Semblance
ELI5
Semblance is Lacan's word for the way discourse always shows up wearing a mask — not hiding some real truth behind it, but being a mask that has nothing behind it, yet still works and matters, especially when it comes to sex, language, and who gets to speak.
Definition
Semblance (le semblant) in Lacanian theory is not simply a synonym for illusion, appearance, or falsehood. It names the structural condition of discourse as such: the necessary medium through which the real is approached without ever being reached. Lacan formally designates the agent-position (top-left) of all four discourses as "the place of the semblance," making it the constitutive slot from which any discourse is launched. The signifier itself is identified with semblance — not as a copy of some pre-existing reality, but as that which exists in the place where there is nothing, deceiving at the level of being rather than content. In this sense, semblance is neither true nor false in the logical sense; it is a "semblance of truth" — a structural position that imitates truth without coinciding with it, and from which the real can only be registered as an impossible hole or rupture.
The concept carries a double valence with respect to jouissance. On the one hand, every discourse generates a semblance of jouissance (the phallic signifier standing in for what cannot be directly enjoyed); on the other hand, there is a jouissance in semblance itself — a satisfaction in the very fact of pretending. The phallus is ultimately identified as the name of this semblance, the signifier that stands in for the missing sexual relationship. Semblance is thus irreducibly phallic: "as truth it can only say the semblance about enjoyment, and it wins over sexual enjoyment on every occasion." In the discourse of the analyst, the objet petit a is placed in the position of semblance — not to deceive, but to operate as a "representamen" that redirects surplus-jouissance toward the analysand. The analyst's position is therefore a structural one: he "occupies the position of semblance," embodying a mask that is neither pretence nor being, analogous to the Greek theatrical mask. Miller's formula cited by Žižek distills this logic: semblance is a veil that veils nothing — its function is to create the illusion that something is hidden beneath it.
Evolution
In the early period of the Four Discourses (Seminar XVIII, 1971), Lacan introduces semblance as the defining structural feature of discourse itself. The very title of Seminar XVIII — "On a discourse that might not be a semblance" — announces that all existing discourse is constitutively semblance, and the question is only whether an analytic discourse could ever be otherwise. Here semblance is grounded cosmologically (the rainbow, thunder, animal display) before being elevated to a formal structural category: the agent-position in the four discourses. Semblance is distinguished from mere appearance: it does not misrepresent a real object but exists in the place of a constitutive lack, deceiving at the level of being. The woman occupies a privileged position here: she "is the one who knows what is disjunctive between enjoyment and the semblance," making her the truth of man precisely insofar as she exposes the gap between semblance and jouissance.
By the encore-real period (Seminars XIX, XIX½, XX, 1972–73), the concept is refined and formalized. Semblance is now one of four terms in the quadripode (alongside truth, jouissance, and surplus-jouissance) and is explicitly identified as the structural pole correlative to jouissance as obstacle to the sexual relationship. Meaning itself — including sexual meaning — is declared to be "based on semblance" (Seminar XX). The analyst's occupation of the place of semblance with the objet petit a is developed as the clinical pivot of analytic discourse, distinguishing it from the discourse of the master and from psychology. The objet a is theorized as "semblance of being" — it seems to give being support, but resolves only in failure when it approaches the real.
In the late Borromean period (Seminar XXIV, 1977), Lacan revisits semblance through topological and quasi-etymological reflection, coining "s'emblant" as the reflexive form to describe L'étourdit's near-approach to metalanguage — a semblance of metalanguage that never quite arrives. This marks a late intensification: semblance is no longer only a structural position in discourse but is implicated in the very possibility and impossibility of language speaking about itself.
Among commentators, Žižek (drawing on J.-A. Miller) radicalizes the concept by linking it to the Platonic problem of non-being and to the logic of the veil that veils nothing. He also introduces the double genitive structure — semblance of jouissance and jouissance in semblance — giving the concept an explicitly dialectical character that goes beyond its purely structural use in Lacan's seminars. Zupančič, working from a different angle, aligns le semblant with Kantian transcendental illusion: both deceive not by misrepresenting an object but by existing where there should be nothing, thereby grounding the concept in a broader epistemological tradition.
Key formulations
Seminar XVIII · On a Discourse That Might Not Be a Semblance (p.21)
this place still not designated, I am designating by its name, by the name that it deserves, it is very precisely the place of the semblance... semblance is not only locatable, essential, to designate the primary function of truth, it is impossible without this reference to qualify what is involved in discourse
This is Lacan's formal naming of the agent-position in all four discourses as 'the place of the semblance,' establishing it as the structural condition of both discourse and truth — not an idealist illusion but the necessary medium of discourse.
Seminar XVIII · On a Discourse That Might Not Be a Semblance (p.155)
There is no discourse except a semblance... The semblance is only stated starting from the truth... As truth it can only say the semblance about enjoyment, and it wins over sexual enjoyment on every occasion.
This triple formulation makes semblance the universal condition of discourse, links it constitutively to truth, and identifies it as the structural barrier between truth and jouissance — the phallus being the name of this semblance.
Seminar XX · Encore: On Feminine Sexuality, the Limits of Love and Knowledge (p.88)
What analytic discourse brings out is precisely the idea that that meaning is based on semblance (ce sens est du semblant).
This compact formulation from Seminar XX crystallises the epistemological function of semblance: meaning, including sexual meaning, does not reach the real but rests on a counterfeit appearance, distinguishing analytic from scientific discourse.
Less Than Nothing: Hegel and the Shadow of Dialectical Materialism (page unknown)
when Lacan claims that every discourse generates a semblance of jouissance, one should read this as involving genitivus objectivus as well as subjectivus: the semblance of jouissance (not a fully real one) and a jouissance in (the fact that what we are dealing with is a mere) semblance.
Žižek's double-genitive reading articulates the dialectical complexity suppressed in purely structural accounts: semblance is not only what replaces jouissance but itself generates a form of jouissance, linking Symbolic and Real in a non-trivial loop.
Ethics of the Real: Kant and Lacan (p.79)
Transcendental illusion has to do not with the content of an 'image' but with its very existence - it deceives on the level of being. In this respect, the Kantian concept of (transcendental) illusion is very close to the Lacanian concept of le semblant.
Zupančič's alignment of le semblant with Kantian transcendental illusion is pivotal for situating the concept philosophically: semblance deceives not by distorting a real object but by occupying the place of a constitutive lack — an object in place of the absence of an object.
Cited examples
The rainbow as the paradigmatic semblance in nature (other)
Cited by Seminar XVIII · On a Discourse That Might Not Be a Semblance (p.10). Lacan uses the rainbow as his primary illustration of semblance in nature: no one, even among the most 'primitive' peoples, ever believed the rainbow was a solid arc set up in the sky. It is questioned as an atmospheric phenomenon — something that appears as a figure without being a thing. This makes it 'the very figure of the semblance' and grounds Lacan's claim that all discourse, like all science (beginning with the observation of meteors and constellations), starts from what in nature is a semblance.
Thunder as the structural semblance at the origin of the Name of the Father (other)
Cited by Seminar XVIII · On a Discourse That Might Not Be a Semblance (p.10). Lacan identifies thunder as 'the most characteristic atmospheric phenomenon' linked to the very structure of discourse, and explicitly connects it to the Name of the Father: 'no Name of the Father is tenable without thunder.' Thunder is a semblance because no one knows what it is the sign of — it is the pure figure of signification without a determinable referent.
Hitchcock's Stage Fright and the lying flashback (film)
Cited by Less Than Nothing: Hegel and the Shadow of Dialectical Materialism (page unknown). Žižek invokes the famous 'false flashback' in Hitchcock's Stage Fright — where what is shown as a direct flashback turns out to have been narrated by the murderer and thus was a lie — to illustrate the problem of 'pretending to pretend' within the symbolic order. This is used to show how semblance operates: the symbolic fiction (flashback as truth) carries more ontological weight than the 'stupid reality' beneath it, exemplifying Lacan's claim that semblance is a veil that veils nothing yet still functions.
Hitler's moustache as the tiny surplus-jouissance crystallising mass identification (history)
Cited by Seminar XVIII · On a Discourse That Might Not Be a Semblance (p.29). Lacan invokes Hitler's moustache as the minimal, seemingly trivial object — 'the tiny little surplus enjoying of Hitler, that went no further perhaps than his moustache' — that was sufficient to crystallise mass identification among people fully committed to capitalist discourse. This illustrates how semblance operates at the level of the object: an identification with a small piece of jouissance, a pure semblance, can organise a whole social-political formation.
Tensions
Within the corpus
Is semblance aligned with the Imaginary (as quasi-phenomenal form/appearance) or is it a structural category of the Symbolic that is irreducible to the Imaginary/Real distinction?
Lacan (Seminar XVIII, 'Lituraterre'): The letter ruptures the semblance — semblance belongs to the register of form, phenomena, and appearance (clouds, meteors), distinguished from both the Real (furrowing/letter) and the Symbolic (signifier), functioning as a quasi-Imaginary term that the letter dissolves. — cite: jacques-lacan-seminar-18 p.128
Lacan (Seminar XVIII, opening session): Semblance is structurally identical to the signifier itself and is the condition of all discourse — not an imaginary appearance but the very medium of the Symbolic; 'everything that is discourse, can only present itself as semblance... is identical to this status as such of the semblance.' — cite: jacques-lacan-seminar-18 p.10
This tension — semblance as quasi-Imaginary (ruptured by the letter) vs. semblance as co-extensive with the Symbolic (identical to the signifier) — reflects an unresolved oscillation within Seminar XVIII itself between topological and ontological uses of the term.
Does the discourse of the analyst escape being a semblance, or is it merely the most appropriate placement of semblance?
Lacan (Seminar XVIII): The seminar is titled 'On a discourse that might not be a semblance,' and Lacan suggests that a discourse centred from its effect as impossible 'will have some chance of being a discourse that might not be a semblance' — implying analytic discourse aspires beyond semblance. — cite: jacques-lacan-seminar-18 p.17
Lacan (Seminar XIX): 'Discourse as such, is always the discourse of a semblance' — and in Seminar XIX½, the analyst 'occupies the position of a semblance' with the objet a placed in the place of semblance, making analytic discourse the most apt deployment of semblance, not its overcoming. — cite: jacques-lacan-seminar-19 p.177
This tension marks the movement from Seminar XVIII's utopian posing of the question to the later seminars' more sober structural answer: there is no escape from semblance, only a more rigorous occupation of its place.
Across frameworks
vs Object Oriented Ontology
Lacanian: For Lacan, semblance is not a veil over a fully present real object but a structural placeholder for a constitutive absence. The real is not hidden behind semblance — it is what semblance points toward as impossible, as what does not cease not to be written. Semblance is the condition of discourse, not an epistemic obstacle to be overcome by withdrawing to the object itself.
Object Oriented Ontology: Object-Oriented Ontology (Harman, Bryant) posits that all objects withdraw from any relation or access — every encounter with an object is already a sensory/aesthetic translation, not the object itself. Objects 'lure' other objects through their qualities, which are themselves a kind of semblance or allure. But OOO frames this as a universal feature of object-object relations, with no privileged position of the subject or of language, and without the irreducible role of jouissance or the sexual non-relation.
Fault line: Lacan insists semblance is structurally tied to the speaking being, to jouissance, and to the sexual non-relation — it is a function of the signifier, not a universal feature of all entities. OOO democratises withdrawal/allure across all objects, dissolving the specifically human-linguistic register that gives semblance its Lacanian force.
vs Frankfurt School
Lacanian: Lacanian semblance is not ideology in the Frankfurt School sense: it does not function as a mystification of real social relations that could be unmasked by critique. Semblance is constitutive — there is no non-semblance position from which to judge discourse, no metalanguage, and no 'real' social relation whose distortion semblance would correct. The analyst's task is not demystification but a rigorous occupation of the place of semblance with the objet a.
Frankfurt School: The Frankfurt School (Adorno, Horkheimer, Habermas) treats ideological appearance as a distortion of underlying social reality or communicative potential that critical reason can expose and, in principle, correct. Ideology critique relies on a contrast between appearance and a more adequate or emancipated reality — the semblance of freedom in commodity exchange vs. the reality of exploitation, for instance.
Fault line: Where Frankfurt School critique assumes a gap between appearance and a recoverable truth or undistorted communication, Lacanian semblance denies any outside: truth itself has the structure of fiction, and the 'half-saying' of truth is the most that discourse can achieve. Demystification, for Lacan, merely produces another semblance.
vs Humanistic Self Actualization
Lacanian: For Lacan, semblance is not something the subject can shed through growth, authenticity, or self-knowledge. The division between jouissance and semblance is irremediable — the speaking being is constitutively split, and there is no authentic self beneath the mask of semblance. The analyst does not help the analysand become 'more real' but navigates the structure of semblance so that the subject can come to terms with the impossibility of full jouissance.
Humanistic Self Actualization: Humanistic psychology (Rogers, Maslow) posits a true or authentic self that is distorted or suppressed by social conditioning, defense mechanisms, and inauthenticity. Self-actualization involves progressively stripping away false personas and semblances to reach an underlying authentic core of experience and potential.
Fault line: Lacanian theory structurally forecloses the humanistic promise: there is no authentic core beneath semblance, because the subject is an effect of the signifier — it exists only in the place of semblance. The 'authentic self' would itself be another semblance, albeit one that disavows its own status.
All occurrences
Where it appears in the corpus (48)
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#01
Ethics of the Real: Kant and Lacan · Alenka Zupančič · p.79
From the Logic of Illusion to the Postulates > The 'stonny ocean' of illusion
Theoretical move: Zupančič argues that Kant's transcendental dialectic (the 'logic of illusion') structurally anticipates a Lacanian conception of truth and illusion: truth is not correspondence to an external object but conformity of knowledge with itself (a formal criterion), while dialectical illusion is not a false representation of a real object but an 'object in the place of the lack of an object' — a structure that aligns Kantian transcendental illusion with the Lacanian concept of le semblant.
Transcendental illusion has to do not with the content of an 'image' but with its very existence - it deceives on the level of being. In this respect, the Kantian concept of (transcendental) illusion is very close to the Lacanian concept of le semblant.
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#02
An Introductory Dictionary of Lacanian Psychoanalysis · Dylan Evans
<span id="9781134780112_Part25.xhtml_ncx_134"></span><span id="9781134780112_Part25.xhtml_page_0151"></span>***O*** > <span id="9781134780112_Part25.xhtml_ncx_136"></span>***objet (petit) a***
Theoretical move: This passage traces the full conceptual evolution of objet petit a across Lacan's work, showing how it migrates from a purely imaginary little other (schema L, 1955) through the object of desire/fantasy (1957) to the real cause of desire, surplus-jouissance, and finally semblance of being at the centre of the Borromean knot—demonstrating that the concept accumulates rather than replaces its earlier determinations.
the analyst must situate himself as the semblance of objet petit a, the cause of the analysand's desire … In 1973, Lacan links objet petit a to the concept of SEMBLANCE, asserting that a is a 'semblance of being'.
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#03
An Introductory Dictionary of Lacanian Psychoanalysis · Dylan Evans
<span id="9781134780112_Part29.xhtml_ncx_173"></span><span id="9781134780112_Part29.xhtml_page_0195"></span>***S*** > <span id="9781134780112_Part29.xhtml_ncx_179"></span>**semblance**
Theoretical move: The passage traces the theoretical evolution of Lacan's concept of *semblant* (semblance) from a classical appearance/essence opposition, through its connection to the imaginary/symbolic distinction, to its mature formulation in the early 1970s where truth is shown to be continuous with—rather than opposed to—appearance, and where objet petit a, love, and jouissance are all theorized in terms of semblance.
Lacan devotes his 1970–1 seminar to 'a discourse that would not be semblance', in which he argues that TRUTH is not simply the opposite of appearance, but is in fact continuous with it; truth and appearance are like the two sides of a moebius strip, which are in fact only one side.
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#04
An Introductory Dictionary of Lacanian Psychoanalysis · Dylan Evans
<span id="9781134780112_Part14.xhtml_ncx_43"></span><span id="9781134780112_Part14.xhtml_page_0056"></span>***D*** > <span id="9781134780112_Part14.xhtml_ncx_54"></span><span id="9781134780112_Part14.xhtml_page_0069"></span>**discourse**
Theoretical move: The passage systematically presents Lacan's theory of the Four Discourses as four possible social bonds founded in language, each defined by rotating four algebraic symbols (S1, S2, $, a) through four structural positions, with the discourse of the master as the generative base from which the others derive—and with the discourse of the analyst positioned as the structural inverse of mastery, making psychoanalysis inherently subversive.
In 1971, Lacan proposes that the position of the agent is also the position of the SEMBLANCE.
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#05
An Introductory Dictionary of Lacanian Psychoanalysis · Dylan Evans
<span id="9781134780112_Part30.xhtml_ncx_202"></span><span id="9781134780112_Part30.xhtml_page_0231"></span>***T*** > <span id="9781134780112_Part30.xhtml_ncx_211"></span>**truth**
Theoretical move: Lacan's concept of truth is irreducibly plural in its functions: it is always particular (not universal), tied to desire and speech rather than exactitude or science, and structurally intertwined with deception, fiction, and the Real—making it impossible to reduce to a single definition while remaining central to psychoanalytic ethics and treatment.
the analyst must take them into account (see SEMBLANCE).
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#06
An Introductory Dictionary of Lacanian Psychoanalysis · Dylan Evans
<span id="9781134780112_Part29.xhtml_ncx_173"></span><span id="9781134780112_Part29.xhtml_page_0195"></span>***S*** > <span id="9781134780112_Part29.xhtml_ncx_180"></span><span id="9781134780112_Part29.xhtml_page_0203"></span>**Seminar**
Theoretical move: This passage is a bibliographic and historical entry on Lacan's Seminar, tracing its institutional history, the oral-to-written transmission problem, and providing a complete chronological index of all twenty-seven annual seminars — functioning as reference material rather than advancing a theoretical argument.
XVIII | 1970-1 | On a discourse that would not be semblance.
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#07
Ghosts of My Life: Writings on Depression, Hauntology and Lost Futures · Mark Fisher
<span id="Chapter13.htm_page140"></span>Hauntological Blues: Little Axe
Theoretical move: Fisher develops a theory of sonic hauntology through Little Axe's music, arguing that the combination of blues and dub constitutes a political-aesthetic practice that confronts American slavery as unassimilable trauma by detaching sound from presence (acousmatic production), producing a "dyschronic contemporaneity" that refuses to let the dead be silenced.
as though it really were just a re-presentation of something that already existed in its own right
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#08
Ghosts of My Life: Writings on Depression, Hauntology and Lost Futures · Mark Fisher
<span id="Chapter3.htm_page62"></span>No Longer the Pleasures: Joy Division
Theoretical move: Fisher argues that Joy Division's depression is not a mood but an ontological-philosophical position that operates beyond the pleasure principle—a Schopenhauerian diagnosis of the Will's obscene undead insatiability—and that what makes it theoretically distinct from ordinary sadness or rock nihilism is the total absence of an object-cause, making it structurally homologous to Lacanian melancholia while functioning as a dangerously seductive half-truth about the human condition.
he sees himself as a serial consumer of empty simulations, a junky hooked on every kind of deadening high, a meat puppet of the passions
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#09
Ghosts of My Life: Writings on Depression, Hauntology and Lost Futures · Mark Fisher
<span id="Chapter2.htm_page42"></span>Ghosts Of My Life: Goldie, Japan, Tricky
Theoretical move: Fisher deploys hauntology as the master concept to read English art pop (Japan, Sylvian) and Tricky's music as sites where class anxiety, spectral identity, and the alien/android figure converge, arguing that identification with the alien/void — rather than authentic selfhood — is the politically charged gesture that links postpunk, art pop, and 1990s British music across racial and class lines.
The words are little labyrinths, enigmas with no possible solution – the appearance of enigmas, perhaps – false-fronted follies decorated with Chinese and Japanese motifs.
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#10
Seminar XVIII · On a Discourse That Might Not Be a Semblance · Jacques Lacan · p.32
**Seminar [l:\Vednesday](file://l:/Vednesday) 13 January 1971** > **Seminar 2: Wednesday 20 January 1971**
Theoretical move: Lacan argues that woman occupies the structural position of truth for man precisely because she holds knowledge of the disjunction between jouissance and semblance; this truth — usually domesticated under the label "castration complex" — is what the whole formation of masculine subjectivity is organised to evade, and Lacan links this structure to a broader critique of capitalist discourse via the discourse of the master.
the woman is precisely in this relation, this relationship, for man, the moment of truth... she is the one that the whole formation of man is designed to respond to, and now over and against everything, the whole status of her semblance
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#11
Seminar XVIII · On a Discourse That Might Not Be a Semblance · Jacques Lacan · p.17
**Seminar [l:\Vednesday](file://l:/Vednesday) 13 January 1971**
Theoretical move: Lacan reframes Freud's pleasure-principle economy as a "hyper-hedonism" in which jouissance is structurally produced by discourse rather than being a natural fact, and introduces surplus-jouissance as the impossible-real effect that the emerging discourse of the unconscious names but cannot simply realise.
That it existed up to then as a token, is indeed the reason why I put it at the source of the semblance.
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#12
Seminar XVIII · On a Discourse That Might Not Be a Semblance · Jacques Lacan · p.162
**Seminar 8: Wednesday 19 May 1971** > - We can't hear you!
Theoretical move: The passage argues that the hysteric's desire—structurally unsatisfied because it emphasises the invariance of the unknown—functions as a formal schema for the logic of the Not-all (pas-toute), such that 'a woman' can only emerge by sliding beyond the hysteric's phallic semblance; simultaneously, Lacan grounds the unconscious-structured-like-a-language thesis in the irreducible division between jouissance and semblance, and links truth to half-saying rather than full articulation.
the irremediable division between enjoyment and the semblance. The truth is to enjoy being a semblance
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#13
Seminar XVIII · On a Discourse That Might Not Be a Semblance · Jacques Lacan · p.29
**Seminar [l:\Vednesday](file://l:/Vednesday) 13 January 1971** > **Seminar 2: Wednesday 20 January 1971**
Theoretical move: Lacan argues that there is no sexual relationship because sexuality at the level of discourse is constituted as semblance, with surplus-jouissance (not biology) as its operative term; the phallus functions as the signifier of sexual enjoyment precisely insofar as it is identical with the Name of the Father, and the Oedipus myth is the discourse's necessary fiction for designating the real of an impossible enjoyment.
it is at this level of discourse alone, that it is carried towards, allow me, some effect that might not be a semblance... the only thing which differentiates it from it, is that this semblance is conveyed in a discourse
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#14
Seminar XVIII · On a Discourse That Might Not Be a Semblance · Jacques Lacan · p.7
**Seminar [l:\Vednesday](file://l:/Vednesday) 13 January 1971**
Theoretical move: Lacan opens Seminar XVIII by arguing that discourse is a structure irreducible to any speaking subject, that the subject is necessarily alienated and split within it, and that the question of "a discourse that might not be a semblance" can only be posed from within the artefact of discourse itself — there being no metalanguage, no Other of the Other, and no true of the true from which to judge it.
On a discourse which might not be a semblance... A semblance of discourse, for example. You know that this is the position described as logical positivism.
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#15
Seminar XVIII · On a Discourse That Might Not Be a Semblance · Jacques Lacan · p.21
**Seminar [l:\Vednesday](file://l:/Vednesday) 13 January 1971** > **Seminar 2: Wednesday 20 January 1971**
Theoretical move: Lacan designates the unnamed "top-left" place in the Four Discourses as the place of the *semblance*, establishing that the semblance is not the contrary of truth but its strictly correlative dimension (*demansion*), and that scientific discourse reaches the real only through the algebraic articulation of semblance—where the real appears as the impossible hole in that semblance.
this place still not designated, I am designating by its name, by the name that it deserves, it is very precisely the place of the semblance... semblance is not only locatable, essential, to designate the primary function of truth, it is impossible without this reference to qualify what is involved in discourse
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#16
Seminar XVIII · On a Discourse That Might Not Be a Semblance · Jacques Lacan · p.155
**Seminar 8: Wednesday 19 May 1971** > - We can't hear you!
Theoretical move: Language has only one Bedeutung — the phallus — because it is constituted from the impossibility of symbolising the sexual relationship; writing provides the "bone" that jouissance lacks, and the semblance that structures discourse is irreducibly phallic, meaning sexual enjoyment forever remains barred from the field of truth.
There is no discourse except a semblance... The semblance is only stated starting from the truth... As truth it can only say the semblance about enjoyment, and it wins over sexual enjoyment on every occasion.
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#17
Seminar XVIII · On a Discourse That Might Not Be a Semblance · Jacques Lacan · p.128
**Seminar 6: Wednesday 17 March 1971** > *Lituraterre*
Theoretical move: Lacan uses his experience of the Siberian landscape (streaming/furrowing) and Japanese calligraphy to establish that the letter/writing belongs to the Real as the 'furrowing of the signified,' while the signifier belongs to the Symbolic — thereby distinguishing the letter from the signifier and articulating the concept of 'lituraterre' (litoral/literal/literature) as the erasure that constitutes the subject.
The letter which erases, is distinguished by being a rupture then, of the semblance, which dissolves whatever pretended to be a form, a phenomenon, a meteor.
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#18
Seminar XVIII · On a Discourse That Might Not Be a Semblance · Jacques Lacan · p.10
**Seminar [l:\Vednesday](file://l:/Vednesday) 13 January 1971**
Theoretical move: Lacan argues that discourse is constitutively a semblance—not a semblance *of* something else, but semblance as its proper object—and that the Freudian hypothesis (repetition against the pleasure principle, introducing surplus-jouissance) is what points toward a discourse that might not be a semblance, linking the emergence of the signifier, the master signifier, and the subject to this economy of semblance.
everything that is discourse, can only present itself as semblance, and nothing is built on it that is not at the basis of this something that is called signifier, which... is identical to this status as such of the semblance.
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#19
Seminar XIX · …or Worse · Jacques Lacan · p.177
J Lacan - Pierce as astronomer > Seminar 12: Wednesday 21 Jane 1972
Theoretical move: Lacan argues that discourse is always discourse of semblance, and that the Four Discourses—grounded in the tetrad of semblance, truth, enjoyment, and surplus-jouissance—are held together not by their content but by the formal necessity of the number four and its vectors; the analytic discourse is distinguished by placing the objet petit a in the position of semblance, thereby intervening in the gap between body and discourse.
discourse as such, is always the discourse of a semblance. And that if there is something somewhere which authorises me some enjoyment, precisely, it is to pretend (faire semblant).
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#20
Seminar XIX · …or Worse · Jacques Lacan · p.137
Seminar 9: Wednesday 10 May 1972
Theoretical move: Lacan grounds the sexual non-relation and the logic of sexuation in the mathematical real, arguing that the One (Y a d'l'un) does not found a binary complementarity between man and woman because the not-all prevents any consistent application of the principle of contradiction to gender; simultaneously, he insists that the analyst must hold the position of the little o-object as semblance, and that the mathematical real—which resists both truth and meaning—is the proper anchor for analytic discourse.
it is a matter of ensuring that the one who plays the function of small o in it holds a position...of a semblance
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#21
Seminar XIX · …or Worse · Jacques Lacan · p.126
Seminar 9: Wednesday 10 May 1972
Theoretical move: Lacan distinguishes the unary trait (support of imaginary identification via the mirror stage) from the *Yad'lun* (there-is-One), while arguing that the Not-all grounds both the crowd and the question of Woman; he then re-situates the Subject Supposed to Know as a pleonasm pointing to the analyst's legitimate occupation of the position of semblance with respect to jouissance.
the analyst does not pretend, he occupies, he occupies with what? This is what I am leaving to come back to, he occupies *the position* of a semblance.
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#22
Seminar XIX · …or Worse · Jacques Lacan · p.181
J Lacan - Pierce as astronomer > Seminar 12: Wednesday 21 Jane 1972
Theoretical move: Lacan substitutes Peirce's schema with his own articulation of analytic discourse, identifying the *objet petit a* as the sole representamen in analysis — the analyst embodies this object as semblance/waste-product so that the analysand can be born to interpreting speech; the passage closes by reframing the analytic relation as fraternal brotherhood rooted in shared subjection to discourse, while warning that bodily fraternity without symbolic mediation gives rise to racism.
The little o- analyst makes himself the representamen precisely, at the place of the semblance.
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#23
Seminar XIX bis · The Knowledge of the Psychoanalyst · Jacques Lacan · p.47
The Psychoanalyst's Knowledge
Theoretical move: Lacan uses topology (the non-orientable surface) to argue that castration is structurally ubiquitous—present at every point of the relational surface between man and woman—and then anchors this topological claim to the Four Discourses, showing that the mathemes ($, S1, S2, a) constitute the logical "walls" behind which enjoyment, surplus-enjoyment, truth, and semblance must be situated.
truth and semblance, enjoyment, surplus enjoyment
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#24
Seminar XIX bis · The Knowledge of the Psychoanalyst · Jacques Lacan · p.58
The Psychoanalyst's Knowledge
Theoretical move: The passage argues that the phallus is the singular meaning (Bedeutung) through which language signifies, that this phallic function structurally prevents any harmonious sexual relation, and that the objet petit a — as metonymical cause of desire — is what determines the speaking being as a divided subject within discourse, with the semblance-pole (analyst's position) and enjoyment-pole standing as the two irreducible terms of the quadripode.
It is this pole that I designate as a semblance... the man and the woman make a pretence (font semblant) each one in this role.
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#25
Seminar XIX bis · The Knowledge of the Psychoanalyst · Jacques Lacan · p.21
The Psychoanalyst's Knowledge
Theoretical move: Lacan argues that mathematical incomprehension is not a flight from truth but an over-sensitivity to it, and uses this to pivot toward the claim that there is no sexual relationship for speaking beings — because sexual enjoyment (jouissance) can only be approached through lalangue and castration, never directly articulated, requiring the mathème as its proper formalization.
It is truth or it is a semblance, a distinction that has nothing to do with the opposition between the true and the false. Because if it is a semblance, it is a semblance of truth precisely.
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#26
Seminar XIX bis · The Knowledge of the Psychoanalyst · Jacques Lacan · p.13
The Psychoanalyst's Knowledge
Theoretical move: The passage advances the thesis that there is no sexual relationship in the speaking being—not as mere wordplay, but as a structural impossibility grounded in the constitutive failure of jouissance and the irreducibility of lack at the centre of sexuality—while positioning the psychoanalyst's knowledge as the knowledge of impotence, distinct from both scientific and religious discourses.
a discourse that might not be a semblance, in one case as in the other none exists, neither a discourse nor such an act
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#27
Seminar XX · Encore: On Feminine Sexuality, the Limits of Love and Knowledge · Jacques Lacan · p.88
**VII** > A love letter *(une lettre d'amour)*
Theoretical move: Lacan articulates the formulas of sexuation by showing how masculine and feminine sides of speaking beings relate differently to phallic jouissance, fantasy, and the barred Other — culminating in the claim that the dissociation of *a* (imaginary) from S(Ⱥ) (symbolic) is the task of psychoanalysis, distinguishing it from psychology, and that woman's radical Other jouissance places her in closer proximity to God than any ancient speculation on the Good could reach.
What analytic discourse brings out is precisely the idea that that meaning is based on semblance (ce sens est du semblant).
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#28
Seminar XX · Encore: On Feminine Sexuality, the Limits of Love and Knowledge · Jacques Lacan · p.181
**Seminar 9: Wednesday 20 March 1973**
Theoretical move: Lacan argues that the analyst's discourse is uniquely positioned to examine the truth of knowledge by placing the objet petit a in the place of semblance; he then develops a theory of knowledge as grounded in the Other (as locus of the signifier), where knowledge must be 'paid for' through use/enjoyment rather than exchange, and where the Letter reproduces without reproducing the same being—culminating in the claim that the Other's structural not-knowing constitutes the not-all, linking feminine sexuality, unconscious, and castration.
it is indeed the analyst who, by putting the small o object in the place of the semblance, is in the most appropriate position for doing what it is right to do
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#29
Seminar XXIV · L'insu que sait de l'une-bévue s'aile à mourre · Jacques Lacan · p.91
**Seminar 8: Wednesday 8 March 1977**
Theoretical move: Lacan argues that the Real cannot constitute a universe on its own but only through its knotting with the Imaginary and Symbolic via the Borromean structure, and that the torus — not the simple ring — is the proper topological unit for this knotting; he further exploits the distinction between metaphor and structure to insist that topology here is structural (not merely analogical), while his anecdote about his grandson reframes the Unconscious as the intrusion of words one does not understand — language as parasitic.
It is a semblance of metalanguage and since I make use in the text, I make use of this way of writing, s'embler, s'emblant to metalanguage.
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#30
Seminar XXIV · L'insu que sait de l'une-bévue s'aile à mourre · Jacques Lacan · p.100
**Seminar 8: Wednesday 8 March 1977**
Theoretical move: The passage pivots on the relation between the Real, the universal, and sense: Lacan argues that the Real is defined by the exclusion of all sense and by impossibility (what does not cease not to be written), yet psychoanalysis as a practice depends on words having import — a tension he navigates by revisiting the Four Discourses, specifically the Discourse of the Analyst, to show how the barred subject holds the place of Truth through Knowledge, while the gap between S1 and S2 marks an irreducible incompletion.
I remind you that the place of semblance where I put the object…that the place of semblance is not where I articulated that of the Truth.
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#31
Seminar XXIV · L'insu que sait de l'une-bévue s'aile à mourre · Jacques Lacan · p.121
**Seminar 9: Wednesday 15 March 1977** > **Seminar 11: Wednesday 10 May 1977**
Theoretical move: Lacan triangulates the Real, the Sinthome, and the Unconscious through a meditation on undecidability, negation, and the sign: the Real is defined by what does not cease not to be written (impossibility), the Unconscious is recast as 'bévue' (the structural stumbling of language), and the sinthome is identified with the mental as such — the upshot being that psychoanalysis produces only a 'semblance' of truth, not truth itself, because S1 never fully represents the subject for S2.
psychoanalysis, is, is what seems true (fait vrai), but how must one understand this seems true? It is an effort at sense, but it is a sensblance (sens blant).
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#32
The Parallax View · Slavoj Žižek · p.165
The Birth of (Hegelian) Concrete Universality out of the Spirit of (Kantian) Antinomies > Pick Up Your Cave!
Theoretical move: By reading Plato's cave allegory through Hegel, Lévi-Strauss, Lacan, and cognitive neuroscience, Žižek argues that the 'true Real' is not substantial reality behind appearances but rather the irreducible gap between modes of appearance itself—a parallax gap that culminates in the absolute split between the lived experience of selfhood and the 'nothing' of the open skull.
what happens in this shift, rather, is that the very irreducibility of the appearance to its substantial support, its 'autonomy' with regard to it, engenders a Thing of its own, the true 'real Thing.'
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#33
The Parallax View · Slavoj Žižek · p.31
The Birth of (Hegelian) Concrete Universality out of the Spirit of (Kantian) Antinomies
Theoretical move: The passage argues that the Hegelian "concrete universality" is not a neutral container of particulars but the irreducible tension and non-coincidence between levels—demonstrated through the logic of the frame (appearance appearing as such), the supernumerary exception that *is* the universal, and the "temporal parallax" by which the same principle cannot actualize simultaneously across domains, requiring retroactive reading (après-coup) to become legible.
a thing is its own best mask... reality itself turns into its own appearance.
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#34
The Parallax View · Slavoj Žižek · p.150
The Birth of (Hegelian) Concrete Universality out of the Spirit of (Kantian) Antinomies > Burned by the Sun
Theoretical move: The passage argues that the Freudian subject of the unconscious has the structure of a Kierkegaardian apostle—a pure formal function of impersonal Truth rather than an expression of ego or id—and that the "Thing from Inner Space" (which modern art strains toward beyond the pleasure principle) is not the Kantian Thing-in-itself but rather the site of the direct inscription of subjectivity into reality, emerging through fantasy-staging of what is "actually" a rational phenomenon.
Within the horizon of traditional metaphysics, art is about (beautiful) appearances with elusive and confused meanings, while science is about the reality beneath appearances.
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#35
The Parallax View · Slavoj Žižek · p.249
Copernicus, Darwin, Freud . . . and Many Others > The Language of Seduction, the Seduction of Language
Theoretical move: Drawing on Geoffrey Miller's evolutionary account of fitness indicators and Steven Pinker's "short circuit" of pleasure, Žižek argues that the human animal's symbolic explosion does not merely sexualize non-sexual activities but sexualizes sexuality itself—sexual activity becomes genuinely sexual only when it is caught in the self-referential circuit of drive, the repetitive failure to reach the impossible Thing; the utility-function of any human capacity is always secondary to its "wasteful" display function.
if a girl gets a big diamond ring from her lover, this is not just a signal of his wealth but, simultaneously, a proof of it
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#36
The Parallax View · Slavoj Žižek · p.349
The Academic Rumspringa, or, the Parallax of Power and Resistance > The Ignorance of the Chicken
Theoretical move: The passage argues that the opposition between liberal cynicism and fundamentalism is a false one masking a deeper shared pathology—both substitute direct knowledge for authentic belief—while the structural logic of the symbolic order (fetishistic disavowal, the big Other, les non-dupes errent) requires a "third term" to reveal the true antagonism beneath ideological surface oppositions, and that "the truth has the structure of a fiction" applies to political, aesthetic, and theological domains alike.
the masks of the official ideological struggle fall off, the official opponents discover their 'deeper solidarity' and start to share their concerns
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#37
The Parallax View · Slavoj Žižek · p.312
Copernicus, Darwin, Freud . . . and Many Others > Jouissance as a Political Category
Theoretical move: The passage argues that contemporary politics is fundamentally a biopolitical regulation of jouissance rather than emancipatory politics proper, tracing this through liberal ideology's fantasmatic disgust, the symmetry between fundamentalism and liberal hedonism, and the paradox of the superego imperative to enjoy—where permitted jouissance becomes obligatory jouissance—culminating in a reading of The Matrix as staging the co-dependence of the big Other (Symbolic) and the Real.
liberal hedonism elevates into its Cause the extra-symbolic Real of jouissance (which compels it to adopt a cynical attitude of reducing language, the symbolic medium, to a mere secondary irrelevant semblant, instrument of manipulation or seduction)
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#38
The Parallax View · Slavoj Žižek · p.133
The Birth of (Hegelian) Concrete Universality out of the Spirit of (Kantian) Antinomies > interlude 1
Theoretical move: The passage deploys the "parallax view" as a structural principle—no common denominator can resolve the split between incommensurable perspectives (First World/Third World, Milly/Densher/Kate)—and uses this to argue that genuine ethical acts consist not in symbolic reconciliation or hysterical clinging to fantasy, but in a traversal of fantasy that breaks the deadlock from within, as exemplified by Kate's refusal in James and Paul's self-sacrifice in Iñárritu.
we should introduce sexual difference here: far from indicating some kind of 'feminine' indecision and passivity... the negative feminine gesture would be the only way to break out of this deadlock
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#39
The Parallax View · Slavoj Žižek · p.145
The Birth of (Hegelian) Concrete Universality out of the Spirit of (Kantian) Antinomies > interlude 1
Theoretical move: By reading Henry James's *The Golden Bowl* and *The Wings of the Dove* through a Lacanian lens, Žižek argues that the network of protective lies ultimately serves to maintain the big Other's ignorance—keeping up social appearances—and that this "ethics of the unspoken" constitutes a false ethics, while "female masochism" is unmasked as a male fantasy rather than an attribute of feminine nature.
what matters is that others do not know that he or she knows—if his or her knowledge is not known, it allows him or her to pretend not to know, and thus to keep up appearances.
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#40
The Parallax View · Slavoj Žižek · p.119
The Birth of (Hegelian) Concrete Universality out of the Spirit of (Kantian) Antinomies > Odradek as a Political Category
Theoretical move: Odradek (Kafka's figure) is read as the lamella—jouissance embodied as immortal, purposeless, inhuman-human excess outside symbolic/paternal order—and this logic is extended to bureaucracy as the secular form of the divine Thing, and to the Alien series as a figuration of pure drive that capitalism exploits and sacralizes.
The appearance of a nervous hyperactivity is, of course, a staged performance which masks a self-indulgent nonsensical spectacle of imitating, of playing 'efficient administration.'
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#41
The Parallax View · Slavoj Žižek · p.116
The Birth of (Hegelian) Concrete Universality out of the Spirit of (Kantian) Antinomies > Odradek as a Political Category
Theoretical move: The passage argues that both Levinas and Adorno fail to account for the truly "inhuman" dimension of subjectivity—exemplified by the Muselmann—which cannot be subsumed under any ethical or normative frame; Žižek uses Agamben's Muselmann, the L Schema, and Kafka's Odradek to articulate a "neighbor" as monstrous, impenetrable Thing that exceeds Levinasian face-ethics and demands a radically different conceptualization of the human/inhuman boundary.
the neighbor's face stands neither for my imaginary double/semblant nor for the purely symbolic abstract 'partner in communication'
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#42
The Parallax View · Slavoj Žižek · p.179
Copernicus, Darwin, Freud . . . and Many Others > Resistances to Disenchantment
Theoretical move: Žižek argues that neither the transcendental-philosophical defense of subjectivity nor the accommodationist strategy of finding neuronal correlates for psychoanalytic concepts constitutes an adequate response to the challenge of brain sciences; instead, psychoanalysis must locate itself within the brain sciences' own inherent silences and impossibilities, identifying the "absent Cause" of cognitivist accounts as the Freudian death drive / German Idealist self-relating negativity. Along the way, he maps four positions on consciousness through a Greimasian square and proposes a Badiouian framing of consciousness-emergence as Event.
the only proper reply to this challenge is to meet the brain sciences' neuronal Real with another Real, not simply to ground the Freudian semblant within the neuronal Real.
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#43
The Parallax View · Slavoj Žižek · p.143
The Birth of (Hegelian) Concrete Universality out of the Spirit of (Kantian) Antinomies > interlude 1
Theoretical move: The passage reads two Henry James novels—*The Wings of the Dove* and *The Golden Bowl*—as ethical and libidinal allegories: in *Wings*, Densher's "moral masochism" (fake love for Milly's memory) constitutes the real betrayal, while in *Golden Bowl*, the cracked bowl functions as the signifier of the barred Other that structures intersubjective relations, and the incest motif encodes the link between capitalist brutality and familial protection/violation.
appearances are saved, although there is an emotional desert all around
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#44
The Parallax View · Slavoj Žižek · p.281
Copernicus, Darwin, Freud . . . and Many Others > Gelassenheit? No, Thanks!
Theoretical move: Žižek argues that Heidegger's apparent opposition between "decisionist" active will and passive Gelassenheit is a symptomal torsion-point revealing their deep complicity, and extends this diagnosis to Nietzsche's ethico-political antinomy (militarism vs. peace), resolving both by showing that the Real is not an inaccessible Thing but the gap/antagonism that makes perspectives incommensurable—a solution structurally opposed to the "Oriental" Gelassenheit, which is ultimately indifference, in contrast to the violent, subject-splitting love proper to Christian/revolutionary engagement.
So, in Alain Badiou's terms, the passion for the Real versus the passion of semblance.
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#45
The Parallax View · Slavoj Žižek · p.176
Copernicus, Darwin, Freud . . . and Many Others > Toward a New Science of Appearances
Theoretical move: Žižek argues that the Lacanian, Freudian, and Marxian "demystifications" share a common structure: they reveal not a hidden reality behind appearances but a split *within* appearance itself—between "the way things really appear to us" and "the way they appear to appear to us"—and that this ontological structure (paralleled in quantum physics) is more radical than any naturalist or perspectivist account of subjectivity.
This shift from the split between appearance and reality to the split, inherent to appearance itself, between 'true' and 'false' appearance is to be linked to its obverse: to a split inherent to reality itself.
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#46
The Parallax View · Slavoj Žižek · p.261
Copernicus, Darwin, Freud . . . and Many Others > interlude 2
Theoretical move: Žižek argues that the anti-Semitic figure of the Jew mystifies constitutive social antagonism by displacing it onto an external limit, and that Milner's "Jewish exception" logic inadvertently reproduces this displacement; the properly Lacanian response is a "not-all" Europe in which everyone becomes an exception (objet petit a), dissolving the need for a constitutive Other — and he extends this critique to Jacques-Alain Miller's therapeutic-political proposal, which he reads as a socially conservative "compassionate cushion" that profits from the disarray of identifications rather than challenging the anonymous systems that produce it.
the psychiatrist as providing the 'compassionate cushion,' that is, as (re)constituting the social bond—or, rather, the semblance of such a bond
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#47
The Parallax View · Slavoj Žižek · p.58
The Birth of (Hegelian) Concrete Universality out of the Spirit of (Kantian) Antinomies > The Parallax of the Critique of Political Economy
Theoretical move: The passage argues that the Marxian "parallax" consists in the irreducible, non-synthesisable gap between the logic of economy (commodity-form as socio-transcendental a priori) and the logic of politics (antagonism), such that the bracketing which produces each domain is not merely epistemological but inscribed in "real abstraction" — and that post-Marxist "pure politics" (Badiou, Rancière, etc.) mistakes by reducing economy to an ontic sphere while Karatani's Kantianism fails to go beyond a transcendental X that leaves the fetishism of Power intact.
politics is reduced to a theater of appearances, to a passing phenomenon which will disappear with the arrival of the developed Communist (or technocratic) society
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#48
What Is Sex? · Alenka Zupančič · p.90
Object-Disoriented Ontology > <span id="page-81-0"></span>Realism in Psychoanalysis
Theoretical move: Zupančič develops a Lacanian "realism of consequences" against both naïve realism and Meillassoux's correlationism, arguing that the Real is constituted not by matter or mathematical continuity but by the cut that discourse makes in nature—a cut whose reality is indexed by the impossible, i.e., the limit of consistency that discourse encounters. True materialism is grounded in contradiction and split, not in the primacy of matter.
The articulation, and I mean algebraic articulation, of the semblance—which, as such, only involves letters—and its effects, this is the only apparatus by means of which we designate what is real.