Ontological Affect
On this page 1 section ›
This concept page does not yet have synthesis content. The extractor flagged it as a load-bearing concept; a future synthesis pass will populate it. The All Occurrences section below shows every place it appears in the corpus.
All occurrences
Where it appears in the corpus (1)
-
#01
Self and Emotional Life: Philosophy, Psychoanalysis, and Neuroscience · Adrian Johnston & Catherine Malabou · p.62
4.
Theoretical move: The passage argues that Spinoza's theory of affects is fundamentally ontological rather than subjective — affects belong to Being/Nature itself, not to an autonomous human subject — and uses this to stage a comparative reading between Deleuze and Damasio that reveals two incompatible interpretations of what 'ontological' means in the context of affect theory.
affects are always affects of Being. This is exactly what Deleuze says when he declares: 'every affection [affect] is affection of essence.'