and clinical lens for unsettling identity as a construction—across gender, race, and sexuality—and that Lacanian psychoanalysis, through its theory of sexuation (separating phallus from penis) and its engagement with hysteria, offers the most productive framework for depathologizing and universalizing trans experience.

    the growing influx in our practices of analysands who identify as trans or outside the gender binary.
  402. #402

    Transgender Psychoanalysis: A Lacanian Perspective on Sexual Difference · Patricia Gherovici · p.35

    **DEPATHOLOGIZING TRANS** > **Psychoanalysis needs realignment**

    Theoretical move: By reframing the trans experience through Lacan's sinthome (symptom as creative solution rather than pathology) and the concept of sexuation (unconscious sexual positioning independent of anatomy or social convention), Gherovici argues for a depathologization of trans experience and a realignment of psychoanalytic practice toward an ethics of tolerance for non-normative genders and sexualities.

    This request interferes in the dynamic between analyst and analysand, potentially putting the psychoanalyst in the position of gate-keeper.
  403. #403

    Transgender Psychoanalysis: A Lacanian Perspective on Sexual Difference · Patricia Gherovici · p.39

    **GENDER IN THE BLENDER**

    Theoretical move: By positioning the analysand as the only "specialist" through the rule of free association, the passage argues that psychoanalytic listening — rather than diagnostic expertise — is the proper clinical stance toward transgender and gender non-conforming patients, reframing the analyst's role as one of non-judgmental openness to unconscious knowledge.

    One might say that the fundamental rule makes the analysand the only specialist in the consulting room.
  404. #404

    Transgender Psychoanalysis: A Lacanian Perspective on Sexual Difference · Patricia Gherovici · p.45

    **GENDER IN THE BLENDER** > **Moving beyond the dichotomy of boy and girl**

    Theoretical move: Lacan's sexuation formulae—by grounding sexual difference in modes of jouissance rather than anatomy—offer a clinical and theoretical framework capable of accounting for trans and non-binary subjectivities, demonstrating that gender is an imaginary effect of a real difference and that bodily identity is a fiction constituted through identification rather than anatomical destiny.

    instead of the pronouns 'he' and 'she,' these analysands refer to themselves using the pronoun 'they'
  405. #405

    Transgender Psychoanalysis: A Lacanian Perspective on Sexual Difference · Patricia Gherovici · p.47

    **BRING SEX BACK**

    Theoretical move: The passage argues that contemporary psychoanalysis has systematically repressed sexuality — its foundational concern — in favor of object-relations, attachment, and relational frameworks, and that this desexualization constitutes both a clinical failure and a theoretical regression; Lacanian sexuation and Zupančič's reading of the sexual as inherently identity-disrupting are mobilized to diagnose this suppression and call for psychoanalysis to re-engage transgender discourse as a site of productive contestation.

    the number of analysands presenting 'gender trouble' might only be increasing
  406. #406

    Transgender Psychoanalysis: A Lacanian Perspective on Sexual Difference · Patricia Gherovici · p.60

    **CHANGING SEX, CHANGING PSYCHOANALYSIS**

    Theoretical move: The passage historicizes the term 'paraphilia' to argue that psychoanalysis has occupied a central and paradoxical role in the pathologization and de-pathologization of transgender phenomena, with the concept of parapraxis serving as an implicit analogy for normalizing sexual "deviations" through psychoanalytic framing.

    records of early treatments of transgender analysands, which are as revealing as they are exemplary
  407. #407

    Transgender Psychoanalysis: A Lacanian Perspective on Sexual Difference · Patricia Gherovici · p.62

    **CHANGING SEX, CHANGING PSYCHOANALYSIS** > **"Not in the least pathological"**

    Theoretical move: Through a detailed reading of Gutheil's case of Elsa B., Gherovici demonstrates how early post-Freudian psychoanalysis reduced gender variance to fetishism, penis envy, and the castration complex—thereby subordinating clinical nuance to a normative, heterosexist medical model—while simultaneously showing that Elsa's own framing of her condition anticipates a non-pathological, subject-centred understanding of trans identity.

    For Elsa, as is the case with many analysands identifying as trans I worked with, beauty and aesthetics offer a pathway to freedom, appearing less a narcissistic striving than as an issue of existence.
  408. #408

    Transgender Psychoanalysis: A Lacanian Perspective on Sexual Difference · Patricia Gherovici · p.85

    **SIMULATION, EXPRESSION, AND TRUTH**

    Theoretical move: The passage traces Lacan's theoretical trajectory from Babinskian psychiatry through Surrealism to a distinctly Freudo-Lacanian account of hysteria, arguing that his "Return to Freud" was simultaneously a return to hysteria as the privileged site where truth emerges in speech, and that his early mirror-stage framework recast hysterical symptoms as imaginary body-fragments rather than organic or simulated phenomena.

    the 'orthodramatization' of the analysand's subjectivity depends on the analyst's response
  409. #409

    Transgender Psychoanalysis: A Lacanian Perspective on Sexual Difference · Patricia Gherovici · p.93

    **THE SWEET SCIENCE OF TRANSITION**

    Theoretical move: Gherovici argues that being "outside sex" (hors-sex) is not a marker of psychosis but a structural feature of hysteria, and that trans men analysands often exhibit a hysterical structure characterised by an irreducible indecision about sexual positioning, dissatisfied desire, and a defensive strategy against castration — thereby relocating the clinical question of trans identity from foreclosure to neurosis.

    I am currently working with several analysands who identify as trans men, who take 'T' (testosterone), who look for love by dating cis women, cis men, trans men, trans women, gays, lesbians; their psychic structure is that of hysteria
  410. #410

    Transgender Psychoanalysis: A Lacanian Perspective on Sexual Difference · Patricia Gherovici · p.99

    **THE SINGULAR UNIVERSALITY OF TRANS**

    Theoretical move: Through the case of Henri/Anne-Henriette, Gherovici argues that Lacan's clinical approach to gender-variant patients enacts an ethics of sexual difference that refuses to ground sexual identity in organ attribution (the phallus as organon), insisting instead that the subject must ultimately subscribe to their own choice—a move that anticipates a structuralist account of the trans phenomenon.

    it has been my experience with many analysands with this type of gender trouble, had tried to commit suicide, and was often navigating the treacherous liminal space between life and death.
  411. #411

    Transgender Psychoanalysis: A Lacanian Perspective on Sexual Difference · Patricia Gherovici · p.109

    **PORTRAITS IN A TWO-WAY MIRROR** > **Anxious? Castration is the solution!**

    Theoretical move: By reading clinical cases of sexual ambiguity through Lacanian concepts of castration and lack, the passage argues that the psychoanalytic subject is constituted by subjectivized lack — not by a stable sexual identity — and that castration anxiety, properly understood, is a productive organizing force rather than a wound, one that psychoanalysis itself must now undergo in relation to transgender subjects.

    This was shown by an analytic session with Melissa, as I call her, a 24-year-old female analysand.
  412. #412

    Transgender Psychoanalysis: A Lacanian Perspective on Sexual Difference · Patricia Gherovici · p.118

    **PLASTIC SEX, THE BEAUTY OF IT** > **The plasticity of gender**

    Theoretical move: The passage argues that sexual identity transcends anatomical plasticity by invoking the death drive as a structural limit to the promise of endless gender transformation — against both Giddens' "plastic sexuality" (freed from the phallus and reproduction) and Butler's performative plasticity, the real of mortality and the drive return as irreducible constraints.

    Can we understand the transformation of Angelina Jolie—her mastectomy and subsequent reconstructive surgery—and that of my analysand Maxwell in the same context?
  413. #413

    Transgender Psychoanalysis: A Lacanian Perspective on Sexual Difference · Patricia Gherovici

    **THAT OBSCURE OBJECT**

    Theoretical move: The anal object is theorized as a non-gendered, universally applicable model for subjective loss, making it relevant across cis and trans subjectivities, while simultaneously showing how even excremental practice is organized by cultural signifiers (Ladies/Gentlemen) that impose sexual difference.

    one of my analysands unwittingly testified to the importance of our cloacal destiny: 'I am an asshole letting my partner treat me like shit.'
  414. #414

    Transgender Psychoanalysis: A Lacanian Perspective on Sexual Difference · Patricia Gherovici · p.149

    **THE ART OF ARTIFICE**

    Theoretical move: The transgender body-as-art-project illustrates how writing on the body functions as a sinthome — a structural supplement analogous to Joyce's use of art — such that the trans experience of bodily transformation makes visible a universal "curative" role of writing that Lacanian clinical practice can generalise beyond trans patients to the broader question of embodiment and the symptom.

    the issue of body-writing and bodies-as-written is an issue I have often encountered in my practice while working with analysands who identify as trans.
  415. #415

    Transgender Psychoanalysis: A Lacanian Perspective on Sexual Difference · Patricia Gherovici · p.152

    **CLINIC OF THE CLINAMEN**

    Theoretical move: The passage argues that Lacan's engagement with Joyce's writing marks a decisive theoretical pivot: rather than "applying" psychoanalysis to art psychobiographically, Lacan derives from Joyce a new definition of the symptom as *sinthome* — a creative knotting of the three registers that provides an organization of jouissance and becomes the basis for identification, reorienting the aim of the cure from symptom-removal to identification with one's sinthome.

    psychoanalytic interpretation would work only within the boundaries of the transference relationship established between analysand and analyst.
  416. #416

    Transgender Psychoanalysis: A Lacanian Perspective on Sexual Difference · Patricia Gherovici · p.177

    **BODY TROUBLE** > **Born This Way**

    Theoretical move: Gherovici argues that the transgender request is fundamentally structured around the Real of the death drive and the limits of mortal existence, not merely around sex/gender binaries; using Lacan's sinthome, the drive, and the mirror stage, she shows that gender transition is a "new birth" in which art and desire confront the border between life and death.

    The drama of many analysands identified as transgender is often predicated around existential issues, for beyond the gender trouble, it is often a matter of life and death.
  417. #417

    Transgender Psychoanalysis: A Lacanian Perspective on Sexual Difference · Patricia Gherovici · p.20

    **INTRODUCTION** > **The moment is now** > **Transitions**

    Theoretical move: The passage argues that Lacan's concept of the sinthome—redefining the symptom as a singular invention enabling one to live rather than a repressed signifier to be decoded—opens a post-Oedipal, post-phallic framework for thinking sexual difference and offers positive clinical outcomes for trans analysands, extended by the author's proposed "clinic of the clinamen."

    This new definition of the symptom has important consequences for a positive ending of analysis in cases of analysands who identify as trans.
  418. #418

    Transgender Psychoanalysis: A Lacanian Perspective on Sexual Difference · Patricia Gherovici · p.90

    **SIMULATION, EXPRESSION, AND TRUTH**

    Theoretical move: By reading Freud's *prôton pseudos* as "fallacy" rather than "lie," Gherovici argues that hysteria's founding logic is one of constitutive undecidability between error, deception, and creativity—and leverages this to propose that the analyst must listen to trans patients the way Freud listened to hysterics: allowing unconscious errancy to disclose subjective truth rather than reducing subjects to objects of classification.

    when an analyst receives into the office an analysand who might identify as transgender, the analyst has the opportunity to repeat Freud's gesture when confronted with his first hysteric patients
  419. #419

    What Is Sex? · Alenka Zupančič · p.74

    Contradictions that Matter > Hm…

    Theoretical move: Zupančič argues that the apparent opposition between equivocity (Cassin) and formalization/univocity (Badiou) in Lacan is false: equivocity is not the opposite of formalization but its very condition, since the "right word" in analytic interpretation functions like a formula by targeting the singular impasse/contradiction that the symptom "solves," rather than by conveying a determinate meaning.

    I learn everything from my analysands; it is from them that I learn what psychoanalysis is about. I borrow my interventions from them, and not from my teaching.