Neuro-Psychoanalysis
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Where it appears in the corpus (3)
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#01
Self and Emotional Life: Philosophy, Psychoanalysis, and Neuroscience · Adrian Johnston & Catherine Malabou · p.53
3. > The Neural Self
Theoretical move: The passage argues that contemporary neurobiology, by positing a plastic, distributed, and non-fixed neural substrate for subjectivity, structurally reopens Freud's abandoned 1895 "Project" and creates the conditions for a neuro-psychoanalytic rapprochement—one in which the self is neither a static essence nor a consciously self-present structure, but an open, affect-modifiable formation whose damage is simultaneously damage to subjectivity itself.
Solms founded a small group that explored neuropsychoanalysis, or 'depth neuro-psychology.' This group became the International Neuropsychoanalysis Society.
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#02
Self and Emotional Life: Philosophy, Psychoanalysis, and Neuroscience · Adrian Johnston & Catherine Malabou · p.208
12. > F r o m P s y c h o a n a l y s i s to the Neurosciences
Theoretical move: Johnston argues that neither naturalism nor antinaturalism adequately captures the human subject's psychical constitution; against Žižek's (sometimes) absolute antinaturalism, he proposes a dialectic of incomplete, "uneven" denaturalization in which archaic evolutionary strata and sociosymbolic orders remain in irreducible, conflictual tension—a position he claims is borne out by convergences between Damasian neuroscience and Lacanian metapsychology.
A specific combination of neuroscience and psychoanalysis requires critically amending and qualifying Žižek's Lacanian emphasis on the breadth and depth of human beings' identifying denaturalization
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#03
Self and Emotional Life: Philosophy, Psychoanalysis, and Neuroscience · Adrian Johnston & Catherine Malabou · p.213
13. > Affects Are Si gnifier s
Theoretical move: Johnston argues that a Freudian-Lacanian affective neuroscience requires neither reductive biologism nor antinaturalist denial: the parlêtre is split between nature and antinature, and this very gap (between evolutionary corporeal emotion and linguistically-mediated feeling) functions as itself an affective factor constitutive of the barred subject—a position developed through critical engagement with Panksepp, LeDoux, and Damasio.
In light of my nascent version of neuro-psychoanalysis, LeDoux's work on the brain is appealing for several reasons.