Affect as Pseudo-Evidence
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Where it appears in the corpus (1)
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#01
Self and Emotional Life: Philosophy, Psychoanalysis, and Neuroscience · Adrian Johnston & Catherine Malabou · p.167
11.
Theoretical move: The passage argues that affects are irreducibly entangled with signifying systems (primal and secondary repression both involve displacement of affect), such that the discourse of the analyst produces a single affect—anxiety about one's status as object—by hystericizing the parlêtre, while lalangue names the pre-syntactic, libidinal substrate of language that persists into analytic free association and reveals the unconscious's private, nonsensical play with the mother tongue.
Soler claims that 'affects have for the affected the force of immediate evidence, of a pseudo-evidence.' Although this is generally true… a good analysis dispels this illusory immediacy qua self-evidence, bringing to light its 'pseudo' status.