Cartesian Disembodiment
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#01
Self and Emotional Life: Philosophy, Psychoanalysis, and Neuroscience · Adrian Johnston & Catherine Malabou · p.55
3. > *Brain Events Are Not Enough*
Theoretical move: By invoking Damasio's critique of neuroscientific Cartesianism, the passage argues that reducing subjectivity to brain events alone reproduces a disembodying dualism; a non-reductive neurobiology must treat the brain as an open, fragile structure embedded in organism and environment, which is the condition of possibility for theorising the psychosomatic dimension of affects.
There may be some Cartesian disembodiment also behind the thinking of neuroscientists who insist that the mind can be fully explained solely in terms of brain events