Lacanian Affect Theory
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#01
Self and Emotional Life: Philosophy, Psychoanalysis, and Neuroscience · Adrian Johnston & Catherine Malabou · p.149
11.
Theoretical move: Johnston argues that Lacan's sustained subordination of affect to the signifier/Vorstellungsrepräsentanz rests on a selective and partially erroneous reading of Freud's 1915 metapsychology, and proposes instead (following Green) that affect and ideational structure are primordially indistinct—their separation being a secondary abstraction produced by repression itself.
Harari maintains that the true 'Lacanian conception' of affects is that which 'postulates affect as one effect of the signifier.' Soler likewise bluntly states, 'affect is effect.'