Auto-Heteroaffection
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#01
Self and Emotional Life: Philosophy, Psychoanalysis, and Neuroscience · Adrian Johnston & Catherine Malabou · p.81
5. > Damasio as a Reader of Spinoza
Theoretical move: By reading Damasio's neuroscientific interpretation of Spinoza, the passage argues that the conatus—as biological self-preservation enacted through emotions, feelings, and neural mapping—constitutes a form of auto-heteroaffection in which subjectivity is grounded in impersonal, nonconscious processes, thereby challenging any first-person account of selfhood and opening toward a third-person perspective on neural subjectivity.
there is a process of heteroaffection in autoaffection because the feeling of oneself speaks and refers to itself in the third person