Cerebral Autoaffection
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Where it appears in the corpus (2)
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#01
Self and Emotional Life: Philosophy, Psychoanalysis, and Neuroscience · Adrian Johnston & Catherine Malabou · p.247
13. > The Paradoxes of the Principle of Constancy > Psychoanalysis: Are There Unconscious Feelings?
Theoretical move: The passage argues that homeostasis is not a mechanistic energetic process but an affective, auto-representative structure: the brain's self-regulation constitutes a "cerebral unconscious" grounded in autoaffection rather than in Freudian energetics, thereby challenging the classical psychoanalytic separation of the unconscious from biological self-regulation and redefining the unconscious as the autoaffection of the brain in its entirety.
How can one comprehend more exactly the concept of the brain's autoaffection? … Cerebral autoaffection is not of the same nature as the autoaffection of a subject such as philosophers define it. Cerebral autoaffection does not redouble its specularity up to the point of giving itself the form of consciousness.
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#02
Self and Emotional Life: Philosophy, Psychoanalysis, and Neuroscience · Adrian Johnston & Catherine Malabou · p.249
13. > The Paradoxes of the Principle of Constancy > Psychoanalysis: Are There Unconscious Feelings?
Theoretical move: Malabou argues that the neurobiological (Damasian) unconscious and the Freudian unconscious are structurally opposed: the former is temporal, destructible, and anonymous (cerebral autoaffection constituting finitude without self-knowledge), while the latter is timeless and 'immortal'—yet this very contrast, especially the potential loss of affect, opens a new chapter in the theory of the death drive.
Cerebral autoaffection is the biological process, both logical and affective, by which finitude is constituted in the core of subjectivity without ever being able to become, at the same time, the knowledge (savoir) of the subject.