Misfelt Affect
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#01
Self and Emotional Life: Philosophy, Psychoanalysis, and Neuroscience · Adrian Johnston & Catherine Malabou · p.133
10. > F r e u d 's M e ta p s y c h o l o g i e s of Affective Life
Theoretical move: Johnston argues that Freud's 1915 metapsychology of affect is internally contradictory: while Freud formally denies the existence of unconscious affects (reducing them to protoaffective ideational potentials), his own tripartite German terminology (Affekte/Gefühle/Empfindungen) and the logic of "true/false connections" between affect and Vorstellung open conceptual space for a coherent theory of unconscious or "misfelt" affects that Lacan's sweeping denial forecloses prematurely.
it now could be maintained that the feelings constitutive of guilt feel like guilt as such and per se when they enjoy a 'true connection' with their 'proper representative [eigentlichen Repräsentanz],' whereas these 'identical' feelings don't feel like guilt when decoupled from their (unconscious) ideational ur-origin