Cartesian Mind-Body Problem
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#01
Self and Emotional Life: Philosophy, Psychoanalysis, and Neuroscience · Adrian Johnston & Catherine Malabou · p.47
1. > A "Self-Touchin g You " > A Nonspatial Space
Theoretical move: The passage traces Derrida's shift from logocentrism to "haptocentrism," using Descartes's pineal gland as the paradigmatic site of autoaffection—a nonspatial, ideal locus of the soul's self-touching—and argues that this structure of self-differentiation (activity/passivity) is the precursor of Kantian apperception, raising the question of whether autoaffection can be interrupted or breached.
Does not the idea of a punctual spatialization of the mind, which corresponds to the site of the union, amount to a pure and simple absence of spatiality (of the mind as well as of the union itself)?