Freudian Affect Metapsychology
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#01
Self and Emotional Life: Philosophy, Psychoanalysis, and Neuroscience · Adrian Johnston & Catherine Malabou · p.139
10. > F r e u d 's M e ta p s y c h o l o g i e s of Affective Life
Theoretical move: By carefully parsing Freud's 1915 German terminology (Affektbildung, Affektbetrag, Affekt-qua-Gefühl, Empfindung), the passage argues that Freud's metapsychology of affect is more complex and less consistent than both Lacanian and Anglo-American inheritors acknowledge, and that Pulver's clinical categories of "unconscious affects" and "potential affects" largely rediscover distinctions already latent in Freud—setting up a critique of Lacan's tendency to reduce affect to a secondary by-product of ideational-representational structure.
Freud's account of affect (or, more accurately, accounts), especially in his metapsychological writings from the era around 1915, has been treated by the vast majority of his successors of various stripes, both Lacanian and non-Lacanian, as an open-and-shut matter of established exegetical fact