Senti-ment
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All occurrences
Where it appears in the corpus (2)
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#01
Self and Emotional Life: Philosophy, Psychoanalysis, and Neuroscience · Adrian Johnston & Catherine Malabou · p.238
13. > The Paradoxes of the Principle of Constancy > Psychoanalysis: Are There Unconscious Feelings?
Theoretical move: The passage argues that Freud and Lacan's shared thesis—that affects are always conscious and the unconscious is constituted by signifiers/representations, not affects—runs into paradox through the concept of "misfelt feelings" (guilt, anxiety), and that this psychoanalytic topology of drive, representation, and affect is now challenged by neurobiology's discovery of an emotionally competent, symbolically active brain.
perhaps it is possible to reconcile here what Lacan calls a senti-ment, playing with the two verbs sentir (to feel) and mentir (to lie), with what Johnston names a 'misfelt feeling.'
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#02
Self and Emotional Life: Philosophy, Psychoanalysis, and Neuroscience · Adrian Johnston & Catherine Malabou · p.292
13. > Inde x > Freud, Sigmund (*continued*)
Theoretical move: This index chunk maps the theoretical terrain of a Freudian-Lacanian metapsychology of affects, tracking key debates around unconscious affects, the priority of signifiers over affects, the translation problems around Vorstellungsrepräsentanz, and Lacan's neologisms (lalangue, jouis-sens, senti-ment) as attempts to articulate the affective-linguistic interface — while situating these debates in relation to neuroscience, neurobiology, and continental philosophy.
neologism senti-ment, 141, 146–47, 213