Absence of Emotions
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#01
Self and Emotional Life: Philosophy, Psychoanalysis, and Neuroscience · Adrian Johnston & Catherine Malabou · p.33
Part I. > Introduction > Affects and Autoaffection: Definitions
Theoretical move: The passage establishes a conceptual genealogy of *affect* (Spinoza/Deleuze) and *autoaffection* (Kant/Heidegger) in order to pose the question of whether affects can exist without a pre-given subject, staging a confrontation between philosophical autoaffection and neurobiological heteroaffection/non-affection as rival models of subjectivity and emotion.
I would like to advance here that the notion of an absence of emotions, which does not come from a kind of disavowal or any type of psychic strategies, marks the novelty of the current neurobiological point of view on affects.